


# GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment

Enhancing Peace through Community-level  
Development Programming



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# GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment


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Enhancing Peace through  
Community-level Development Programming

**March 2006**

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Main photo : Generation Peace - an old man and his two grandsons, Aceh Timur  
Collage : Looking Forward - the beauty of Aceh, Aceh Jaya  
GAM and TNI Side by Side, Aceh Jaya  
Shoes Off Before Coming Home, Aceh Besar



## **GUBERNUR PROVINSI NANGGROE ACEH DARUSSALAM**

Jln. T. Nyak Arief No. 219 Telp. 51377  
BANDA ACEH - 23114

In August 2005, the Government of Indonesia (Gol) and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) entered into a historic Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), aimed at bringing longterm peace and stability to the people of Aceh.


Since the signing of the agreement, both Gol and GAM have shown their strong commitment to the peace process. The decommissioning of GAM weapons and the redeployment of Gol troops are visible signs of these commitments. The people of Aceh have responded warmly to the peace.

These are, however, only initial steps and challenges still remain. The Gol is committed to rebuilding Aceh. In accordance with the MoU, funds have been allocated to rehabilitate public and private property destroyed or damaged by the conflict, to facilitate the reintegration into society of former combatants and to provide compensation for political prisoners, GAM and conflict-affected civilians. We have established the Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (Aceh Reintegration Agency) to implement these programs and coordinate conflict-related assistance.

In order to support the reintegration process, soon after the signing of the MoU we requested support from the World Bank and Decentralization Support Facility to undertake this GAM Reintegration Needs Assessments. This report provides detailed information on the current reintegration dynamics and the needs of former combatants, political prisoners and receiving communities. The recommendations outline an approach that addresses the needs of both former combatants and other conflict-affected groups.

Our challenge now is to ensure that the findings in this assessment lead to practical programs to support the peace process throughout Aceh. The Government is committed to this process and welcomes the support of the international community. The people of Aceh have suffered through a long conflict, followed by the disaster of the tsunami. An opportunity now exists for all parties to work together to bring hope and development to the people of Aceh.

March 2006

  
Dr. Mustafa Abubakar  
Governor  
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.



**FREE ACHEH MOVEMENT  
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to  
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March 2006

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) is a landmark agreement that we believe will usher in peace and prosperity for the people of Aceh.

Since August 2005, we have seen tremendous changes across Aceh and both parties to the agreement have made positive steps in implementing the articles and principles of the MoU. On the December 21st we completed the decommissioning of our weapons. On December 31st a ceremony was held to mark the final stage of troop redeployment.

However, challenges remain for 2006, in particular the reintegration of former combatants and prisoners into normal life. The MoU promises that the "GoI and the authorities of Aceh will take measures to assist persons who have participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into civil society. These measures include economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians." Yet at present, little support has reached these people.

To assist the development of reintegration programs and policies, the World Bank and Decentralization Support Facilities have produced this comprehensive report on current and long-term reintegration needs and dynamics. It is much needed, but it is really only the first step.

We urge the Government of Indonesia, the authorities of Aceh, civil society groups as well as the international community to act upon these findings and work together to address the needs identified.

In particular, I wish to draw your attention to the report's findings on the need for livelihood assistance. Many of those involved with GAM have returned with little more than the clothes on their back. They sacrificed their livelihoods, and many their lives, for a better Aceh. With better support, not only can they look after themselves, but they can also help to rebuild Aceh.

**Irwandi Yusuf**  
Senior Representative

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## Executive Summary

In August 2005, eight months after the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami hit Aceh's shores, a peace agreement was signed between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) committed both parties to building mutual confidence and trust and set out a range of agreed principles to guide the war-to-peace transition.

Seven months on, progress has been made towards implementing many of the articles in the agreement. GAM has surrendered 840 weapons, 31,681 troops and police have left the province, and GAM has formally demobilized. The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) has successfully overseen decommissioning, relocation and demobilization and has investigated the limited number of alleged violations of the agreement. A draft Law on the Governing of Aceh is being debated in Aceh and Jakarta.

Section 3 of the MoU outlines measures for aiding the reintegration of former GAM combatants and political prisoners into Acehnese villages and society, including "economic facilitation", the "rehabilitation of public and private property destroyed or damaged in the conflict", and the "allocation of farming land, employment or social security" for former combatants, prisoners and affected civilians. The need for GAM to be 'reintegrate' can be questioned? There are few cleavages between combatants and the general population. Yet international experience shows that the transition from a military to civilian life can be challenging and that many groups, including women, can be marginalized in the process. Individuals need to find new occupations and learn new skills. Returnees may need housing, land and access to health care. Communities also need to feel they are benefiting.

To help address these issues, the GoI requested that the World Bank conduct a *GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment*. There are three main aims: (1) to assess the process of reintegration so far, focusing on potential obstacles to peace; (2) to assess the needs and aspirations of former combatants, prisoners and receiving communities; and (3) to help in the development of programs and mechanisms to address these needs. The assessment was developed in close partnership with GAM.

The assessment was conducted from October 2005 to March 2006. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were utilized. Three teams undertook qualitative fieldwork in ten districts from November to January. Interviews were conducted with former combatants, political prisoners and receiving communities in a total of 38 villages in 22 sub-districts. Research locations were chosen to maximize variation in the factors that might impact on reintegration. Quantitative data comes from two sources. First, the report utilizes the results of a census survey of 1782 released political prisoners undertaken by the International Organization of Migration (IOM) between August 2005 and February 2006. Second, the World Bank, in partnership with AMM, conducted a survey of 642 active GAM<sup>1</sup> carefully sampled to be representative of the GAM population across all of Aceh, in February 2006.

The report consists of six parts. After an introduction, Section 2 provides detailed information on the *socio-economic characteristics of GAM returnees*: released political prisoners, former

<sup>1</sup> Active GAM refers to those who were actively involved in GAM at the time of the MoU. This covers GAM former combatants as well as those involved in GAM's civilian, police and training structures, but not political prisoners.

combatants and other active GAM. Section 3 examines the *progress of the peace and reintegration processes*, including current reintegration and reconciliation dynamics, sources of tension, the benefits that have flowed, and understandings of the peace agreement at the village level. Section 4 considers the different socio-economic *needs and aspirations of GAM returnees*. Section 5 identifies the *needs of receiving communities*. Section 6 concludes with a *summary of findings and gives recommendations* on types of programs, and design principles, that can help support reintegration.

## **Socio-Economic Characteristics**

### ***Distribution of Returnees***

Both GAM members and communities define GAM widely to include others beyond those who were former combatants. Active members who performed logistical, policing and trainee duties, as well as many of the released political prisoners, are also included within common definitions of GAM. GAM returnees are distributed across Aceh, with significant variation at the district, sub-district and village levels. There is considerable overlap between the areas where GAM returnees are and areas that are tsunami-affected. 23% of surveyed active GAM claimed to have had their family house damaged or destroyed by the tsunami. Distinguishing between conflict and tsunami areas therefore has limited utility.

### ***Age, Gender and Marital Status of Returnees***

Over 75% of active GAM are aged between 18 and 35 years old. Older GAM members are comparatively more likely to be involved in GAM's civil structure. None of the GAM members surveyed were under the age of 18, although seven political prisoners were between 16 and 18 years old. Under 4% of GAM returnees are women. Women returnees are younger than the rest of the GAM population surveyed and slightly more likely to be married. Approximately half of active GAM are married and those who are, have on average 2.5 children.

### ***Education Levels of Returnees***

Despite differing community perceptions, the education levels of active GAM are broadly similar to those of receiving communities. GAM members are more likely to have finished some level of schooling than the general population, but less likely to have completed senior high school or above. In contrast, released political prisoners have lower levels of schooling than former combatants and the rest of the population in villages.

### ***Livelihoods of Returnees and Urban/Rural Distribution***

Six months after the signing of the MoU, almost 75% of GAM have yet to return to work. While the reasons for this are varied, the implications for reintegration are serious. Prior to joining GAM, almost 95% had some form of employment, with the majority being either farmers or small traders. Of those who have returned to work, the greatest number have gone back to farming, followed by those who have begun trading or casual work. Those who own land have found it easier to return to work. The vast majority of active GAM are from rural villages and have returned to these villages. Less than 2% have migrated from rural to urban areas.

## **The Peace Process and Reintegration Dynamics**

### ***Progress of Peace***

Overall, the peace process is proceeding very well. Both GAM returnees and receiving communities express a high degree of confidence in the peace lasting; 84.8% of active GAM

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interviewed indicated that they were either "very confident" or "confident". Receiving communities have already felt the positive effects of decommissioning and the withdrawal of non-organic troops. They have received a sizeable peace dividend in the form of increased freedom of movement and a decrease in conflict-related fear. There has been a significant decrease in the number of GAM-Gol conflict incidents since the signing of the MoU, and both GAM and Gol, with facilitation by AMM, have shown flexibility and initiative in resolving incidents that have occurred.

### ***Reintegration, Reconciliation and Sources of Tension***

In almost all cases, there has been a high level of acceptance of GAM returnees. Almost 90% of GAM members returned to their villages without encountering problems. This is primarily because they have returned to their home villages and are therefore familiar faces in the community, and because they managed to return home for short periods during the conflict. Some community members have less positive feelings towards their return, but they have generally been willing to put these feelings aside for the sake of peace. The return of GAM has not resulted in a spate of revenge seeking. Fieldwork identified isolated cases of open tensions between returnees and anti-separatist fronts in Aceh Besar and Aceh Utara. Latent tensions remain in central Aceh, as the region has been subject to GAM-militia hostilities in the past. There have been few tensions between returnees and the military, police or local government.

Despite these positives there remain longer-term reintegration challenges. Perhaps the most significant relates to the ability of GAM returnees to fit into existing civilian leadership structures and to acknowledge the authority of local communities and leaders. This relates to both the attitudes of some GAM members and to the fact that GAM members still predominantly respond to directions from their commanders. In some villages visited, GAM returnees are beginning to openly compete for local community leadership positions.

### ***Benefits and Support for GAM Returnees***

In order to smooth the reinsertion of GAM returnees into village life, the Government envisioned a reinsertion package for political prisoners and former combatants. The prisoner package of Rp. 5 million in cash and kind has been implemented smoothly and without serious issues. Former prisoners have primarily used the money for paying off debt and meeting everyday needs.

The planned package for former combatants has not eventuated because of political disagreement over the production of a list of those eligible. In its absence, the Government has provided GAM members with a *jadup* (form of living allowance or social security payment) through the GAM command structure. Three rounds of Rp. 1 million were to be provided to 3,000 GAM. However, the amounts reaching former combatants at the village level have been smaller. This has happened because GAM leaders have distributed benefits to other categories of GAM beyond ex-combatants (e.g. civil and police GAM) as well as to orphans, widows and other conflict victims. The average amount received is Rp. 170,000-260,000 per GAM member per round but varies from village to village. The distribution of the *jadup* has not caused tensions to date, primarily because of the small sums involved and the fact that, in most instances, GAM at the local level have been involved in the allocation process.

Family members are the most important source of support for GAM returnees. Over 72% of active GAM stated that they have received support from family members. This is followed by support from GAM leaders and from friends. Communities have played an important role in supporting the reintegration process. They have been willing to do this both because active GAM often form part of the community and also because they view their support as a contribution to peace. However,

the continued inactivity and unemployed status of GAM returnees creates the possibility for an increase in extortion which would place pressure on community relations.

### ***Knowledge of the Peace Process***

Although most community members are aware of the existence of the MoU, their understanding of its content is low. Villagers are, generally, more interested in the existence of peace than in the specifics of the agreement. In contrast, GAM returnees have a higher understanding of the agreement. This is because they have a greater vested interest in its details and because the socialization campaign through the GAM command structure has been more comprehensive than other information programs. Aside from GAM internal socialization, AMM forums at the sub-district level have been useful and, importantly, offer an opportunity to discuss differing interpretations through structured dialogue. Future socialization campaigns need to move from general peace messages to specific issues that are of most relevance to GAM returnees and receiving communities alike. Concrete information on the reintegration program is especially needed.

Both communities and GAM returnees believe that AMM is playing an important role in ensuring peace. The presence of international monitors has increased confidence in the peace process. Most respondents believe an on-going presence, at least for the short-to-medium term, is required. The positive response to AMM is despite low levels of knowledge about their mandate, particularly amongst villagers. GAM members have higher awareness but many are also confused about the extent of problems AMM can resolve. As a result, some GAM members have unrealistically high expectations of what AMM can do.

### **Needs and Aspirations of GAM Returnees**

#### ***Livelihoods***

The greatest development need for GAM returnees is for help in reestablishing their livelihoods. The current employment status of returnees is precarious. Six months after the signing of the MoU, almost 75% of GAM members have yet to return to work. Their inability to find work has meant that many are overly dependant on communities; in some cases they have resorted to illegal activities to get by.

Active GAM identified four options available to them for finding employment: (a) 43.1% wish to return to their previous occupation and stay in their village; (b) 26.0% want to stay in their village but change jobs; (c) 6.1% want to move villages but stay in the same occupation; (d) 1.3% wish to move villages and change occupations. 23.5% are not sure if they want to stay in the same job and/or village. Tailoring support to the different aspirations of GAM returnees, and understanding the different options they may pursue for improving their situation, and why they want to pursue them, is key if assistance is to be effective.

GAM returnees overwhelmingly identified the lack of capital as the single largest impediment to improved livelihoods. However, for returnees to make effective and sustainable use of capital investments, additional inputs will be required. These include training (in particular for those who wish to change occupations), private sector development and job creation schemes. How these inputs are prioritized will vary depending on the livelihood options preferred by GAM returnees.

#### ***Housing***

Shelter was identified as the second highest priority by GAM returnees. The houses of half of those active in GAM were either damaged or destroyed by the conflict. There is not, however,

a need for an immediate shelter program, as returnees have been able to find a place to stay. Most returnees are living in the types of shelter they were in before joining GAM (63% are staying in their family's house). It is, however, important to address housing needs over the medium term as providing compensation is seen as a fairness issue for many GAM returnees and affected communities.

### **Health**

A large proportion of GAM returnees are experiencing health problems. These include conflict-related injuries such as bullet wounds, chronic diseases such as malaria and respiratory illnesses, as well as mental health issues. Across all districts the physical and mental health condition of former political prisoners was identified as being the most pressing health priority by both prisoners and those in the community. A vast majority of political prisoners suffer from health conditions related to their incarceration. Only half of those active GAM who reported health concerns have been able to access health care since their return. The main reasons for this are that they have either not been able to meet the associated costs or do not have sufficient information about accessing health care. Mental health problems are highly prevalent amongst GAM returnees and are probably underreported, although the rate of reporting was higher than anticipated.

### **Education and Training**

Formal education is not a high priority for most GAM returnees, although younger GAM members (aged 25 or less) were proportionally more interested. Returnees prefer receiving part-time education or practical skills training, and are particularly keen when they can work at the same time. Women returnees were more interested in pursuing further education. Most active GAM who are interested in skills training would like courses that can help them become traders (70%). This is unsurprising given that most of those wanting to change occupations want to become traders.

### **Land**

Land was not identified as a significant issue for the majority of GAM returnees. Most returnees who want to farm indicate that they have access to land. Land is only an issue for returnees in areas where it is an issue for receiving communities more generally.

## **Needs and Aspirations of Receiving Communities**

Addressing the needs of receiving communities is important for a number of reasons. First, both GAM and communities feel that equity requires that ordinary citizens who were affected by the conflict should also receive benefits. Second, the provision of benefits to GAM alone may cause tensions or division between GAM and communities. Third, the provision of assistance to a category of affected persons that includes but also goes beyond GAM returnees will facilitate peace-building efforts by reducing the distinction between GAM and receiving communities.

Assistance to receiving communities needs to cover both public and private goods. In order to deliver private benefits, it is necessary to refine the definition of "affected civilians" to determine which individuals and groups in the community are most vulnerable and deserving of targeted support.

### ***The Provision of Public Goods to Conflict-Affected Communities***

A large number of villages visited had pressing infrastructure needs. The conflict impacted on the provision of infrastructure such as roads, electricity and irrigation at the village level, particularly in more remote villages. Rebuilding infrastructure damaged by the conflict can be a vital component of a livelihoods assistance strategy and can help solidify reintegration, especially if projects are jointly undertaken by returnees and others in the community.

Communities place a high priority on improving access to services, in particular education and health. Access to health and education is constrained by four inter-related factors: (a) the costs of schooling and healthcare, including transportation; (b) the distance to services; (c) the fact that clinics and, especially, schools were damaged in the conflict or not maintained because of it; and (d) the poor quality of services. Community-wide approaches to improving livelihoods include interventions aimed at improving the local private sector investment climate and improving market linkages.

Continued security is a prerequisite to addressing socio-economic needs. Improving service provision, the operation of local markets, rebuilding houses, creating new jobs: all are dependent on a positive security situation. Despite the current positive environment, challenges remain. In the long-term, law enforcement agencies will require capacity building to address security concerns appropriately. In the more immediate term, there is a need to address transitional arrangements as AMM phases out.

### ***The Provision of Private Goods to Vulnerable Groups***

In addition to the community-wide approaches outlined above, more narrowly targeted programs aimed at particularly vulnerable groups who were directly affected by the conflict are also required. Communities themselves are in the best position to identify who is in need of assistance, although this process will require facilitation to ensure that such decision-making doesn't exclude marginalized groups. Vulnerable groups include IDPs, widows who lost their husbands in the conflict, and those whose houses were destroyed by the fighting.

Rebuilding houses destroyed by conflict is a priority, as is the provision of capital and training to those most in need of it and who can best put it to productive use. In addition, there is a need for targeted mental health care.

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

The assessment findings lead to three sets of recommendations that, taken together, provide an action framework for consolidating peace and responding to some of the challenges identified. The first focuses on the supporting programs necessary to sustain an environment conducive to deeper reintegration and reconciliation. The second set identifies and summarizes the priority needs and sectors that reintegration programming should address. These needs are categorized by whether they are private or public goods. The final set of recommendations suggests delivery mechanisms for addressing the sectoral needs in a timely and transparent fashion.

### ***Peace Process Supporting Programs***

**Sustaining the achievements of the peace process will continued monitoring.** Serious consideration needs to be given to the development of impartial monitoring mechanisms to fill the vacuum in the transitional period following the withdrawal of AMM. This will be particularly

important around the upcoming elections when political competition could result in mass mobilization and conflict.

**In the medium to long-term, support to increase the capacity of local law enforcement agencies and justice sector institutions will be necessary.** Relations between police and communities are poor and the province's legal system has systematic weaknesses. Institutional capacity building should not only focus at the provincial level but also the districts and sub-districts, particularly in those areas where latent tensions remain. Concurrently, programs to increase access to justice for communities and support non-state informal justice mechanisms would be useful. Gender sensitivity in all these programs is essential.

**Socialization efforts are important but need to change focus.** Immediate post-MoU socialization has focused on increasing knowledge of the MoU. This has achieved high levels of general awareness. However, the peace process is entering a new phase and GAM returnees and communities want information on programs and processes that directly affect them. Socialization activities should be seen as a core component of all reintegration programming. Socialization should also focus on creating spaces at the local level to debate different understandings of the MoU. Strategies should focus on reaching down to rural areas.

### ***Priority Sectoral Needs for Reintegration Programming***

As mentioned above, support to GAM returnees and communities can be achieved through the provision of both individual benefits (private goods) to vulnerable groups, including GAM returnees, as well as community benefits (public goods) for all those "conflict affected". These benefits are mutually reinforcing.

**Reintegration programming for both private and public goods needs to have a rural focus.** The survey shows that GAM returnees predominately live in rural areas. Similarly, the qualitative fieldwork indicated that rural villages, particularly those more remote, were disproportionately more likely to have experienced physical conflict damage during the conflict.

**Short-term transitional assistance is necessary to fulfill day-to-day needs and to facilitate reinsertion.** In most of rural Aceh, both GAM returnees and communities are struggling to fulfill their everyday needs. Vulnerable groups, including GAM returnees but also IDPs and other victims, will not be able to make productive investments in livelihoods and small-scale public infrastructure, such as irrigation, as long these needs are not being met.

### ***Individual Benefits (Private Goods)***

**The greatest priority need for active GAM, political prisoners and vulnerable conflict-affected community members is livelihoods assistance.** Capital is often the greatest need but its provision should be augmented with other inputs such as skills training and mentoring. The provision of support must be finite. Such programs should be distributed through community decision-making so as to ensure benefits are allocated fairly and transparently.

**A second priority is a house building or repair program aimed at those whose homes were destroyed or damaged during the conflict.** This is often a need for both GAM returnees as well as ordinary villagers. Further, there is considerable overlap between conflict and tsunami

areas. Instead of singling out GAM returnees for a special housing program (or excluding them from existing programs), integrating GAM returnees and conflict victims into tsunami shelter programs should be a priority. This is a medium-term priority as most returnees and conflict victims already have some form of shelter.

**Ensuring access to health care for GAM returnees and some conflict victims must be a priority.** There is need for a common response mechanism for identifying and responding to the health needs of GAM returnees and conflict victims. A demand driven voucher system managed by communities could be considered.

**Training and education programs should be focused on the skills needed to allow returnees and other population groups to access jobs and succeed in the workplace.** Training, however, should not be provided alone, but must link into more holistic livelihood strategies.

**Programs to reintegrate active GAM and political prisoners civically and politically as well as socially and economically are important.** These activities should focus on community leadership and political training for those with a genuine interest or role in such fields. Reintegration is a holistic endeavour.

### ***Community Benefits (Public Goods)***

**A priority for communities is small- and medium-scale infrastructure.** Communities are almost always well aware of what small-scale public infrastructure projects they require. Their participation in identifying local priorities and in implementing programs will help ensure local preferences are incorporated and can contribute to short-term job creation.

**Improving the private sector development climate, market linkages and access to credit are also priorities.** A comprehensive livelihood strategy needs to ensure the local economy is capable of absorbing extra people into the workforce.

**It is necessary to speed up the implementation of short-term community-driven development projects in conflict-affected areas, and to provide for a transition to long-term development strategies.** In contrast to private benefits, many programs and mechanisms already exist for the provision of public goods. Additional resources should initially be targeted in affected areas, but over time should be distributed across Aceh.

### ***Targeting and Delivery Mechanisms***

**Targeting of both public and private goods must cover GAM returnees, vulnerable groups as well as those more generally affected by conflict.** Not only are the needs of GAM returnees and vulnerable groups similar, but both GAM and communities strongly believe that the benefits of reintegration programming should be provided to all those in need.

**The provision of these goods will require two distinct types of programs: *individual support programs and community support programs.*** There are a number of reasons for this. First, the two are dealt with quite separately in the MoU. Second, the aims of providing such benefits differ. Third, the programs have different timeframes and urgency; individual benefits need to start quickly but should last only no longer than one or two years to prevent dependency. Fourth, the programs will require different information and implementation mechanisms.

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**Three key sets of mechanisms will be crucial to both program types:***Identification of Vulnerability / Prioritization of Community Needs*

The greatest challenge for delivering individual benefits is identifying eligible vulnerable groups and individuals in a way that does not cause tension, facilitates reintegration and is perceived to be fair. Similarly, it will be a challenge to identify the most conflict-affected communities and identify their priority needs. For these reasons, communities should be the drivers of such decision-making mechanisms through putting forward list of eligible individuals (private goods), or priority programs (public goods).

*Verification of Eligibility / Technical Verification of Feasibility*

Although communities should be provided with considerable scope to determine vulnerability and priority needs, there is a limited supply of resources. As such, there is some need for some screening of names and proposals at a higher level. There are also many dimensions to 'conflict-affectedness' - it is difficult to place conflict-related vulnerability on a metric as can be done, for example, for income poverty - so clear and transparent eligibility criteria must be developed. The challenge will be balancing community and 'program-driven' definitions of vulnerability.

*Supporting Mechanisms*

In addition to the core community identification assessment and verification mechanisms, supporting processes will be necessary. These include, socialization of eligibility criteria and benefit packages; ongoing monitoring of participation and implementation; facilitation and mediation support if necessary; and complaints handling for those individuals and communities that slip through the gaps.

**The next step is to get reintegration programming moving in the field.** Seven months has passed since the signing of the MoU, yet few programs are operational at the village level. This report has highlighted that conflict-sensitive reintegration programming is urgently required to build on the initial successes of the peace process and has provided some ideas for what these program might look like, and how they might be implemented. Support must be provided to GAM returnees to assist them in re-starting their livelihoods. Such assistance must be provided in a manner that consolidates reintegration and minimizes the risk of creating jealousies or tensions. The MoU provides a framework for doing this by ensuring support for all conflict-affected persons, including but not limited to GAM returnees. The opportunity now exists to use reintegration programming to build on the initial successes of decommissioning weapons, return of ex-combatants and troop withdrawal, to help ensure the longer-term peace that remains the hope of the vast majority of people in Aceh.

## Glossary

### Indonesian/Acehnese Terms

Adat	Local norm or custom
Aparat	Police and military
Bupati	District Head
Cangkul	Hoe
Gampong	Village
Geuchik	Village Head
Haji	Person who goes on the pilgrimage to Mecca
Imam	Local religious leader
Intel	Intelligence Agency
Kabupaten	District
Kecamatan	Sub-district
Kaleng	Tin can (used as a measurement, one <i>kaleng</i> equals approximately 25 liters)
Kartu merah-putih	"Red-white card" (Identity card, also known as KTP)
Mayam	A quantity of gold equal 3.5 grams
Meunasah	Village hall
Mukim	Traditional leader (between the village and sub-district)
Musyawarah	Collective group decision-making
Panglima Daerah	District Commander
Panglima Sagoe	Sub-district Commander
Panglima Wilayah	Regional Commander (there are 17 GAM regional divisions in Aceh)
Pajak Nanggroe	Tax collected by GAM
Pekerjaan lepas	Casual work
Peusijek	Traditional ceremony
Rp.	<i>Rupiah</i> (Indonesian Currency, approx 1 USD = Rp. 9,200)
Warung	Small shop, stall

### Acronyms

AM	<i>Aceh Merdeka</i> (Free Aceh)
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
DAI	Development Alternatives Incorporated
Dinsos	<i>Dinas Sosial</i> (Department of Social Affairs)
DSF	Decentralization Support Facility
Gol	Government of Indonesia
GAM	<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i> (Free Aceh Movement)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
Jadup	<i>Jatah Hidup</i> (form of Social Security Payment)
KDP	<i>Kecamatan</i> Development Project
Koramil	<i>Komando Rayon Militer</i> (Sub-district Military Command)
KTP	<i>Kartu Tanda Penduduk</i> (identity card)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding (signed in Helsinki on August 15 <sup>th</sup> , 2005)

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NGO	Non-Government Organization
Perda	<i>Peraturan Daerah</i> (Local Regulation)
PKI	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Communist Party)
Polindes	<i>Pondok Bersalin Desa</i> (Village Birthing Clinics)
Polsek	<i>Polisi Sektor</i> (Sub-district Police)
Puskesmas	<i>Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat</i> (Sub-district health clinic)
RSUD	<i>Rumah Sakit Umum Daerah</i> (District-level public hospital)
SD	<i>Sekolah Dasar</i> (Primary School)
SIM	<i>Surat Izin Mengemudi</i> (Driving License)
SMA	<i>Sekolah Menengah Atas</i> (Senior High School)
SMP	<i>Sekolah Menengah Pertama</i> (Junior High School)
SUSENAS	<i>Survei Sosial-Ekonomi Nasional</i> (National Social Economic Survey)
TNA	<i>Tentara Nanggroe Aceh</i> (Aceh State Army)
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesia National Army)





## I. Introduction

## I. Introduction

In August 2005, eight months after the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami hit Aceh's shores, a peace agreement was signed between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) committed both parties to building mutual confidence and trust, and set out a range of agreed principles to guide the war-to-peace transition. Sections focused on governing Aceh, human rights, amnesty and reintegration, security arrangements, the establishment of an Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), and the settlement of disputes.

Seven months on, progress has been made towards implementing many of the articles in the agreement. On December 19<sup>th</sup> 2005, the last of 840 weapons surrendered by GAM were destroyed; 25,890 military troops and 5,791 police have been withdrawn from the province without incident. GAM formerly demobilized as an armed force on December 28<sup>th</sup>. The joint EU/ASEAN AMM, through its twelve district offices and Banda Aceh headquarters, has overseen the decommissioning, relocation and demobilization processes, and has investigated, with success, the limited number of alleged violations of the agreement. A draft Law on the Governing of Aceh is being debated in Aceh and Jakarta.

Section 3 of the MoU outlines mechanisms for aiding the reintegration of "persons who have participated in GAM activities" into Acehnese villages and society. In some respects GAM returnees do not need to be 'reintegrated'. On the whole, cleavages between combatants and the general population are not clear or absolute. Throughout the conflict, combatants returned home to their villages for periods of rest or special occasions, although most often only for a couple of hours at a time. The lines between who was a combatant (in the jungle) and who was a sympathizer (in the village) were often blurry. Yet, in drafting and signing the agreement, both the Government and GAM realized that there would be challenges associated with the return of former combatants and prisoners. Experience from across the globe has shown that the transition from a military life to a civilian one can be challenging and that many groups, including women, can be further marginalized in the process. Individuals need to find new occupations and means for financial independence; in cases, they will need to learn new skills. Psychological adjustments to new ways of life may need to be made. Former combatants may need housing, land and access to health care. Communities must be provided with the incentives - in the form of a visible peace dividend or compensation - to welcome back GAM returnees and to support the peace process.

As a result, the MoU provides a number of measures to aid the reintegration of pardoned political prisoners, former combatants and other population groups:

- The provision of a Reintegration Fund to provide "economic facilitation" to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians (Clause 3.2.3);
- The rehabilitation of public and private property destroyed or damaged in the conflict (Clause 3.2.4);
- The allocation of farming land, employment or social security for former combatants, political prisoners and affected civilians (Clause 3.2.5).

Fulfilling these promises requires the provision of social and economic development programs. Designing such programs requires answers to a number of questions: What does "economic

facilitation" entail in the Aceh context? What are the needs and aspirations of former combatants and political prisoners, and what kinds of programs do they think would help? How are women and youth affected, as combatants and prisoners and as members of the communities to which these groups are returning? How many former combatants and released political prisoners will move to urban areas to look for employment and how do their needs differ from those who remain in rural areas? Who are the affected civilians, and what are their needs? How do socio-economic needs interact with security concerns, and how might development programs targeted at satisfying such needs help strengthen peace? What public and private property has been damaged or destroyed, who does it belong to, and how can it be identified? In order to help answer these questions, and to aid in the development of programs to support the peace process, the Government requested that the World Bank, working with other development partners, conduct two complementary needs assessment. Both were developed in close partnership with GAM.

- The first (the *GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment*) looks at questions relating to development needs and aspirations at the local level. The results are presented here.
- The second (a *Conflict Damage Assessment*) assesses the extent and location of private property and public infrastructure damage. The assessment is currently being conducted and results will follow.

### ***Aims and Scope of the GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment***

The GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment has three main aims:

1. To assess the process of reintegration so far, focusing on potential obstacles to peace;
2. To assess the socio-economic needs and aspirations of former combatants, non-combatant GAM, and released political prisoners, and how they fit with those of receiving communities;
3. To help in the development of programs and delivery mechanisms to aid the reintegration of former combatants, GAM non-combatants, and political prisoners into Acehese society.

It is necessary to make a few points about the scope and focus of the assessment. First, the focus is on the *needs and aspirations of people in rural Acehese villages*. The report uses quantitative survey data on GAM active at the time the MoU was signed (both former combatants and non-combatants) in urban and rural areas, but the in-depth qualitative work was largely conducted in rural villages. Second, the study looks at *needs and aspirations as defined by local people themselves*. The study team were researchers with experience in conflict and community development issues, rather than sectoral experts (e.g. health or private sector development specialists). While the report does evaluate whether reported needs match with those observed in the field, and if suggested delivery mechanisms are appropriate, the emphasis is on documenting what people at the local level want. In a conflict context, aspirations are as important as needs; the satisfaction of the former rather than the latter may be more necessary for the consolidation of peace.

### ***Definitions***

Throughout Aceh numerous definitions are used both to differentiate those actively involved in GAM from ordinary villagers and to distinguish between the various categories of GAM. In this report the following terms are used to define the different categories of those associated with GAM:

*Political prisoners:* covers both prisoners who were officially pardoned by presidential decree on August 31<sup>st</sup> 2005 as part of the MoU and prisoners released as part of Indonesian Independence Day celebrations on August 17<sup>th</sup> 2005.<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that not all political prisoners were actively involved in GAM. Some may have been imprisoned due to their involvement in other organizations in Aceh or may even have been wrongly incarcerated;

*Former combatants:* refers to those who were involved in the military branch of GAM at the time of the MoU. These troops are also referred to as the *Tentara Nanggroe Aceh* (TNA or Aceh State Army).

*Non-combatants:* refers to members of GAM performing civilian functions, as well as those in the police and training structures.

These two last categories are collectively cited in this study as *active GAM* or people who were actively involved in GAM at the time of the MoU. This category covers GAM former combatants as well as those involved in GAM's civilian, police and training structures. Active GAM do not include political prisoners;

*GAM returnees:* refers to all active GAM and political prisoners. The assessment is not focused on other groups of returnees related to the peace process - e.g. non-GAM internally displaced persons (IDPs);

## **Methods**

The assessment took place from early November 2005 to early February 2006. It made use of multiple methods, integrating quantitative and qualitative data from a number of sources. Annex A on the attached CD-Rom outlines full methodological details and procedures.

First, *qualitative fieldwork in ten districts (Kabupaten)* took place between November and January. Three teams of researchers visited one district each in three rounds of fieldwork.<sup>3</sup> Each visit lasted for approximately ten days. Most of the districts with a large number of returnees were chosen. However, districts were also selected in order to capture variation in factors that might impact on reintegration dynamics and socio-economic needs. This two part selection criteria meant that all districts with the highest number of returnees, with the exception of Bireuen, were selected as quantitative research sites. Bireuen was not selected as its number of GAM returnees and dynamics are similar to neighbouring districts Aceh Utara and Pidie, which were selected. Map 1.1 shows the research districts for each round of qualitative fieldwork.

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<sup>2</sup> Traditionally, prisoners are released every year on Indonesian Independence Day, August 17<sup>th</sup>. In 2005, the Government decided to release some GAM political prisoners on August 17<sup>th</sup>, two days after the MoU was signed and two weeks before the general amnesty, as a sign of goodwill.

<sup>3</sup> One district was visited by each team in each round, with the exception of the visit to central Aceh, which covered Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah districts.

Map 1.1: Qualitative Research Districts



Within each district, at least two sub-districts (*Kecamatan*) were chosen using similar criteria to that for district selection. In most of the sub-districts selected, at least two villages were chosen for fieldwork. Factors that were taken into consideration in selecting villages included: the number of GAM returnees present in a village, types of livelihood, history of conflict in the village,

the location of the village, and development needs, including impacts of the tsunami. In all, 38 villages in 22 sub-districts were covered in the qualitative component of the assessment. Field visits from World Bank staff to areas throughout Aceh, and especially to central Aceh in late 2005 and early 2006, also informed the findings.

Within each village three research instruments were utilized. First, in-depth interviews were conducted with a range of target groups including returnees (former combatants, political prisoners and non-combatant GAM), and those in the receiving communities. The latter included local leaders and community figures, anti-separatist fronts and ordinary villagers. Efforts were made to ensure that women, minority groups and the poor were interviewed. Second, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were held with returnees and receiving communities in all villages. Overall, 215 in-depth interviews and 78 focus group discussions were conducted with both returnees and receiving communities. Third, the research teams used participant observation to observe local dynamics. Transcripts and analysis pieces were written-up by the research teams, and used as the basis for district reports (attached in Annexes D-L) and the overall report.

Second, *survey data collected by IOM on political prisoners* was analyzed to understand better their socio-economic characteristics. This survey is ongoing as IOM continues to identify and register the up to 2,000 eligible political prisoners. At the time of writing (early March 2006), 1,956 prisoners have registered and received benefits. The data used in this report is based on the 1,782 prisoners registered and surveyed by mid-February 2006. The survey asks questions on (a) demographic and household characteristics, (b) household assets and income, (c) health status, (d) education and employment, and (e) future plans.

Third, a *quantitative survey of 642 active GAM* was implemented in close cooperation with the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in late January-February 2006. Similar to the prisoner survey, combatants and non-combatants were asked questions on (a) demographic and household characteristics, (b) the return process, (c) occupations, (d) household assets and land, (e) health status and access, (f) future employment and needs for assistance, and (g) the MoU and the peace process. Locations and informants were carefully sampled to be representative of the broader combatant and non-combatant GAM population. The GAM survey was implemented in the field by the AMM district offices.

The report integrates data from the three sources. The structure of the report was developed based on the initial fieldwork, including the results of the piloting of instruments before the research proper began. The survey of active GAM was developed based on emerging findings and categories from the qualitative fieldwork and so as to allow for comparability with the prisoner data. The nine district reports, which summarize the qualitative findings, were used as a basis for an initial draft of the synthesis report. Findings from the quantitative surveys (of active GAM and of political prisoners) were then integrated to test further, and quantify, the qualitative findings. In writing the final report, an iterative approach was used with different sources of data used to generate hypotheses that could be tested (or findings fleshed out) by the other forms of data. Where data sources pointed to different conclusions, the data was triangulated further. A series of public and private consultations in Jakarta and Banda Aceh provided feedback and helped add nuance to many of the findings, as well as identifying new analytical paths for exploration.

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## Structure

The rest of the report is structured into five main parts plus annexes:


- Section 2 looks at the *characteristics of returnees* - at their distribution, demographic profiles, etc. Attention is paid to the socio-economic similarities (and differences) between GAM returnees and receiving communities.
- Section 3 looks at the *peace process and reintegration dynamics*. It considers four themes: (a) the progress of peace; (b) reintegration, reconciliation and sources of tension; (c) benefits and support for GAM returnees; and (d) knowledge and attitudes towards the peace process, including views of the MoU and the AMM.
- Section 4 focuses on the *needs and aspirations of GAM returnees*. Priority needs are identified, and consideration is given to the types of programs that may satisfy them.
- Section 5 examines *the needs of receiving communities*. Needs relating to both public and private goods are assessed.
- Section 6 provides a *summary of findings* and gives *recommendations* on types of programs, and design principles, that can help support the reintegration process.

The attached CD-Rom contains a number of annexes. Annex A gives full methodological details for the study, including sampling procedures. Annex B contains the quantitative instrument used in the study. Annex C contains the research guidelines for the qualitative teams. The nine district reports written by the qualitative research teams make up Annexes D-L. Each provides in-depth information on a specific district.<sup>4</sup> The reports are working documents and should be treated as such. Annex M gives break-downs of the answers to the quantitative combatant survey. Annexes N and O give the full text of the MoU in English and Indonesian, respectively. The CD-Rom also has a library of photos that help illuminate the process of reintegration in the field and the peace process more broadly.

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<sup>4</sup> With the exception of the central Aceh report which covers two districts, Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah.





## II. Characteristics of GAM Returnees

## II. Characteristics of GAM Returnees

Understanding reintegration challenges that will emerge requires an understanding of who is returning. This section considers the characteristics of GAM returnees - former combatants, non-combatants and political prisoners. The distribution of returnees, their age, their gender and marital status, education levels, their former and current livelihoods, where they live and migration patterns are all considered. Data is primarily from two quantitative surveys: the first a census survey conducted by IOM using the responses of 1,782 pardoned political prisoners surveyed up to mid-February 2006; the other, a sample survey of 642 combatants conducted by the World Bank in cooperation with AMM in January-February 2006. Data from the qualitative fieldwork is used to illustrate findings.

### 1. Distribution of GAM Returnees


**GAM returnees do not only include former combatants and political prisoners,<sup>5</sup> but also civilian GAM.** GAM had a civil structure that mirrored that of the local government and security forces. There were active members of GAM who fulfilled logistical roles, who operated as a GAM policing force, and who were trainee combatants.

**Both GAM and communities at the local level define GAM membership widely to include non-TNA.** This was apparent during the fielding of the quantitative combatant survey. 12.2% of those interviewed identified themselves as civilian GAM, 3.7% as GAM police, and 1.2% as probation TNA.<sup>6</sup> Part of the reasons for this wide definition is that individuals' roles within GAM are often fluid. In the field, a number of respondents reported that over the course of their involvement with GAM they had held various positions.

"Two years ago I was TNA, but just one year ago I became civil [GAM]. This is common."

*Civil GAM, Samadua, Aceh Selatan*

**Figure 2.1: Types of GAM**



**There are up to 2,000 political prisoners.** On August 31<sup>st</sup>, 1401 political prisoners were officially pardoned by presidential decree and released from prisons. Earlier, on August 17<sup>th</sup>, 282 were released as part of the Indonesian Independence Day celebrations. Other released political prisoners have subsequently been 'discovered' and are receiving the benefits package from the district *Dinas Sosial* offices with the support of IOM. As for other GAM returnees,

political prisoners are widely distributed, with very few villages having more than two. In addition to the political prisoners released recently, during the conflict many villagers spent time in jail or experienced incarceration in their own homes.

<sup>5</sup> Although the fieldwork found that not all of the released political prisoners were actually members of GAM.

<sup>6</sup> This does not accurately reflect the proportional split within GAM, as GAM combatants were probably over-sampled.

"During the martial law period I was ordered to go into forest and find my son. In the evenings I would be locked up in the house besides the TNI (military) post if I couldn't find him. This occurred to about 15 households. We were all locked up in the one house every night for one and a half months. The TNI said it was so as to ensure I didn't give food to my son [who was a GAM member]."  
*Villager, Kluet Tengah, Aceh Selatan*

There is significant variation in the number of GAM returnees in different districts. The majority of returnees are on the east coast. However, other areas also have significant numbers of returnees. Map 2.1 shows the estimated distribution of GAM across Aceh.<sup>7</sup>

**Map 2.1: Estimated Distribution of GAM Returnees by District<sup>8</sup>**



Source: AMM, IOM data and fieldwork-based projections

<sup>7</sup> The estimates are based on data from AMM district offices, data from IOM on where pardoned prisoners returned to, the field work, and projections based on the distribution of jadup (social security) to combatants. See Annex A for further details.

<sup>8</sup> In five areas the figures cover two districts or one district and a city. These areas are as follows: Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar (9.01-13%); Lhokseumawe and Aceh Utara (9.01-13%); Aceh Timur and Kota Langsa (13.01%-17.10%); Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah (3.01-6%); and Aceh Barat and Nagan Raya (6.01-9%).

**Within districts, particular sub-districts have disproportionate amounts of returnees, and certain villages also have particularly large numbers of returning GAM.** Many villages in Aceh have at least one or two returnees. This fits with previous research that suggests that GAM's recruiting approach was to request - or sometimes force - one or two able men from each village to join the movement.<sup>9</sup> However, there are some villages that have higher numbers of active GAM. These villages often have a long historical link to separatist activities in Aceh, are where famous separatist leaders originated from or were particularly conflict-affected.

**Returnees make up a very small proportion of the communities to which they are returning.** Across the 38 villages where qualitative research was conducted, the highest number of returnees in one village was 70. However, this village was relatively large with over 1,000 households. As such, even here the percentage of returnees was relatively small. Across the 38 villages, returning GAM made up between 0.1 and 4% of village populations.<sup>10</sup>

**Further, there is overlap between the areas GAM returnees are from and areas that are tsunami-affected.** Over 23% of active GAM surveyed claimed to have had their family house destroyed or damaged by the tsunami. Even though it is possible that respondents adopted a broad definition of the family unit or over-reported damage in responding to this question, the qualitative fieldwork showed that there are a high percentage of active GAM who were impacted by the tsunami. Distinguishing between conflict-affected and tsunami-affected areas therefore has limited utility.

## 2. Age of GAM Returnees

**In contrast to the general demographics of Aceh, a vast majority of GAM returnees are between 18 and 35 years old.** Over 75% fall within this age bracket, compared to 36% of the general population.<sup>11</sup> Almost 90% of active GAM in this age category were either TNA or trainee TNA. This reflects the fact that former combatants were required to undertake work of a physical nature that is often best suited to young males. It also highlights the fact that GAM targeted recruitment at young adults who had limited opportunities to find productive remunerated work. Active GAM over 35 were more likely to be involved in the GAM civil and police structure than those who are younger.

**Amnestied political prisoners are proportionally older than former combatants.** Although the majority of amnestied political prisoners also fall within the 16-35 year age category, the spread of the age of prisoners over 35 years old is more similar to that of the general population. The oldest prisoner is 78 years old.


Figure 2.2 provides a comparison of the age of GAM returnees (active GAM, political prisoners) and the general population in Aceh.

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<sup>9</sup> Schulze, Kirsten (2004, p. 17). "The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization". *Policy Studies* 2. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.

<sup>10</sup> It should also be noted that our qualitative research villages were purposively selected to include villages with a large numbers of GAM returnees and hence the percentage of returning GAM in other villages across Aceh is probably smaller.

<sup>11</sup> Statistics for Aceh come from National Social Economic Survey (*Survei Sosial-Ekonomi Nasional or SUSENAS*) 2004, BPS. The survey was conducted prior to the tsunami. Amnestied prisoner data is as of August 2005. GAM data is from the AMM survey and measures ages as of January 2006.

**Figure 2.2: Age Breakdown of Active GAM, Prisoners and the General Population**

Source: AMM/WB survey (active GAM), IOM survey (prisoners) and SUSENAS 2004 (general population)

**The age breakdown of GAM returnees is also linked to recruitment drives undertaken by GAM.** Proportionally, more former combatants from the central and western districts of Aceh fall within the 26-35 year age group. In some districts in these areas, such as Aceh Barat Daya and Aceh Selatan, most GAM returnees interviewed joined in 1999 following a major recruitment drive undertaken by GAM, targeting young males. Six years later these males are now likely to be in their mid-to-late twenties. In the eastern districts of Aceh there are a higher proportion of active GAM under the age of 25.<sup>12</sup> This indicates that in these 'heart-land' areas GAM relied less on specific recruitment drives and was able to convince young males to become combatants on an on-going basis both during the CoHA process and throughout the martial law period of 2003-2005.

"Before 1999 there was no movement in this village. People here didn't know AM (Aceh Merdeka, GAM's predecessor), they have only known GAM. Later, people from Lhokseumawe came and told us about the movement (GAM). There were ten people who traveled all over *Wilayah Blang Pidie*.<sup>13</sup> So I said to the people from Lhokseumawe: 'If I enter GAM how will my expenses be paid?' They replied, 'You will need to pay them yourself. If you can, please join, if you don't want to, don't join'. After that I thought about it for a few days and I decided to join."

*Civil GAM, Kuala Batee, Aceh Barat Daya*

**There are currently very few, if any, under age former combatants.** None of the active GAM surveyed were under 18 years old. Some members interviewed claimed to have joined GAM whilst they were 16 or 17 but had subsequently been active in GAM for several years. In contrast, seven of the 1782 amnestied prisoners surveyed were under the age of 18, although none were under 16 years old. GAM and villagers did, however, use children throughout the conflict to act as guards and to collect information on the movement of armed forces. Children would be used to man watch posts on the edge of villages and warn the communities if the military were approaching. This was often because children, especially in school uniform, were able to move around more freely than others. GAM subsequently recruited some of these children (see Box 2.1).

<sup>12</sup> Eastern districts refer to those districts along the east coast from Aceh Besar to Aceh Tamiang (Banda Aceh, Sabang, Aceh Besar, Pidie, Bireuen, Aceh Utara, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Timur, Langsa and Aceh Tamiang). All other districts are referred to as western districts.

<sup>13</sup> *Wilayah Blang Pidie*, or *Blang Pidie* region, is one of the 17 regions in the GAM command system. *Wilayah Blang Pidie* covers Aceh Barat Daya and part of Aceh Selatan.

### **Box 2.1: *Aneuk Itek* or "Ducklings"**

A number of mothers interviewed in Muara Tiga in Pidie district outlined the process through which GAM recruited village children to become spies. Many of these children were still attending elementary or junior school and were aged between nine and fifteen years at the time of recruitment. Some of the children were allegedly shot by the TNI (military).

"Children that GAM recruited to become spies we call *"aneuk itek"* in Acehese ("ducklings"). Many of them, in the end, became GAM combatants."

"There are many *aneuk itek* in this village because in the past they liked the excitement of collaborating with GAM. Some of them became combatants. Others did not because their parents made them go back to school. Most of those who were *aneuk itek* are now between 16 and 20 years old. They are lazy, stupid and most don't work because they think they're still a part of GAM."

*Female villagers, Muara Tiga, Pidie*

Many of the *aneuk itek* who did not become combatants (and even some who did) expressed their regret at not having finished school. A large proportion indicated that they would like to return to finish junior school, although most had not yet completed elementary school. It is clear from the interviews that these young men will find it difficult to re-integrate into communal structures outside of the GAM structure. They have little education and no practical skills that they could use to earn a living.

### **3. Gender and Marital Status**

**Women make up a very small proportion of GAM returnees.** From the survey conducted of active GAM, only 3.9% of the respondents were women. The average age of women surveyed was also much lower, with almost 60% of women being under 25 years old. An even smaller number (1.4%) of political prisoners were women. Although there are few women GAM returning, wives of returnees played an important role in supporting their husbands through the conflict. Women interviewed generally indicated that they were able to see their husbands at least once every couple of months and would often provide them with food, clothing and money. Women also took up the entire burden of raising their families while their husbands were in the mountains or in prison.

"I followed my husband into the struggle in September 2003. I didn't have permission to fight battles because the women's group wasn't big enough so we stayed in the camp only. I had a uniform and a photo of me in uniform but I've already lost it. My training uniform was destroyed when we hid them and my notebook was also lost."

*Female former combatant, Kuala Batee, Aceh Barat Daya*

"I went along with my husband the first time he went to the mountains. A group of us walked to Aceh Barat. At that time I was three months pregnant. I gave birth in the forest. My baby died because there was no medicine. I was also disabled for one year. While my husband was in the mountains I would send him clothes and food every two months."

*Wife of former combatant, Silih Nara, Aceh Tengah*


**Approximately half of the GAM returnees are married.** Active GAM who are currently married, or who have been married, have on average 2.5 children. Women respondents are slightly more likely to be married than male former combatants, with only 40% still single. Political prisoners are also more likely to be married (almost 62%). This is due to political prisoners being generally older.

**GAM returnees who are still single are interested in getting married.** During the conflict females were reluctant to marry men associated with GAM because they feared being subjected to greater harassment by the military or that their husbands would die from the conflict. There are indications that this is changing. Three GAM weddings were held in two villages in Pidie over the week that field visits were conducted there. Furthermore, GAM returnees interviewed across Aceh often stressed their desire to find a wife. They did, however, note that one main impediment to this was their ability to meet the costs of *mayam*.<sup>14</sup> In fact, one former combatant indicated in the quantitative survey that finding a wife was his highest priority.

#### 4. Education levels

**Compared to the rest of the population, active GAM are more likely to have completed some schooling but are less likely to have a high level of education** (see Figure 2.3). Active GAM who are under 25 years old or over 46 years old are less educated than those between 26 to 45 years old. Political prisoners have much lower education levels than both active GAM and the rest of the population. Just over 10% of political prisoners have no formal education and almost 50% have only completed primary school.

**Figure 2.3: Education Levels of Active GAM and the General Population of Aceh**



Source: AMM/WB survey (active GAM) and SUSENAS 2004 (general population)

**The common perception at the village level that the education level of GAM is much lower than the levels of the general population does not reflect reality on the ground.** Many villagers argue that those who join GAM do so because they have low education levels and therefore have few other opportunities or do not know better. It is possible that the lower education levels of younger active GAM (65.5% have only completed junior high school or less) has created this perception. However, overall, the education level of active GAM at the village level is very similar to the level of education of the rest of the villagers. In fact, in many villages there are one or two active GAM who are more educated and who can clearly articulate an ideological rationale for joining GAM, especially in the traditional GAM strongholds on the east

<sup>14</sup> In Aceh, when men get married they have to provide the wife's family with a gift of several mayam (a quantity of gold equaling 3.5 grams). The amount of mayam required varies from area to area, with marriages being more expensive in cities and along the east coast (where returnees are concentrated) than in the rest of Aceh.

coast. There were also several *kecamatan* visited, where the education level of returnees was higher than that of receiving villages. For example, in the villages visited in Pidie district, approximately 65% of GAM returnees had completed junior high school, compared to 45% of the general population.

"Of the 140 GAM members who joined from this village, most finished elementary school, and about 15% attended junior high, although many didn't finish this. Only one finished senior high school."

*Villager, Nisam, Aceh Utara*


"We joined this struggle because we were invited to do so by our teacher, who ran the pesantren (religious boarding school). He provided us with information about the plans, so we joined because he had already joined. He explained the struggle to us for the first time."

*Former combatant, Babahrot, Aceh Barat Daya*

## 5. Livelihoods


Prior to joining GAM an overwhelming majority (94.6%) of active GAM had some form of employment. Most returnees worked as either farmers (former combatants 30.2%, political prisoners 42.8%) or small traders (former combatants 19.6%, political prisoners 20.3%) - see Figure 2.4.

**Figure 2.4: Occupation of Active GAM Before Joining GAM**



Source: AMM/WB survey

**Figure 2.5: Current Work Status of Active GAM Returnees**



Source: AMM/WB survey

Only 5.4% of active GAM were not employed before they joined. Returnees from western districts of Aceh were much more likely to be involved in agricultural occupations (38.9%) than those from eastern districts (25.3%). In the eastern districts, there was a higher percentage of combatants and non-combatants who were formerly students (11.5% compared to 7.1% for western districts) reflecting the large number of returnees in the 18-25 age bracket in these districts.

The vast majority of GAM returnees have yet to return to work. Almost six months after the start of the peace process, only 25.4% of active GAM have started working (see Figure 2.5); the remainder are either looking for work (42.2%) or not working (32.5%). Active GAM in eastern districts are slightly more likely to have started work (27.5%) than those in other districts in Aceh (21.5%). Of those who are working, the largest proportion are farmers (see Figure 2.6 below). There are no significant differences in the employment status of urban and rural-based returnees.

There are a number of reasons why returnees have yet to return to work. Initially, returnees were content to spend time with their families and friends and recuperate from their experiences in the mountains. This transitional period lasted several months, and families were happy to support returnees during this period. Returnees now, however, primarily cite the lack of opportunities and capital as the major reasons why

they have not returned to work (see discussion in Section 4). In addition, some returnees have been restricted from returning to work because they are waiting on guidance from their leaders. In a number of districts, returnees mentioned that their leaders had permitted them to return to work on a needs basis. They could work to meet their day-to-day needs, return to farming or find *pekerjaan lepas* (casual work), but they were restricted from finding more permanent occupations. However, this situation varies from district to district, and within some districts, depending on the command structure within those areas.

"Nowadays I don't have any activities. I don't have plantations. I take work when I can find it. It is enough to buy cigarettes. Rp. 30,000 a day."

*Political prisoner, Nisam, Aceh Utara*

"I've already started working the forest gardens. There's no way I could not start working immediately. My parents are really poor as they just returned from Tapaktuan so they cannot support me."


*Former combatant, Kluet Tengah, Aceh Selatan*

"Of the combatants that have come back some have started working, some haven't. Whatever we can do we will do. If we ask our commander about our future he says that we must be patient."

*Former combatant, Kuala Batee, Aceh Barat Daya*

**Of the returnees who have returned to work, the majority are farming, trading or in non-permanent jobs.** However, as Figure 2.6 shows, the proportion of active GAM in each of these jobs is still small, because of the large number of returnees who are unemployed. Active GAM who have access to land have found it much easier to return to work. Of those in our sample who have returned to work, 72.7% have access to land (compared to 55.5% of those across the sample).

**Figure 2.6: Current Occupation of Active GAM**



Source: AMM/WB survey

## 6. Urban/Rural Distribution and Migration

**The vast majority of returnees currently live in rural areas.** Almost 90% of active GAM live in rural villages. This includes all of the women surveyed. Active GAM between the ages of 26-35 were most likely to live in urban areas.

**There is no major difference in the employment status of urban and rural returnees but there is in the type of job of those working.** As indicated above, almost three-quarters of non-prisoner returnees are yet to commence work. In rural areas, the majority of those that have started working again are currently farming (51.3%), with others working as small traders (14.3%) or doing temporary work (9.8%). In contrast, in urban areas the most popular occupation of those surveyed is small trading (29.3%), with others working as carpenter (16.0%), drivers (13.3%) or in impermanent jobs (13.3%).

**Since the signing of the MoU migration to urban areas has been minimal.** Of the 10.6% of active GAM surveyed who currently live in urban areas, approximately 83% lived in the same urban village prior to joining GAM. Therefore no more than 17% of active GAM who currently live in urban areas have moved from rural ones.<sup>15</sup> Overall, this means that less than 2% have

<sup>15</sup> The total will be lower, because some GAM members will have moved from one urban area to another.

moved to urban areas from rural ones. There are at least two possible explanations for this. The first is that many active GAM still fall under their district command structure and are therefore waiting for orders from their commanders prior to making decisions on the type of occupation they should pursue or where to live. The second is that making a move such as this requires capital, and as most returnees have yet to start working, or to receive any significant benefits, they do not have sufficient savings to make the move.



### III. The Peace Process and Reintegration Dynamics

### III. The Peace Process and Reintegration Dynamics

This section takes stock of what has occurred since August 15<sup>th</sup>. It looks at the overall progress of the peace process, current reintegration and reconciliation dynamics including sources of tension, the benefits that have flowed and knowledge of the process and the peace agreement. An understanding of current dynamics is important. Reintegration programs must not only address material needs but must also strengthen the incentives of different parties to support peace. Understanding the security dimensions of the reintegration process, and emerging and latent tensions, is thus of vital importance for designing socio- and economic interventions aimed at consolidating peaceful development. Considering social relations at the local level, and how they are being impacted by the return of former combatants, prisoners and other population groups, is key for working through the multi-fold issues involved with delivering aid in a post-conflict environment.

Overall, the peace process is proceeding very well. Decommissioning and troop redeployment has been a success and former combatants and communities are increasingly confident that peace will hold. There is a high degree of acceptance of those returning. At the local level, people are seeing the benefits of peace in the form of freedom of mobility and freedom from fear. Worries about widespread revenge attacks or of a security vacuum have not been realized. The distribution of assistance to political prisoners went well.

However, real challenges remain. In some areas, there are latent tensions relating to the return of IDPs and between anti-separatist groups and returnees, although thus far these have been managed well. Consideration needs to be given to ensuring continued security after AMM's withdrawal. Except for the basic benefits package for former political prisoners, and minimal social security from the government to former combatants, social and economic programs have not yet reached the local levels. Over time, extortion - and accompanying community resentment - may rise if returnees do not find jobs. Combatants and communities need more concrete information on the parts of the peace agreement that affect them.

#### 1. Progress of Peace

"So far I think it is working. GAM have all come home safely, I saw the troops going home, and my friends tell me they destroyed weapons at the market."

*Female villager, Sabit, Aceh Jaya*


"Go to the coffee shop, and instantly you can feel the peace process is going on. Since the MoU, people like to sit in the coffee shop for 24 hours - from morning to late at night. [And] that's good for my business."

*Villager, Alue Bu Jalan, Aceh Timur*

**The implementation of the peace process has progressed smoothly and with remarkably few incidents.** As Figure 3.1 indicates, the number of GAM-Gol incidents has dropped dramatically since the signing of the MoU on August 15<sup>th</sup> 2005. Indeed, in January and February 2006 no and only one GAM-Gol incident, respectively, were reported in local newspapers.<sup>16</sup> When incidents and issues have cropped up, both sides have shown genuine commitment to ensuring peace and have worked together to find common ground.

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<sup>16</sup> Information from *Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update*, produced monthly by the World Bank/DSF (available in Indonesian and English at [www.conflictanddevelopment.org](http://www.conflictanddevelopment.org)). The update tracks conflict-related incidents reported in Aceh's two main newspapers, *Aceh Kita* and *Serambi*.

**Figure 3.1: GAM-Gol Incidents by Month**

Source: Newspaper datatest

With facilitation from AMM, the decommissioning of GAM weapons and the withdrawal of Gol security personnel has been successfully implemented. On December 21<sup>st</sup> GAM handed over the final 142 weapons bringing the total number of weapons decommissioned to the 840 stipulated in the MoU. On December 31<sup>st</sup> a ceremony was held to mark the final withdrawal of 7,628 soldiers and 2,150 police, bringing the total security forces withdrawn to 31,681.<sup>17</sup>

**Table 3.1: Weapons Decommissioning and Troop Relocation by phase**

Phase	Decommissioning		Redeployment	
	Surrendered	Accepted	Troops	Police
I (September)	279	243	6,614	1,300
II (October)	291	233	6,097	1,050
III (November)	286	222	5,551	1,291
IV (December)	162	142	7,628	2,150
Total		840	25,890	5,791

Source: AMM/WB

"The day-to-day activities of these villagers [from a village completely destroyed in 2004] are still in their village. More recently, they've started to return and sow their fields, which have been empty collecting weeds for the past one and a half years. The TNI post has been removed, that's why they're now willing to return."

*KDP sub-district facilitator<sup>18</sup>, Bakongan Timur, Aceh Selatan*

The implementation of the peace agreement has had a positive impact on the whole of Acehnese society. Communities most commonly point to their increased mobility as evidence of progress. During the conflict, ordinary community members were prevented from going to their fields and forest plantations. Indeed, even right before the signing of the MoU community members were reluctant to speak openly about the conflict and those that did were visibly afraid.<sup>19</sup> Things have changed. Villages and towns are now much busier; in villages, coffee *warungs* are open until late and people are not afraid to stay out. Populations displaced by

<sup>17</sup> The final group of 2,150 police actually departed on January 4th 2006.

<sup>18</sup> The Kecamatan Development Project (KDP or PPK in Indonesian) is a large Gol/World Bank community-driven development project. Communities, normally the village, plan and implement small-scale infrastructure projects, such as roads, irrigation and micro-credit programs (Rp. 50 million - Rp. 150 million per village).

conflict are now starting to return to their former homes in Aceh Selatan, Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah.<sup>20</sup>

"I hope it can go on like this, no more conflicts. My husband can work to provide for his family so I don't have to suffer anymore."

*Wife of former combatant, Nisam, Aceh Utara*

**Both returnees and communities are confident that the peace process will continue.** 84.8% of active GAM interviewed indicated that they were either "very confident" or "confident" of its continuation; only 1.2% were not confident. Similarly high levels of confidence exist amongst communities, despite low understanding of the MoU and AMM. Instead, community members cite as evidence the success of weapons decommissioning, troop withdrawal, and the peaceful return of GAM members to the village. Everyone agrees that this time it is different.

"I'm sure about this peace because the weapons have already been surrendered. I hope the TNI don't come back."

*Villager, Samadua, Aceh Selatan*

"I'm sure the MoU process will continue, mainly because of the internationals. But if we, as ordinary soldiers, compare this peace with the CoHA<sup>21</sup> there are some big differences. For example, our leaders never told us about the CoHA, that there was a peace agreement. Also, the TNI behaved very aggressively during the CoHA, constantly provoking us. AMM is also different. If there's an incident, AMM visits and carries out an investigation. Very different."

*Former combatant, Tiro/Truseb, Pidie*

"In my view, CoHA was very different to this MoU. During CoHA we couldn't be too open or free, but now we can even shake hands with the military."

*Former combatant, Seuneddon, Aceh Utara*

## 2. Reintegration, Reconciliation and Sources of Tension

"The car dropped me off at Krueng Sabee, I started to walk towards my village and I saw my wife for the first time in five years, many other villagers also came out to the road to welcome me back. When they recognized me, they would cry, kiss and hug me because their prayers had been answered and I was able to make my way home safely."

*Former political prisoner, Krueng Sabee, Aceh Jaya*

**The majority of GAM and political prisoners have already returned to their village.** The vast majority of active GAM (80.3%) returned in the first two months following the signing of the MoU. Generally, they returned directly to their villages, although in some locations GAM regrouped in 'holding villages' before then going back to their own individual villages. These 'holding villages' existed in at least five of the ten districts covered by the qualitative research (one each in Aceh Tengah, Aceh Timur, Aceh Utara, Bener Meriah and Pidie). However, the role of these villages was temporary; combatants soon moved on, and such villages no longer exist.

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<sup>19</sup> This was evident during the field research for the pre-MoU conflict assessment carried out in July 2005. Barron, Patrick, Samuel Clark and Muslahuddin Daud (2005). *Conflict and Recovery in Aceh: An Assessment of Conflict Dynamics and Options for Supporting the Peace Process*. Jakarta: World Bank/DSF.

<sup>20</sup> In three of the research villages covered in Aceh Selatan, internally displaced people (IDPs) have begun to return to their villages since TNI posts have been withdrawn.

<sup>21</sup> CoHA (or the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement) was the last peace agreement lasting from December 2002 to May 2003.

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## **Dynamics of Social Reintegration**

"The relationship between GAM and villages is already the same as before. We have already reunited. For the future we can't have revenge any more. Because of revenge there is conflict like this. Actually there are people with sick hearts, but they will erase this feeling. We will close the book. Revenge is thrown away. We will remember but only as memories. "

*Villager, Babahrot, Aceh Barat Daya*

**Overall, there is a high level of acceptance of GAM returnees.** There have been very few tensions or problems between returnees and communities, with government, police and the military, or with their families. Similarly, returnees do not feel that they have encountered problems upon their return; 89.8% of active GAM surveyed said they had encountered no problems since returning to their village.

"We have already accepted into the community those who have just returned. There's no hostility because they too are a part of the community. Their families live here."

*Village head, Bakongan Timur, Aceh Selatan*

"The reception given to the former GAM members by the people was good enough. Here there aren't any problems. The GAM members have already integrated with the people. These days they aren't yet working. However, they have already formed friendships with visitors from other villages."

*Former village head, Silih Nara, Aceh Tengah*

**The lack of problems is primarily due to the fact that most returning combatants and prisoners have returned to their original villages where they are familiar faces and have family networks.** 87.2% of active GAM surveyed had returned to the village where they had lived before they joined GAM. Further, many 'returnees' have not actually been away for extended periods of time; even during the height of the conflict, they claim to have been able to return at least once every couple of months to visit their family, although this was often for short periods of time. The process is further facilitated by the fact that the conflict in most parts of Aceh does not draw upon ascriptive identities such as ethnicity and religion.<sup>22</sup>

"We are the same as the villagers. We are their fathers, sons and grandsons; it's impossible for them not to accept us back into the village. Which parent would not accept the return of their son? It's like a happy reunion now."

*Former combatant, Pereulak Barat, Aceh Timur*

**The return of GAM has not resulted in a spate of revenge seeking.** For some, the initial return of GAM was tense with fears that their return would spark acts of revenge. People were concerned that GAM would take revenge for past acts or, conversely, that others would take revenge against GAM. With the exception of one case in Pidie, where a villager took vengeance on a recently returned former combatant, this has not occurred. In general, those with mixed feelings towards GAM accept their presence in the village, but prefer not to spend time with them.

"I don't want to take revenge on GAM. What happened in the past was perhaps my destiny. However, some times I do feel pain in my heart and negative feelings emerge. I'm only human. But I don't want revenge."

*Widow, Samadua, Aceh Selatan*

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<sup>22</sup> An obvious contrast in the context of Indonesia is Central Sulawesi and Maluku, where communities have become implicated in conflict because of religious identities.

**There have been few tensions between returnees and the military, police or local government.** Only 2.1% of active GAM said there had been tensions with the military, 1.1% with police, and only 0.2% said there were tensions with local government. Similarly, only 1.7% reported that they had been discriminated against by the military, 1.6% by the police, and 1.1% reported discrimination from local government. Three former combatants surveyed mentioned that there have been tensions as a result of *Intel* (intelligence agency) activities. These are remarkably low figures, and show widespread acceptance of GAM returnees from different state institutions and actors.

**The research found isolated incidents of actual or latent tensions between GAM returnees and anti-separatist fronts (Box 3.1).** Of the 22 *Kecamatan* visited through the qualitative research, actual incidents between GAM returnees and anti-separatist groups had occurred in two locations: Indrapuri, Aceh Besar, and Nisam, Aceh Utara. These incidents were limited to a small specific group of GAM returnees and anti-separatist members who had previously been involved in GAM. In Bener Meriah and, to a lesser extent, Aceh Tengah there were widespread fears stemming from past militia activities in these districts following the failure of CoHA.

"The community in this one village still feel distrustful because of his [the Mukim's] actions as leader of the anti-separatist front here. They [the anti-separatist group] regularly threatened and terrorized the community; particularly those who dared to give food to GAM. He also never helped those who were accused of not showing respect to the TNI, so that many of the community were disciplined and tortured in the TNI post. Because of this a large section of the community continues to hold a deep grudge against the local Mukim here."

*Villager, Samadua, Aceh Selatan*

More indicative of the overall situation, however, none of the 642 active GAM surveyed mentioned tensions with anti-separatist groups as being a problem.

### **Box 3.1: Tensions Involving Anti-Separatist Groups**

- *Indrapuri, Aceh Besar*

In Indrapuri there are significant tensions between a group of recent GAM returnees and a group of GAM who surrendered prior to the MoU. Of the 60 GAM who surrendered prior to the MoU in this *Kecamatan*, approximately 15 subsequently began to co-operate with the TNI. After the signing of the MoU, and the subsequent return of "real GAM", these "anti-separatist inclined GAM" left their villages and have since been living at the local *Koramil* post.

"One week after the MoU I returned to my village. There in the village about ten people mobbed me. I was sitting in a coffee shop and was beaten in front of the villagers there. But everyone is quiet about it, no one is brave enough to speak out about what happened. The matter has already been reported to the *Polsek* (sub-district police) and AMM and the documentation is all ready. The police tell us it's all ready, but nothing has happened. Meanwhile those who beat us are still roaming about."

*Surrendered GAM/anti-separatist group member, Indrapuri, Aceh Besar*

- *Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah*

A main concern of GAM returnees and communities in Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah is the threat of anti-separatist group activity. There have not been any incidents since the MoU, although there were reports that in October group members threatened to beat-up a GAM returnee. For this reason, returnees and communities remain fearful. The response of returnees and communities is to restrict their movements.

"We aren't scared of the aparat or the police, but we are scared of the militia. We don't know how many weapons they have but according to reports they have a lot."

*Former combatant, Permata, Bener Meriah*

- *Nisam, Aceh Utara*

In October, the newspaper Aceh Kita reported that 18 members of *Berantas* (*Benteng Rakyat Anti-Separatis* - People's Anti-Separatist Front) fled their homes in *Kecamatan Nisam*. This, the TNI stated, was in response to the kidnapping of one *Berantas* member by a former GAM combatant. In response, Irwandi Yusuf, Senior Representative of GAM, stated that this was a private matter and hinted that the incident was justified in response to the GAM member's house being burnt down by *Berantas* during Martial Law period. AMM reported that in January tensions remained high.

**In all these situations, tensions are most likely to be resolved through facilitated dialogue.**

The "anti-separatist GAM" in Aceh Besar felt that the only person they trusted and who they thought had appropriate relations with those GAM involved was a local *Imam* (religious leader). Similarly, returnees and community members in the highlands requested meetings with government and those the community suspected as being militia leaders in order to build trust and receive security guarantees. These are actions that need to occur on a local level and involve legitimate local leaders.

**Reconciliation Activities**

**In almost all villages visited, some form of traditional *peusijuk* (also known as *tepung tawar*) or *kenduri* ceremony has been held (see Box 3.2).** 76.7% of active GAM surveyed indicated that welcome ceremonies had been held in their village. In some locations, village religious institutions have also played a role by encouraging reconciliation and forgiveness. *Imam* focused, especially during Ramadan, on messages of forgiveness and brotherhood in their sermons at mosques and *meunasah* (village halls).

**Box 3.2: *Peusijuk* - A Traditional and Symbolic Welcoming Ceremony**

*Peusijuk* (sometimes called *tepung tawar*) is an Islamic-influenced *adat* (local norm or custom) ceremony which communities carry out to give thanks and gratitude for certain events. It can be used, for example, to formally resolve a dispute, to bid farewell and welcome home *haji* (those who participate in the hajj) and also before and after harvest season. Usually the ceremony involves the host and/or invited guests pouring water, yellow rice or powder on those to be blessed and reciting verses from the Koran. Practice does vary, however, from village to village.

"When we returned from the mountains the community held a *peusijuk* for us, we all participated. It wasn't only us who had just returned that received the *peusijuk* but also community members who were victims of the conflict such as the two widows from this village. After the community ceremony there was family *peusijuk*. Some of us went to the family ceremonies of our colleagues. Normally only families who have the means will hold larger ceremonies. Those who cannot will simply hold a *kenduri* ceremony, where we simply sit and eat together."

*Former combatant, Kluet Tengah, Aceh Selatan*

"On the same day I arrived home, at 5pm there was a *peusijuk*. On the second day, they [the community] held a bigger *peusijuk*, which included my self and my other friends who had come home. All the villagers were there."

*Former combatant, Kreung Sabee, Aceh Jaya*

"Since returning, there has been a tepung tawar held by my family and also by the community. This gives us returnees renewed faith in ourselves to be back in the communities. Some of us get emotional during the peusijuk, they treat us as if we are heroes that have just returned from the battlefield."

*Former combatant, Banyak Payek, Aceh Tamiang*

"We didn't hold a peusijuk ceremony here [in this village] because a community-wide peusijuk was held near by. With regard to family peusijuk, it depends on the economic situation of each family. A peusijuk has costs attached."

*Village head, Indrapuri, Aceh Besar*

**In 17 of 38 research villages a "community peusijuk" ceremony had been held to welcome the return of GAM and political prisoners, but also for conflict victims such as widows.**

Returnees were genuinely heartened by such warm welcomes. In remaining villages, usually only "family peusijuk" were held amongst returnees. This was either because the village could not afford a community ceremony or, in cases, because feelings towards GAM were mixed and therefore it was deemed inappropriate to hold lavish welcome ceremonies.

**Peusijuk ceremonies (and other similar activities) are symbols or indicators of reconciliation but do not generate reconciliation in themselves.** Peusijuk ceremonies are held, for example, to commemorate or symbolize resolution of a dispute. However, separate local mechanisms are used to actually resolve the issue itself. As such, peusijuk are an indication that few problems exist or that those that do exist have been resolved. They do, however, also contribute to generating an environment conducive to reconciling and resolving differences.

### **Longer-term Reintegration Challenges**

**The initial reinsertion of GAM returnees into villages has gone smoothly.** Challenges for reintegration and reconciliation on a deeper level do, however, remain. As noted earlier, tensions between some GAM and anti-separatist groups remain latent and differences are yet to be resolved. In some cases GAM tend to spend time as a group and are unwilling to mix with ordinary villagers. Some do not want to let go of their 'GAM identity'.

**Perhaps the most significant barrier to reintegration relates to the degree to which GAM returnees are willing to acknowledge and respect the authority of local communities, their leaders, and government authorities.** Some villagers resent GAM returnees' attitudes and lack of respect for the community and community leaders. For some they are arrogant and believe that they are more deserving of respect than existing community leaders. Similarly, others believe that their militaristic ways are incompatible with the community; that GAM has not yet learnt how to behave like a civilian.

"You can see from their behavior, how they carry themselves with such arrogance. They never acknowledge the village elders, they never say "Assalamu'alaikum" (traditional welcoming phrase) ... they have no manners, they think of themselves as better than us, as one of the elders here, I was living through this conflict long before he was born! I have suffered and sacrificed more than he did in his few years of being in the jungle. I deserve more respect. Who do they think they are, coming to my home and sitting and smoking as if it is their own home without even acknowledging me?"

*Female villagers, Keude Gerobak, Aceh Timur*

"They [GAM returnees] are still cold in their interaction with the community. They like to tell us how things are and what to do. It's like they still act as commandos. They want to return to the community but in some respects they don't really know how because of their militaristic ways. The community doesn't like that. For example, they want to supply the building materials, so they tell the community that only they are allowed to provide materials. Until now there's no problem. But it could become a problem because as long as they

have been GAM they have asked for this, asked for that, and, in the past, if they didn't get it they would some times threaten. The community is sick of that but still afraid because they're still organized and unified."

*KDP village facilitator, Peukan Bada, Aceh Besar*

**Some GAM are not (yet) prepared to acknowledge the legitimacy of local community leaders or the government.** In one *kecamatan* in Aceh Selatan, for example, the *Geuchik* (village head) and *Imam* (religious leader) explained that they would never report an incident involving a GAM returnee to the police and that they would always involve the *Panglima Sagoe* (lower-level GAM leader) should a GAM member be involved in a dispute or problem.

"Oh, no, I would never report a GAM member to the police. Even if the incident involved someone from the community. I've already discussed this with the *Panglima Sagoe*. We already have an agreement if some thing happens involving one of his members."

*Village head, Samadua, Aceh Selatan*

Similarly, and again in Aceh Selatan, GAM returnees refused to hear and receive the apology of a local *Mukim* who closely co-operated during the conflict with the TNI. They claimed it was not enough for him to apologize, but that he must also step-down.

"There's a group here who want to force me to leave the position of youth leader. I was selected by the community a couple of years ago. They also want to force the *Mukim* to resign."

*Anti-separatist front member, Bakongan Timur, Aceh Selatan*

**Further, in some cases GAM is openly challenging or competing against local community leadership.** For GAM to have community leadership aspirations is not in itself a problem. Indeed, it is positive sign if community members, including GAM, now feel comfortable enough to challenge what has been the *status quo* for a number of years. It is important, however, that they follow ordinary civil procedures. That rather than threatening existing leaders they adopt more democratic approaches to campaign for change. This is not always the case. Box 3.3 describes three examples.

### Box 3.3: Examples of GAM Returnees Challenging Local Leadership

- In one village in Kluet Tengah, Aceh Selatan, it is clear that one of the recent GAM returnees hold far more authority amongst villagers than the current *Geuchik* (village head). However, the GAM returnee goes out of his way to ensure the he does not overstep the *Geuchik's* position. Indeed, in private the GAM community leaders stated he wanted the position but that he was prepared to wait until village head elections were held later this year.
- In contrast, there are serious tensions between the local *Panglima Sagoe* and the *Geuchik* in one village in Muara Tiga, Pidie. The *Panglima* and a small group of GAM returnees still close to him claimed they were "investigating" the *Geuchik's* collaboration with the TNI and the "jury was still out" as to whether the local GAM returnees would take action "on behalf of the village victims." According to the local GAM commander these "investigations" were being taken on behalf and at the request of local communities.
- In Nisam, Aceh Utara one-third of the *Geuchik* were forced to leave their villages during the conflict following threats from GAM. In December 2005, 7 of the 42 *Geuchik* still lived outside of the sub-district. Although some of these *Geuchik* had returned to visit their village during the day, none were brave enough to stay overnight or move back permanently. GAM perceived that some of these officials were too close to the government during the conflict and as such they still feared retribution if they were to return.

**Such tensions and differences indicate that the potential threat of harassment still limits the ability of villagers and, in particular, community leaders to voice their concerns.**

Villagers were increasingly willing to discuss such issues as the qualitative fieldwork went on, and there was a significant difference compared to research conducted prior to the MoU. Freedom of expression has improved considerably as a result of the peace process. However, there is still a long way to go. As the experience of the village officials highlighted above indicates, in a number of sub-districts some villagers and community leaders continue to fear harassment from GAM and are reluctant to voice their concerns or to present opposing views.

**These tensions could come to head in the coming elections, particularly if they become a run-off between pro-GAM and pro-Gol candidates.** Surveys undertaken prior to the MoU, as well as fieldwork completed after,<sup>23</sup> indicate that there are varying levels of sympathy for GAM and the Gol. However, in some villages both GAM returnees and those closer to the government, simultaneously claim the support of the community. These claims of support will be on trial when GAM, or GAM leaders as independents, contest the elections scheduled for later this year.

### **3. Benefits and Support for Returnees**

In order to smooth the return of former GAM combatants and prisoners, the Government envisioned an initial reinsertion package. Information, Counseling and Referral Service (ICRS) centers were set up within district-level *Dinas Sosial* (Department of Social Affairs) offices. IOM provided support in delivering a package of cash (in three payments) and other benefits, such as clothing, to up to 2,000 pardoned prisoners through these centers. This is an ongoing process and to date, 1956 have been registered. It was also envisioned that a basic package would be given to 3,000 ex-combatants. Political disagreement over the production of a list of eligible combatants meant that the planned reinsertion benefits did not eventuate. Instead, the Government has delivered three rounds of *jadup* (social security) benefits through GAM commanders.

#### ***Political prisoners***

**The provision of reinsertion assistance to political prisoners is being implemented successfully and without serious issues.** Political prisoners amnestied on the August 30<sup>th</sup>, and those pardoned on August 17<sup>th</sup>, each received a reintegration package from IOM. The process of identifying prisoners is ongoing and at the time of writing a total of 1956 political prisoners across all Acehese districts have received assistance. Although some jealousies exist, the provision of benefits to prisoners has not resulted in community tensions. This is because their fellow villagers most often feel sympathy for their situation and believe they have the right to assistance as a form of compensation for the time they spent incarcerated and the impact this had on their health and economic well-being. A survey conducted by IOM when the third round of payments were distributed showed satisfaction amongst prisoners with the program. 87.6% said the payments had been very helpful and 11.4% said they had been somewhat helpful. Only 0.7% said they had made no difference, and no political prisoners said they had caused problems.<sup>24</sup>


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<sup>23</sup> See Barron, Patrick, Samuel Clark and Muslahuddin Daud (2005). *Conflict and Recovery in Aceh: An Assessment of Conflict Dynamics and Options for Supporting the Peace Process*. Jakarta: World Bank/DSF.

<sup>24</sup> Sample size: 1476.

**Prisoners appear to be using the money sensibly, with the largest proportion being spent on paying off debt and everyday needs.** The same survey showed that one-quarter of the money had been spent on debt which prisoners (or their families) had incurred, often during the time they were incarcerated (see Figure 3.2) Cumulatively, the next largest proportion was on everyday consumption and costs including food, shelter, healthcare and education.

**Figure 3.2: Proportion of Payments to Prisoner by Use**



Source: IOM survey

60.6% of prisoners are head of households and 48.1% have children under the age of 18. Therefore the funds are most commonly used for their family's day-to-day needs.

"While we were in prison, our wives had to go into debt to find food and pay for the children's schooling. Some would envy us getting Rp. 5 million, but the reality is, all of that is used to pay off the debts."

*Former political prisoner, Seruway, Aceh Tamiang*

"We use the [IOM] money now for sending our two children to school. One is in middle school and one in high school. It is also used for day-to-day needs. I'm not really sure what I'll do in the future. There are not really any opportunities. If I had some capital then maybe I would begin to think about what I might do. Maybe sow a forest garden, use the capital to buy seeds and fertilizer."

*Former political prisoner, Muara Tiga, Pidie*

**Such packages are useful for facilitating return or reinsertion, but they should be seen as the first step only to more complete social and economic reintegration.** The survey reported that 15.5% had been spent on business investment, but the research found few examples of this in the field. A similar situation is likely to occur should GAM members be only provided with cash payments. It suggests that cash payments, while initially useful, are effective only in the short-term run.

### **Former Combatants**

**In contrast to political prisoners, former combatants have received very little assistance.** The Governor of Aceh provided three rounds of payments to combatants via the GAM hierarchy in October, November and January. The amount provided in each round was Rp. 1,000,000 (approximately US\$100) per combatant for a total of 3,000 combatants. The *Bupati* (District Head) of each district handed over the money to GAM commanders at the district level, with the allocation within districts determined by GAM.

"When we were given the assistance all [GAM] members and commanders were called [to a meeting]. We all decided how to divide up the money and our commanders gave it to us in front of everyone."

*Former combatant, Muara Tiga, Pidie*

**However, it is clear from the field research that each combatant received significantly less than Rp. 1 million per round.** The quantitative survey showed that a majority (68.7%) of GAM received some amount. On average each combatant or GAM member received Rp. 170,000-260,000 each round. The primary reason is that GAM often gave money to others in the organization plus vulnerable groups in the community, such as orphans and widows of GAM


combatants. There was not evidence to suggest that the lower amounts were the result of corruption by either the government or GAM.

"We know that Rp. 1 million was provided for the 3,000 combatants mentioned in the MoU. There was agreement here amongst the [GAM] leadership for this money to be divided up. This was done by the *Panglima Sagoe* (*Kecamatan*-level commander), who also gave some of the money to conflict widows. We each received Rp. 50,000 each time."

*Former combatant, Bakongan Timur, Aceh Selatan*

Further, the research indicates that there is significant variation in the amount received by each active GAM. Figure 3.3 shows the proportion of surveyed active GAM who received different amounts. 40.4% received equal or less than Rp. 200,000 over two-three rounds of *jadup* provision.

**Figure 3.3: Amount of Benefits Received by Surveyed Active GAM (Rp.)**



Source: AMM/WB survey

Similarly, Table 3.2 indicates the variation both across and within the study's ten qualitative research districts. Much of this variation can be explained by the decentralized method of distribution. At all levels, the *Panglima Wilayah*, *Panglima Daerah* and *Panglima Sagoe*, had significant discretion in the allocation of the funds. Thus in some locations the funds were distributed to TNA only, whereas in other locations all GAM received some amount. Similarly, in some locations the funds were given to conflict victims whereas in other areas they were not.

**Table 3.2: Variations in Jadup Received**

District(s)	MoU allocation (persons)	Amount Received per Round (Rp.)	
		Min <sup>25</sup>	Max
Aceh Barat Daya	112	30,000	110,000
Aceh Besar	321	50,000	200,000
Aceh Jaya	208	250,000	300,000
Aceh Selatan	220	50,000	150,000
Aceh Tamiang	75	80,000	150,000
Aceh Timur	455	200,000	300,000
Aceh Utara	364	In kind <sup>26</sup>	800,000
Bener Meriah & Aceh Tengah	102	250,000	750,000

Source: Qualitative fieldwork

<sup>25</sup> The minimum column in this table does not include those who did not receive any part of the *jadup* payment but who felt they were eligible.

<sup>26</sup> In Nisam, Aceh Utara, GAM combatants on two occasions received the *jadup* in the form of an allocation of meat from their leaders.

**The research data does not suggest any systematic exclusion across the whole of Aceh.**

The decentralized allocation makes it difficult to identify who exactly is being excluded from receiving benefits. However, the quantitative survey provides some indication of which groups *might* be prioritized and, conversely, excluded. Among the respondents in the survey, TNA were most likely to receive the *jadup*. 71.2% of TNA, 63.6% of GAM police, 57.8% of civil GAM and only 35.3% of 'probationary GAM' received the funds. Female combatants were less likely to receive assistance; 69.3% of males did, compared to 54.2% of females.

**Despite this variation, the provision of *jadup* via the GAM hierarchy has not resulted in conflict or social tensions.**

Those community members who were aware of the amount (and many were not), acknowledged that GAM returnees deserved assistance. Likewise, the distribution of *jadup* via the GAM hierarchy has not created problems within GAM for two reasons. First, most GAM returnees were aware that the amount would not cover all of GAM; they were either included in the decision on how to distribute the funds locally, or they accepted their commanders decision on how to distribute limited resources. Second, the amount in question is not very significant. Many combatants did not refer to this money as "reintegration assistance" but, rather, as "smoking money" provided by their commanders. The sole exception in our research areas was Aceh Tengah district where tensions emerged when some GAM missed out on receiving benefits.

"I haven't received any assistance from AMM but have got some from our *Panglima*. Maybe that money from the *Panglima* is from AMM. We don't know because we are regarded as children because we have leaders above us. This money is actually smoking money, up to Rp. 110,000 each."

*Former combatant, Kuala Batee, Aceh Barat Daya*

**Overall, the provision of *jadup* via the GAM hierarchy has had little impact and, in its current form, can only be justified as a short-term intervention.**

This is largely due to the fact that the amount to date has been relatively small. The use of GAM's military structure to distribute the payments also re-enforces these structures and, should future payments be more significant, could stymie reintegration into civic structures. As noted above, even the more significant amounts received by political prisoners have mostly been used towards meeting day-to-day needs and repaying past debts and have yet to ensure more sustainable social and economic reintegration. Overall, the size and manner of distribution of payments made to date, indicate that, although they have been welcome, they remain a short-term fix. Future cash payments should take into consideration the amount needed to ensure the payments are put to sustainable use and be accompanied by a more structured program of distribution and support.


### **Community Support of Returnees**

**To date, communities themselves have provided the most significant assistance to GAM returnees.**

Often this is support from returnees' immediate family, but in many cases the whole community is concerned with the economic plight of those coming back (see Box 3.4 below). 74.3% of active GAM indicated that they had received assistance from families, 45.4% from GAM leaders, 37.7% from friends, 17.5% from communities, and only 6.3% from the government and international NGOs combined (see Figure 3.4).<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Interestingly, zero percent reported receiving economic assistance from local NGOs.

**Figure 3.4: Who Active GAM Have Received Assistance From**



Source: AMM/WB survey

**The provision of this assistance from communities reflects a widespread desire for people to make peace work and villagers are often willing to make sacrifices in order to support returning GAM.** Throughout the qualitative research villagers highlighted the fact that they were willing to provide support to returnees and make compromises in order to ensure the peace process continued (see Box 3.4).

"The people here will welcome ex-combatants if they (the returning combatants) really want peace."

*Militia member, Permata, Bener Meriah*

Victims of GAM acts during the conflict often find it challenging to see GAM returnees, sometimes even the perpetrators of the acts, becoming part of the community again. Whilst they may go out of their way to avoid coming into contact with these returnees, they are overwhelmingly willing to accept their presence in the village for the sake of peace. These villagers often stress that the onus lies on the returnees to ensure that their intentions are positive and to make positive efforts to reintegrate.

**Box 3.4: Collective Responsibility for Peace**

Even in villages that traditionally have low levels of support for GAM, and very few returnees, the receiving communities are sympathetic to the economic plight of the combatants. They have voluntarily provided the returnees with floor mats, pots and pans, *cangkul* (hoe), as well as cigarettes. This is not because they necessarily support GAM's ideology but, rather, because they value peace and are willing to do whatever they can to make it work, and because they view returning GAM as community members above and beyond their GAM identity.

"They do have problems when they return, but not with the community at large. The reintegration problems they have are of a personal nature. When they come home they have nothing, they have to live with relatives temporarily, and they have no more fish farms, so it is really difficult for them."

*Villager, Gelong, Aceh Tamiang*

Villagers are concerned that returnees might get frustrated with the conditions in the village and go back into the jungle. One villager invoked the saying, "rather than become a sheep in a city, it's much better to

become a tiger in the jungle" to explain why GAM might return to fighting. Their wise observations were accompanied with requests for assistance, for they realized that ultimately the community could not resolve the issue themselves.

"Please help them, support them, and give them jobs. We are afraid if it continues to be like this, the peace agreement might fail and then we would be talking about a third peace process!"

*Villager, Gelong, Aceh Tamiang*

**Overall, the level of extortion has decreased since the signing of the MoU.** During the conflict villagers were subject to frequent 'requests' for assistance from both sides. The number and scale of these requests appears to have decreased in most of the 38 villages visited. In some locations, such as Aceh Utara, GAM has made it clear in an instruction sheet provided to returnees that they are not to request money or *pajak nanggroe* from communities except when GAM leaders authorize it. Instead of GAM formally making requests for *pajak nanggroe*, which was common in the past, GAM returnees have in places made individual requests for contributions or assistance.

**Communities are prepared to assist GAM returnees if it results in continued peace.** To date villagers have been willing to respond to requests for assistance from returnees. As mentioned in the box above, communities acknowledge that returnees have particular needs. The improved economic climate since the start of the peace process also means that people are more easily able to provide assistance. Finally, communities also feel more empowered to reject those "requests" they consider being closer to acts of "extortion".

"To me, extortion is ok, I tolerate it for the sake of keeping the peace, because it is a fact of life here. Besides, now that there is peace, it is easier for me to find work, so I am able to pay them money when they ask for it"

*Javanese villager, Penaron, Aceh Timur*

"Now, since the peace there is no quota [*pajak nanggroe* or 'GAM tax'] any more. If they ask it is only if you are willing. If you don't give [them anything], no worries."

*Villager, Babahrot, Aceh Barat*

**The ability of villagers to question requests for assistance is positive but may also create tensions.** In a number of districts, villagers had rejected extortion attempts and this has been accepted by the GAM returnees. In Aceh Barat Daya, for example, GAM members had requested a considerable payment from 200 families who had recently been allocated land from the Government. Following a complaint to AMM, GAM withdrew the request and the number of extortion complaints has decreased across the district. However, villagers sometimes find it difficult to distinguish between 'extortion' and what might actually be genuine requests for 'assistance' and this can lead to tension between parties involved (see Box 3.5).

"As a minority, we are happy with the peace process because we can go to work as normal and we can cultivate our land in the hills. But now that there is peace, we are confronted with continued requests for money by GAM. This is extortion. We are also not sure what the future will be..."

*Javanese villager, Penaron, Aceh Timur*

### Box 3.5: Different Approaches to "Extortion" Within the Same Sub-district

In Muara Tiga, Pidie, GAM recently made two attempts to obtain assistance in separate villages. Their approach in one village was to 'request' a cut from the KDP project.

"We asked the village head for money. They thought that we wanted *pajak nanggroe* but it's not like that. Actually we only asked the village head as a community member. We've just returned from the mountains and hardly have the clothes on our back. We asked the community for help, not for tax."

*Former combatant, Muara Tiga, Pidie*

"One week ago GAM requested some money from the KDP budget. I called the community together for a *musyawarah* (community consensus meeting). We [community leaders] explained to them that KDP funds were from foreigners. Normally they [GAM] request between 10-50%. However the community decided that this time no KDP money would be handed over. In my opinion GAM was half-hearted in their request ... as in the past I've had requests and their attitude was different, more like a demand than a request."

*Village head, Muara Tiga, Pidie*

In another village, the same GAM members made a request for Rp. 5 million from the former village head. The GAM leader claimed that the former village head had collected the amount as *pajak nanggroe* from the community before the MoU but had failed to pass it on to GAM. He refuted this and a fight broke out. After the matter was reported to the police a *musyawarah* was called involving GAM, the former village head, government officials and a representative from AMM. Whilst the matter is considered resolved, the former village head continues to feel unsafe in the village.

**The longer the majority of GAM returnees remain unemployed the greater the potential for increased extortion.** As almost three-quarters of active GAM remain unemployed, they face both a lack of financial support activities to spend their time on. The failure to keep returnees busy has the potential to lead to an increase in requests for assistance, including extortion. Indeed, some community members think that if jobs are provided, GAM returnees would no longer have the right to make requests. The key here is ensuring GAM who have recently returned are provided with something, such as a job, to occupy their time.

## 4. Knowledge of the Peace Process and AMM

"I don't know anything about the issues in the MoU. All I know is that there is already peace. Because there is peace we are happy."

*Villager, Kuala Batee, Aceh Barat Daya*

"Peace or no peace, the community doesn't really understand. They only know if there are soldiers, if there's *Brimob* (paramilitary police), if there's GAM. That's what they see and understand, not the MoU."

*KDP sub-district facilitator, Peukan Bada, Aceh Besar*

**Level of awareness of the MoU is high amongst villagers, but knowledge of its contents and meaning is very low.** Everyone without exception is aware of an agreement that resulted in the peace process. Indeed, they can see the changes in their lives: increased mobility, the removal of the TNI, and the fact that they no longer are required to report to military posts. Most informants have heard about the MoU and the peace process on television and have seen some posters or pamphlets. Very few, however, have actually read the MoU and even fewer understand its contents.

**Awareness and understanding is higher amongst returnees.** 32.3% of active GAM indicated that they either "know the content very well" or "know the main points" (see Figure 3.5). The majority (50.6%) felt they knew "just a little", which although still low is much higher than ordinary villagers who had almost no understanding of the content. Indeed, one village-level GAM returnee in Aceh Selatan was able to cite specific clauses of the MoU. There are two reasons for GAM's higher understanding. First, it is more relevant to their lives; returnees are far more interested in the MoU than ordinary community members. Second, GAM has used their command structure to conduct person-to-person socialization, which is more effective than other non-institutional forms of information dissemination.

"I have already read the MoU. We had a meeting with our leaders and we went through it together. I've also read it from one of those books."

*Former combatant, Peukan Bada, Aceh Besar*


"I know the section you're talking about [on the right to join the 'Acehnese military']. It's article 3.3.7 I think [close, it's 3.2.7]. But you have to read it carefully. It doesn't actually say that we can join the 'TNI' but rather the organic police and organic military forces. I wouldn't join the TNI but I would join the 'Aceh organic military'."

*Former combatant, Samadua, Aceh Selatan*

**Figure 3.6 shows the different means by which returning combatants had gained their knowledge of the MoU.** 84.3% of active GAM surveyed said their leaders had socialized the peace agreement and the MoU; 37.0% said AMM had been involved in socialization. Government (13.6%) and community and religious leaders (16.9% were also involved). Other sources were less important.<sup>28</sup>

**GAM has been systematic in socializing the MoU through their ranks, right down to the village level.** In many locations, GAM continue to meet to discuss the MoU and other developments. Whilst this socialization process has been effective, it is often focused on providing GAM returnees with information on how they should conduct themselves during the peace. Other than this internal approach, AMM's *Kecamatan*-level socialization forums have been the most successful approach. These forums involve not only GAM but government officials and village representatives. In this regard, they provide greater opportunities to ensure that information makes its way to villagers, than do other mechanisms.


**Figure 3.5: Active GAM Members' Knowledge of the MoU**



Source: AMM/WB survey

<sup>28</sup> 3.6% said local civil society organizations and NGOs had conducted socialization and 3.2% said international NGOs had done so.

**Figure 3.6: Sources of Knowledge of the MoU Amongst Active GAM**



Source: AMM/WB survey

**There are various and often conflicting interpretations (and misunderstandings) of the MoU amongst the community.** That people have different opinions is not in itself a problem. Rather, it also highlights the importance of the "joint socialization" approach as adopted by GAM, Gol and AMM. Such forums create ideal spaces and places to peacefully express and debate interpretations, and ensure differences are resolved through dialogue.


"The people don't want to know too much about the MoU because afterwards they will have lots of thoughts. However, now there are some that say the MoU means independence. Some say it means federalism. Some say that if we can pick local political parties later, Aceh can be free."

*Village head, Seunuddon, Aceh Utara*

"If you meet the community and especially GAM, you need to explain to them that the true meaning of the MoU is that Aceh will remain part of Indonesia and that the NKRI (nationalist unity ideology) is accepted. If you tell them that, they'll listen. Some GAM refuse to acknowledge this and have been saying that the MoU does not necessarily say that."

*Anti-separatist front member, Bakongan Timur, Aceh Selatan*

**Continued socialization is important but the emphasis must shift to giving villagers concrete information on parts of the agreement that directly affect their lives.** Socialization of the MoU and the general principles of the peace were important in the first months after August 15<sup>th</sup>. However, villagers' and returnees' information needs have shifted. The top priority information needs of surveyed active GAM related to information on economic benefits and programming and political information. As Figure 3.7 shows, 61.1% said they want information on employment opportunities, 29.0% on the reintegration fund, 36.5% want political information, and 36.8% would like more information on financial services. Similarly, community members interviewed were more interested in information on access to development programs and economic opportunities than in political information. The main area of interest relating to political information was the establishment of local political parties. Respondents, both GAM and normal villagers, were generally much more interested in obtaining political information, including information on the Law on Governing Aceh, in district capitals than at the village level.

**Figure 3.7: Information Needs of Former Combatants**

Source: AMM/WB survey

**As reintegration programs start to reach the ground, it is particularly important that villagers understand their aims and procedures.** Socialization efforts in the coming months should focus on strategies to help villagers understand these programs.

**Community understanding of the role of AMM is very low.** At best, communities have seen their cars drive by and are aware they were involved with the decommissioning. However, they know very little about their functions and the length of their mandate. Most villagers do not know how to report an incident to AMM.

"People know there is peace, that there is an MoU. But what does this mean? People don't understand. The same with the AMM. People don't know what this is. Even if you ask at a house or shop in the area around the AMM office, the people still won't know what the AMM is. The most they will know is that the AMM is collecting GAM's weapons. There has never been a socialization program [by AMM]. The government hasn't had a socialization program either."

*Resident, Takengon, Aceh Tengah*

"I have heard of AMM, they came to this village in their cars, but I'm not sure what they do. Is it only to destroy GAM's weapons like they show on television? Or do they do more than that?"

*Villager, Banyak Payek, Aceh Tamiang*

**GAM members have a higher understanding of AMM's role but amongst ordinary members there is confusion as to the extent of AMM's mandate.** As mentioned above, 37.0% of active GAM have attended socialization conducted by AMM. Some believe that AMM's role goes beyond issues relating to the peace process and that they should be active in any disputes involving former combatants.

"What problems are AMM handling? Why didn't they act when our wood was confiscated? So what are they for?"

*Former combatant, Babahrot, Aceh Barat Daya*

**The AMM and international presence is, however, viewed as important to both GAM and communities.** Although the majority of villagers and GAM do not have detailed knowledge on their role, respondents claim that the presence of AMM has given them personal security and confidence in the peace process. In a number of instances, serious incidents such as murder

have been reported. More recently, a number of old graves have been excavated in the presence of AMM representatives.<sup>29</sup> In addition, and perhaps more importantly, people feel their presence is important to prevent incidents from occurring. Nearly everyone interviewed is adamant that international monitors should stay as long as possible, some even suggesting that they remain until the 2009 local elections.

"If there were no international monitors, this peace process couldn't have happened. Now, if we break the law we have to face the UN (sic). The same applies for the Government of Indonesia. If they break the law they will also have to account to the UN (sic)."

*Former combatant, Laut Tawar, Aceh Tengah*

"I have faith in this agreement because we have AMM. If there was no AMM then I'm not so sure."

*Former combatant, Tiro/Truseb, Pidie*

"I really hope that the AMM, the international community, will stay in Aceh to monitor the peace process. Up until now, the AMM's role has been very satisfactory because they are really independent. Independent foreign observers must be here to monitor the local general election."

*Former combatant, Meurandeh, Aceh Tamiang*

**Feelings are mixed amongst those who have actually had dealings with AMM.** As was mentioned earlier, the AMM played an important role in resolving an extortion complaint in Aceh Barat Daya relating to the allocation of land for 200 families. In Aceh Utara, the AMM has also worked closely with GAM and Government leaders to initiate *Kecamatan*-level dispute resolution forums that are able to deal with complaints efficiently. In other locations, local level GAM and anti-separatist fronts were disappointed with their experience.

"This problem [of extortion] has already been reported to AMM but they say it is still in process. If I don't give the money then I'm likely to get beaten. In fact, I've already been beaten once."

*Widow, Muara Tiga, Pidie*

In Aceh Selatan, some GAM became distrustful when two colleagues died while receiving medical treatment that AMM facilitated (see box in the next section). In Aceh Besar, a group of surrendered GAM who were recently beaten by returning GAM were skeptical about AMM, believing that they did not properly follow up their cases. A similar situation occurred in Pidie, where AMM was not seen as having properly investigated a local criminal incident involving GAM and a former anti-separatist member. Often this dissatisfaction stems from a lack of understanding about the scope of AMM's mandate. Some GAM members, and communities, believe that AMM can assist in resolving any of their disputes and are therefore disappointed when AMM is not able to provide assistance.

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<sup>29</sup> See World Bank/DSF, Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update, January 1-31. Available on-line at [www.conflictanddevelopment.org](http://www.conflictanddevelopment.org).



#### IV. The Needs and Aspirations of GAM Returnees

## IV. The Needs and Aspirations of GAM Returnees

"I am afraid if they [GAM returnees] have no jobs to fill their time and to feed their families, they will resort to other things. I give them cigarettes and some rice not because they ask for them from me, but because I want to help them get back on their feet. My own situation is bad, but they need more support from the community. This peace is everybody's responsibility."

*Village elder, Seruway, Aceh Tamiang*


The last section examined the dynamics of reintegration. Thus far the process has been relatively smooth. At the local level, people are seeing the benefits of peace in the form of freedom of mobility and freedom from fear. Recipient communities and returnees largely focus on the benefits of peace. However, a number of challenges were identified relating to the reinsertion process and the longer-term reintegration of former combatants and political prisoners into economic and civic life. Lack of employment for GAM returnees has meant that many are overly dependant on communities and in some cases resort to illegal activities to get by. With the exception of relatively small payments to former prisoners, and even smaller amounts to former combatants, benefit packages have not yet arrived. Communities have still to see any peace dividend in terms of rebuilt infrastructure or economic empowerment programs. After the first blushes of peace fade, will the appropriate incentives be in place to consolidate continuing peaceful development?

This section builds upon the previous analysis by considering the different socio-economic needs and aspirations that GAM returnees have. The methodology is simple. The needs and aspirations are those identified and prioritized by returnees - former combatants, non-combatants and political prisoners - themselves, rather than those that the research teams noted. The emphasis is on what GAM members at the local level want, and what they perceive they are entitled to. How these identified needs might help ensure successful reintegration is also assessed. The next section considers how GAM returnee needs fit with those of the communities to which they are returning, and includes a preliminary discussion of design principles and delivery mechanisms for those designing programs in these areas. This conversation is extended in the conclusions and recommendations of the report. Needs are discussed in the order in which they were prioritized.

The greatest development need for GAM returnees is for activities that will reestablish their livelihoods. Most often they prioritize the provision of capital to be used for productive activities. However, this will need to be accompanied by practical training and the rebuilding of local economies, including improving links to markets. Other needs for GAM returnees include rebuilding housing damaged or destroyed during the conflict, or by the tsunami; tending to immediate health needs (including those related to mental health issues); and improving access to healthcare and education. Provision of land is not a priority for most returnees; most have access to land already, or else want to engage in occupations where land is not required.

Figure 4.1 shows needs as prioritized by surveyed active GAM. Provision of capital was deemed to be the most important (91.7% said it was a priority, and 46.9% their top priority), followed by housing (74.6%), health care (26.2%), skills-building (18.4%) and formal education (18.3%). Women and men GAM members prioritized broadly similar needs.

Figure 4.1: Priority Needs of Active GAM



Source: AMMWB survey

## 1. Capital and Livelihoods Assistance

"That [employment for returnees] has become my largest burden since becoming the GAM representative on AMM ... because they [GAM returnees] can't improve their condition because they are still unemployed. They don't have money. They have only the burden of the forests."

*GAM representative to AMM, Aceh Utara*

"The basis of all our problems is an economic one. What we need is capital. If we continue to face economic difficulties like this, sooner or later we might resort to stealing for survival. We have families and children to feed at home. We need to work not to fill our stomach but also to help the community. We ask for capital and jobs not just for us, but also for the community, they too have suffered because of the tsunami."

*Former combatant, Krueng Sabee, Aceh Jaya*

The desire for capital largely relates to GAM returnees' ambition to restart their livelihoods. During the fieldwork, returnees differentiated between capital (which they said they would use for productive activities such as to clear fields or set up small businesses) and other cash benefits (which they would use for everyday needs). While they would certainly appreciate the latter, they prioritize money that could be used for livelihood purposes.

The current employment status of returnees is precarious. Very few have found long-term employment. The majority are in the process of returning to their previous livelihoods (predominantly agricultural or fisheries based), assisting their families, working day-jobs (*pekerjaan lepas*) when they can find them, or waiting for guidance from GAM leaders regarding future employment. There was a widespread desire amongst GAM returnees to start work.

### Options for Improving Livelihoods

Almost all returnees identified a lack of employment opportunities or ability to generate an income as their greatest concern. Active GAM surveyed generally identified four options available to them for finding employment (see Table 4.1). The *first* option involves returning to their previous livelihood in their current village. Prior to joining GAM most returnees were either farmers (30.2% of active GAM), small traders (19.6%), worked day-to-day jobs (8.9%) or fishermen (7.6%). *Second*, some returnees were interested in finding new employment opportunities in their existing villages or sub-districts. *Third*, others want to move from their

village, but remain in the same kind of work as they were in prior to joining GAM. If work opportunities do not arise in the coming months, it is likely that this strategy will become more popular. *Fourth*, younger returnees, particularly from more semi-urban areas, want to leave their village to find new forms of employment in more commercially developed towns. A *fifth* category

**Table 4.1: Livelihoods Strategies of Active GAM**

No.	Livelihoods Strategy		Percentage <sup>30</sup>
	Stay in Same Job (Yes/No)	Stay in Same Village (Yes/No)	
1	Yes	Yes	43.1%
2	No	Yes	26.0%
3	Yes	No	6.1%
4	No	No	1.3%
5	Don't know if want same job or to stay in same village		23.5%

Source: AMM/WB survey

**Most active GAM want to return to their former occupations in their village.** Those who were traders - either small or large - before joining GAM are more likely to want to return to their former occupation than those in other occupations. This is identified as the preferred option of the largest number of active GAM (43.1%). Those in their later working years (aged 36-55), who had significant work experience prior to joining GAM, are particularly likely to pursue this option.

**The next largest category is of combatants and non-combatants who want to stay in their villages but find a new job (26.0%).** This comprises those who have yet to return to work, but who want to change from their previous occupation when they do (19.9% of all active GAM), and those who have jobs but who want to find new ones in their villages (6.1%). Indeed, active GAM and prisoners appear more interested in looking for new kinds of work than does the community at large, who tend to resist changing occupations. Those most interested in doing non-farming work are: (a) those who have limited experience in farming prior to joining GAM (often because they were young when they joined GAM), or (b) those who do not own their own land. Many who want to try new forms of work do not want to leave their villages. This is largely because they

**Table 4.2: Kinds of New Jobs Wanted by Active GAM**

New Job Wanted	Percentage of those wanting new jobs in same village
Small trader	52.2%
Big trader	26.5%
Farmer	2.4%
Civil Servant	2.4%
Carpenter	2.3%

Source: AMM/WB survey

either want to spend time with their families after time away fighting, or because GAM commanders have instructed them to stay within their areas. These returnees often express an interest in becoming traders or opening up small service shops, such as mechanic shops in their villages or sub-districts. GAM returnees are interested in these occupations because they want to be their own bosses. For many, who are struggling to adapt to the decrease in their power now they do not have access to a gun, working for someone else is an unattractive

proposition. As such, GAM returnees tend to favor occupations where they have a larger degree of autonomy and decision-making power

**A third group (6.1%) plan to move from their villages and find similar work to their previous occupation.** Although the sample size is small for this group, these respondents are more likely

<sup>30</sup> Excluding those unemployed before they joined GAM.

to have had their house destroyed or damaged (66.9% compared to 47.9% overall). Similarly, they are less likely to have access to land. Invariably, the decision to move is based on a determination of where best they can pursue their previous livelihood, although cultural factors may also play a role. In many parts of Aceh, the custom is for the man to move to the village of his wife after marrying. Therefore those young GAM returnees now marrying are likely to move while, by necessity, they retain their previous occupations.

**A small proportion of active GAM (1.3%), predominantly younger members who joined GAM while they were still teenagers, want to move and to find new occupations.** This group, by and large, has little or no experience in traditional occupations such as farming or fishing. Some of these GAM returnees, especially those from more urbanized areas such as Aceh Besar, Pidie and Aceh Utara, indicate that they would be willing to move to pursue new opportunities such as trading or working in construction.

**Almost one quarter (23.5%) of active GAM do not know if they want to stay in their village and/or find a new form of employment.** This group is waiting to see what happens before they make choices about their location and preferred occupation.

**Overall, females surveyed who want new jobs are more likely to want to be civil servants (8.6% compared with 1.4% of men) or students (20.5% versus 1.8%).** This includes both those who want to move and those who are happy staying in their village. In contrast, men are more interested in becoming small traders than are women (53.1% compared to 27.6%). Of those surveyed with a diploma or university education who want a new job, almost all want to become traders - 64.4% big traders, and 24.8% small traders.

### ***Strategies for Supporting Livelihoods: Capital, Training, Private Sector Development and Job Creation***

**There is a healthy discourse at the village level and within GAM about the ways in which livelihoods can be rejuvenated.** Returnees identified the provision of capital as being the most pressing requirement to improve livelihoods. Returnees also require skills training and ongoing technical assistance and counseling. Improving links to markets is also key. However, in some cases improving the labor supply and reducing transaction costs will not be enough. Targeted job creation - including ensuring provision of tsunami and post-conflict construction jobs for returnees - is also necessary.

**GAM returnees identified a lack of capital as the single largest impediment to improved livelihoods.** This was particularly true for those wanting to engage in agricultural work and those seeking to establish small businesses. Some returnees were able to speak at length about the economic opportunities available in their areas and the assistance required to make these opportunities become a reality.

"I already have this idea for assisting the youth here in this village. I hope to find 200 hectares and organize the youth into an association to plant cocoa, palm trees, coffee etc. and manage the harvesting and selling process. The land is quite easy to find but I need the capital to start the process. By youth I don't just mean those who've just returned from the mountains [GAM] but for all the youth in this village. We don't need to distinguish between GAM and normal youth. Just anyone who needs a job."

*Former combatant, Kluet Tengah, Aceh Selatan*

"As a GAM leader here, I ask that we be given some capital. Otherwise, we have nothing to live on. Capital in whatever shape or form ... as long as we can use it and grow it for future use. The most effective means

to give aid is direct financial capital ... from there each of us can decide how best to put it to use; some would like to plant rice or go into chocolate production or open a shop ... it's flexible."

*GAM leader, Keude Gerobak, Aceh Timur*

"If I had capital I would want to open a plantation. There are eight hectares of land here that could be opened. The land used to be a rubber plantation but now it doesn't produce any more rubber. If there was capital I would want to clear the land. While I would plant some plants that require longer to grow, I would also put in ones that grow quicker. That way I could harvest these while I wait."

*Former political prisoner, Nisam, Aceh Utara*

**The manner in which capital would be used varies from area to area depending primarily on the agricultural industry in the area.** In plantation areas, capital is required to revive plantations that have fallen into a state of disrepair and to buy tools, seedlings and plants. In central Aceh, in particular, capital could facilitate the clearing of coffee plantations. In fishing areas, capital would be used to purchase fishing equipment, repair fish farms and eventually invest in boats. The opportunities in rice growing areas can be more limited due to the availability of land, although those without land tend to emphasize that they would rather move away from agricultural occupations than buy or receive land there. For those who already own land, capital is required to prepare the land and purchase rice seedlings, to prepare new rice fields, rent land or to open plantations in surrounding areas.

**Capital is also necessary for those who want to establish small businesses or become traders.** There appears to be a correlation between those who prioritize capital and those who want to become traders.

"What we need now is capital. If we have capital we can do whatever [we want]. The only problem now is that we don't have capital. We are no longer interested in the farming and forest garden work that we did before going to the mountains. How can one become prosperous from such activities?"

*Former combatant, Indrapuri, Aceh Besar*

"I joined AM (Aceh Merdeka - Free Aceh) in 1987, the movement which is now called GAM. Before that my expertise was farming. However, while in Malaysia I learnt how to trade and operate a small business. I have high hopes for the future but if I can't find any capital I'll just return to farming. Really, though, I'd like to start trading again; buy and sell everyday products. Not here in this village but in a busy city, maybe like Sigli or Banda Aceh."

*Former combatant, Tiro/Truseb, Pidie*

**The request for capital in many cases does not appear to be linked to fully thought-out strategies for how people will use it.** Across all forms of desired employment, people appear to want capital. Indeed, while returnees do prioritize capital as a pressing need, there are dangers with a large-scale cash transfer program (see Box 4.1). The program should be designed carefully, and accompanied by other complementary interventions.

#### **Box 4.1: Providing Capital to Improve Livelihoods - Design Considerations**

Capital is the most commonly identified need of returning former combatants and prisoners. In every village where research was conducted, it was claimed that the provision of money would help kick-start local economies and give the hand-up returnees needed. Yet it was clear from interviews that capital alone is not the answer to returnees' problems.

This is true for a number of reasons. First, many returnees are facing difficulties meeting day-to-day needs. The provision of direct capital grants might be spent on these needs (food, household supplies,

cigarettes etc.), rather than being appropriately invested to generate sustainable long-term income. The experience of the political prisoners - who have thus far received Rp. 5 million in cash payment - is illustrative. Money was used to repay debts and for regular needs, including access to health care but also cigarettes. There is a strong case to be made for small-scale cash transfers to former combatants to cover these costs. However, this should be distinguished from a livelihoods program, which must be longer-term and involve counselling and oversight in addition to capital.

Second, communities - including returnees - are generally unaccustomed to receiving capital grants or loans, and it was clear from the interviews that respondents did not always know how they could best make use of money they received. Third, targeting is extremely difficult. Should grants and loans go to those who most need it, or those who would make best use of it? If the latter, it is unclear that former combatants or prisoners would be those who should receive money; others in the village may have a greater claim on such resources (see next section).

The provision of capital should be a key part of reintegration programming. However, in order for it to be effective, some design principles should be adhered to:

- (1) Capital should be accompanied by technical assistance and extension work, with facilitators working closely with recipients on strategies for using the money.
- (2) Rather than providing one lump sum, money should be given in a number of stages, with monitoring of how the first tranche is spent a prerequisite before the second disbursement. Local NGOs could play this monitoring role.
- (3) Money should be given as grants rather than loans, because people are reluctant to borrow while the security situation remains unstable. Despite improvements, Acehese villagers are still risk-averse.
- (4) Targeting should be done by communities, to help decide who in the village should receive money. Criteria should include not only the potential private rate of return of investments funded through capital received, but also public spillovers. Again, facilitators should work closely with communities to help them make these decisions (see further discussion below).

**A second priority form of livelihood support is skills training.** 18.4% of active GAM stated that training was a priority need and 13.8% said they would like to have more information on skills training opportunities.

"Even if capital is given, the villagers don't know how to utilise it for maximum gain. If we had training on management skills, accounting, and planning, then these financial assistance schemes would really be effective. Because right now, if you give villagers capital, they would spend it all in one day...they don't know how to plan, how to invest it for future gain."

*Village official, Lamno, Aceh Jaya*

Active GAM want the skills required to trade, unsurprising given that becoming a trader is the aspiration of the majority of returnees who want new occupations. However, it is also important that a comprehensive livelihoods and economic assessment is conducted to determine sectors of employment where there is room for growth. It is unlikely that the Acehese rural economy could absorb a significant expansion in the small trade sector.

**Skills training will need to be accompanied by capital to enable these returnees to establish their enterprises.** Returnees talked of the limited utility of training programs that were not accompanied by the provision of capital.

"I've joined training programs in the past provided by the government. But what's the use if we're not then given the means to establish a small business and use our skills. I've been to two training sessions, one to learn how to be a mechanic, but have never used the skills because I never had any capital to open a work shop."

*Former combatant, Indrapuri, Aceh Besar*

**Third, broader private sector development strategies will also be necessary.** Improving the skills of a segment of the workforce, and improving the productivity of micro-industries and small-scale agricultural operations, will not alone improve the Acehnese economy. There is also a need to improve the local private sector climate to help ensure that there are jobs for those that have received training. In much of Indonesia, over-trained youth with no employment opportunities become key actors in conflict.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, a rise in agricultural production will not bring significant economic benefits if there are not links to markets where produce can be sold.

**Fourth, there is a case for providing preferential access to employment for returnees.** The tsunami reconstruction effort, and the large-scale public works projects it involves, provides a unique opportunity for job creation for former combatants and prisoners without significantly distorting the market. The post-conflict reconstruction program will provide similar opportunities. Ensuring access to employment is particularly important, given the tendency of some employers to discriminate against returnees. In particular in Aceh Jaya, where tsunami reconstruction is far and away the largest sector of employment, some combatants have found it difficult to secure employment with local NGOs because of their association with GAM.

"I applied for work as a driver, I brought along my CV and my SIM (driving license), but I was rejected the second the NGO found out I am a GAM returnee. My friend got fired after they found out he was also a GAM returnee."

*Former combatant (also IDP), Krueng Sabee, Aceh Jaya*

"I see the NGOs being co-opted by the Aceh Jaya government. They have been given advice to be wary of returnees looking for work. The NGOs hire help from outsiders. I don't understand why they would hire help from outsiders while there are plenty of us here willing to work hard, be it returnees like us or those who lost their jobs because of the tsunami."

*Former combatant, Krueng Sabee, Aceh Jaya*

**The inputs required to address the livelihood needs for each of the four livelihoods options are similar but the way these inputs are prioritized may differ.** Table 4.3 shows the different inputs that are needed for each of the four livelihood options discussed above. As can be seen, capital is important for all four groups, with the exception of those who want to engage in construction work outside their village. Training and skills-building is normally only necessary for those who want to try new occupations. Improving markets linkages is important for those choosing to remain in their village. Job creation schemes, including providing preferential access to jobs, benefit those planning to move.

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<sup>31</sup> Barron, Patrick and David Madden (2004). "Violent Conflict in 'Non-Conflict' Regions: The Case of Lampung, Indonesia." *Indonesia Social Development Paper* No. 2. Jakarta: World Bank.

**Table 4.3: Inputs for Improving Livelihoods for GAM Returnees**

Option for Improving Livelihood	Capital	Training/ skills-building	Private sector development	Preferential access to jobs
(1) Stay in village – go back to former occupation	***		* (improving access to markets)	
(2) Stay in village – new occupation	***	***	** (job creation and access to markets)	*
(3) Move from village – same occupation as before	** (dependant on type of work)		** (job creation)	**
(4) Move from village – new occupation	** (dependant on type of work)	**	** (job creation)	***

\*\*\* = high priority need; \*\* = medium priority need; \* = lower priority need

Assisting former combatants and prisoners in (re)establishing livelihoods will thus require a complex mix of programs aimed at people who pursue the different livelihoods options. A large-scale program of capital assistance should be the cornerstone of this, but it should be accompanied by programs aimed at reshaping the local demand for such workers, while also improving their skills and capacity. An integrated approach is needed.

## 2. Housing and Shelter


"I've had 3 houses burnt. Two here and my plantation house as well. Our house here was big. It was 4 meters by 15 meters. It was burnt on 6 June 2001. Our plantation house was burnt in 2003. Now we are living in this makeshift house with our 9 children."

*Former combatant, Permata, Bener Meriah*

**The second greatest desire for returnees is housing support. However, the need for this varies greatly between geographic locations, and in most cases this is a medium-term rather than immediate need.** GAM returnees in rural areas were more likely to prioritize housing as a need than those in urban locations (76.2% versus 61.2% of active GAM). Active GAM have generally been able to return to some form of housing. Most (62.9%) are staying in the houses of family members. Indeed, while housing ranks as the second highest priority of returning active GAM, the research indicated it was also an important priority for other community members (see discussion in the next section).

**The houses of a large proportion of returnees were destroyed or damaged in the conflict.** As Figure 4.2, shows the houses of almost half of surveyed active GAM were affected. Of those whose houses were totally destroyed in the conflict, only 6.9% have received compensation. For those whose houses were partially damaged, the figure is even lower (2.7%).


**Figure 4.2: Proportion of Active GAM Whose Houses Were Affected by the Conflict**



Source: AMM/WB survey

**Despite the number of returnees whose houses were damaged or destroyed in the conflict, combatants have places to stay.** As Figure 4.3 shows, there are not great differences between where former combatants lived before joining GAM, and where they are staying now. Slightly more are living in rented/shared houses and with friends, and slightly fewer in their family's or their own house. However, it appears that most returning GAM have been able to go back to the types of housing they lived in before.

**Figure 4.3: Where Former Combatants Lived Before Joining GAM and Now**



Source: AMM/WB survey

**There is not a big need for temporary shelter, with the exception of tsunami-affected areas where the housing needs of GAM members are the same as those of other villagers.** The houses of 23.9% of active GAM surveyed were affected by the tsunami (10.0% were destroyed; 13.9% damaged). In some heavily affected areas such as Aceh Jaya (50.1%) and Aceh Besar (38.0%), higher proportion of active GAM reported damage or destruction. These figures are high. Returnees may possibly be using a wide definition of the concept of family housing, including houses of extended family. Nevertheless, there is considerable overlap between areas GAM returnees are from - and are living in now - and the locations of severe tsunami damage.

**Active GAM are less likely to receive compensation for houses destroyed in the tsunami than the general population, largely because they were not around to register in the various programs that began in early 2005.** 16.7% of those whose houses were totally destroyed, and 10.7% of those whose houses were partially damaged by the tsunami have received compensation. 3.3% of returning former combatants are living in barracks. There is a need to ensure that GAM returnees are brought into existing tsunami shelter programs.

**In villages that were completely destroyed by conflict, housing is a need for both returnees and communities.** Table 4.4 contrasts the housing needs of GAM returnees and communities in villages visited across the qualitative research locations. It indicates that generally the needs of communities are just as great as GAM returnees. In a number of areas, particularly in more remote districts such as Aceh Selatan and Bener Meriah, whole villages were targeted. In these cases, the whole communities have been impacted and the housing needs are not restricted to GAM returnees alone. In other villages GAM families were singled out for attention.

**Table 4.4: Housing Destruction in 38 Research Villages**

District(s)	Villages Surveyed	# GAM Returnees Houses Destroyed (% GAM Returnees)	# Community Houses Destroyed (% Community Households)
Aceh Barat Daya	4	6 (7.1%)	13 (1.1%)
Aceh Besar	4	34* (63%)	249* (62.1%)
Aceh Jaya	4	21** (87.5%)	270** (84.4%)
Aceh Tengah & Bener Meriah	4	21 (51.2%)	266 (23.6%)
Aceh Selatan	5	22 (34.9%)	128 (24.1%)
Aceh Tamiang	4	6 (12.2%)	42 (4.8%)
Aceh Timur	5	5 (3.2%)	35 (3.2%)
Aceh Utara	4	21 (25.9%)	157 (10.8%)
Pidie	4	5 (11.1%)	17*** (3.8%)
Total (% of total returnees/ households)	38	141 (23.2%)	1177 (15.7%)

\* All destroyed by tsunami. \*\* Approximately 50% destroyed by tsunami. \*\*\* Includes 13 houses destroyed by tsunami.

Source: Qualitative fieldwork

In most of these areas, with the exception of those tsunami-affected, temporary housing is not needed, because those displaced have either re-built temporary housing or are staying with families or friends. However, it is seen by returnees and communities to be a matter of justice that houses damaged or destroyed are repaired or replaced.

**There are specific housing needs for younger combatants, most of whom are currently living with their families.** 79.4% of those who were 25 or under and who identified housing as a priority need, and 65.8% of those aged 26-35, lived in their family's house. As many of these younger combatants have yet to marry they do not yet have their own houses. While this is true for other single Acehnese males, the difference is that some of these combatants are above the average marriage age as they have spent a number of years in the forest. There is already evidence that many of these young combatants are starting to marry and move out of their family homes as the peace process progresses (see Section 2.3).

### 3. Health

"You can't see the injuries I got from the beatings on the outside, they were just bruises. But on the inside, everything is crushed."

*Former combatant, Kuala Batee, Aceh Barat Daya*

The health needs of returnees relate to conflict-specific injuries, diseases contracted during the period in the jungle, as well as mental health issues. Across all districts, the physical and mental

health condition of political prisoners was identified as being particularly pressing. Addressing health problems for returnees is made more difficult by problems in accessing health care. This relates primarily to the cost of health care and of transportation to clinics.

### Health Needs of Returnees


**A large proportion of former combatants are experiencing health problems.** These include conflict-related injuries such as bullet wounds and illnesses like malaria that are related to spending time in the forests.

"Up until now we've not had a check-up by a doctor. We've certainly not gone to the hospital even though I've three bullets lodged in my back and right leg, as that would cost us too much money. However, they've already healed over as you can see [shows us] and only the one in my shoulder and my calf still gives me some discomfort, especially at night. I'm currently working as a trader. I used to work as a farmer but because of my injuries I'm not physically able to do physical work in the fields."

*Former combatant, Samadua, Aceh Selatan*

Figure 4.4 shows the percentage of different categories of active GAM suffering from conflict-related wounds and chronic disease.

**Figure 4.4: Health Condition by Position in GAM**



Source: AMM/WB survey

**No female former combatants surveyed reported conflict-related wounds.** Interestingly, combatant returnees (TNA) were only slightly more likely to suffer from wounds or disease than those who were civil GAM, GAM police, or probation TNA. Unsurprisingly those who were disabled in some way were more likely to prioritize health care than those who were not (41.9% compared to 22.8%). Similarly, those who had a chronic disease were more likely to prioritize healthcare than those who did not (30.0% compared to 24.5%). Overall, older combatants, and especially those over 65, were more likely to have conflict-related wounds than younger combatants.

**The health condition of prisoners is worse than that of active GAM.** 87% of political prisoners have wounds or are disabled and 35% have some form of chronic disease. The medical condition of prisoners was also raised as a pressing issue in most of the districts visited. All political prisoners interviewed claim to have ongoing medical conditions as a result of their treatment in jail. This is having an impact on their day-to-day existence and their ability

to return to work. Prisoners interviewed in the qualitative fieldwork claim to suffer symptoms such as extensive respiratory and internal organ problems.

"Whilst I was in jail, and during interrogations, I was tortured in many ways - such as being hung from my feet, having my toenails pulled out and receiving beatings - and I still feel the pain now in my bones. Sometimes blood still comes out of my ears."

*Former political prisoner, Laut Tawar, Aceh Tengah*

**Mental health problems are highly prevalent throughout the districts surveyed.** 21.2% of active GAM said they suffered from conflict-related psychological problems. This is remarkably high given cultural tendencies to underplay such problems. Females disproportionately report having psychological problems: 46.2% of surveyed female returning combatants reported such issues, compared to 20.5% of men. Returning combatants (TNA) were also significantly less likely to report psychological problems than other returnees. 18.4% of returning TNA said they had psychological problems, compared with 31.4% of civilian GAM, 31.8% of GAM police and 23.9% of probation GAM.

**Several factors may explain the differences in reported levels of mental health problems.** Firstly, culturally, Acehnese women are more likely to openly discuss issues relating to trauma and psychological problems than men. Acehnese men, particularly younger males, may refer to the mental health condition of communities but would be inclined to deny personal psychological problems. As the proportion of young males is higher in TNA than in other GAM roles this also helps explain the higher impact of psychological problems amongst civil and police GAM. Another reason is that non-combatants often either remained in their village or returned more frequently to villages, thereby increasing the risk of being caught by the military and their levels of fear.

"What peace process? I see the wounds on my husband everyday, my husband can no longer work in the fields because he was beaten too many times, this peace process means little to me because the wounds still hurt. When will there be a healing process? Peace is for the Government and GAM only. But what about the peace in my heart? It still hurts me everyday..."

*Wife of political prisoner, Pereulak Barat, Aceh Timur*

**Released political prisoners, especially those incarcerated in jails outside of Aceh, also have serious psychological difficulties.** According to the IOM survey of political prisoners, 48.6% suffered from mental health issues. This is impacting on the prisoners' ability to return to a normal life. Prisoners are complaining that an inability to sleep at night affects their energy levels during the day. They also continue to have problems interacting with the broader community and fear venturing too far from their homes.


"Until now, I am still not brave enough to go to far from home. I still have fears, especially because of militias."

*Former political prisoner, Laut Tawar, Aceh Tengah*

### **Access to Health Care**

**Of active GAM who have conflict-related wounds or chronic diseases, only 51.2% have been able to access health care since the peace agreement.** *Puskesmas* (sub-district clinic - 45.1%), or the *Rumah Sakit Umum Daerah* (district level public hospital - 33.3%) were the most common providers of health care for those receiving treatment. Former combatants who have accessed health care post-MoU were generally able to access it themselves, but on occasions GAM leaders or friends helped. Surveyed GAM returnees in urban and rural areas had similar levels of access. Only 12.2% of returnees identified distance to facilities as a primary reason why they had not accessed healthcare.


**Figure 4.5: Where Active GAM Have Accessed Health Care**



Source: AMM/WB survey

**Medical assistance has been provided for some of the most serious cases but more assistance is required for other former combatants.** The AMM has provided medical assistance to a number of former combatants. As Figure 4.6 shows, 5.6% of former combatants who accessed healthcare were aided in doing so by AMM. This was completed as part of AMM's mandate in monitoring the implementation of the MoU. This assistance has been, with a few exceptions, well received. However, the health assistance given to former combatants only addresses the tip of the iceberg. Respondents noted that the assistance was targeted only at the most serious cases.

**Figure 4.6: Who Helped Active GAM Access Health Care**



Source: AMM/WB survey


**There are a number of reasons why some returnees have been unable to access health care. The primary reason is an inability to cover costs.** 49.3% of respondents who said they had not accessed health care said that cost, in particular transportation and accommodation costs, had been a barrier to access (see Figure 4.7).

"To get healthcare, we have to bear the cost of transportation and accommodation. AMM should directly take care of our health needs, there should also be money to pay for the transport cost and accommodation cost while we are receiving treatment at the hospital."

*Former combatant, Meurandeh, Aceh Tamiang*

Cut Meutia hospital in Lhokseumawe provides free medicine and medical advice to former combatants and prisoners. Despite GAM members being aware of this service, it is underutilized because many in surrounding Aceh Utara cannot afford to travel to Lhokseumawe.

**Figure 4.7: Reasons Why Active GAM Have Not Been Able to Access Health Care**



Source: AMM/WB survey

**Lack of information was the other most common reason for failing to access health care.** In a number of cases in the field, returnees said they did not know how to receive care.

"Now I can never work hard again. I was beaten by the military when I was in jail. The living conditions in jail were terrible, so much so that I developed problems with my breathing and now I have lung complications. I never go to the doctor because I don't have enough money. Besides, I don't know where to go for health care for people like me."

*Former political prisoner, Alue Bu Jalan, Aceh Timur*

"Our friend told us that there is access to health services, but he is not sure where to go to get them. We tried to get medical care in Langsa, but we did not know which organisation would provide help for us. Many of us are sick. If the health services continue to be like this I think we will die before the aid comes. I don't want to die because of waiting."

*Former combatant, Banda Alam, Aceh Timur*

**There is also distrust from some about the health services provided by the government.** In some cases, GAM returnees feel they are being discriminated against when it comes to accessing public services.

"I see the lack of attention the government is giving to us returnees. Those that tried to seek medical attention at the hospitals did not receive any help from the doctors. We feel as if they did not want to help us because we are not going to pay them. We are entitled to free treatment. All we want is to be treated like a normal patient, with dignity and compassion."

*Former combatant, Meurandeh, Aceh Tamiang*

In one case in Aceh Selatan, GAM returnees viewed with suspicion the death of one of their colleagues whilst receiving treatment in the hospital in Tapaktuan (Box 4.2).

#### **Box 4.2: Ad Hoc Provision of Medical Assistance Highlights Distrust in Aceh Selatan**

The local AMM office in Tapaktuan, Aceh Selatan, has provided some ad hoc medical assistance to injured GAM former combatants. GAM informed the AMM office that they had over 100 combatants with serious health problems in Kluet Utara. AMM arranged for a doctor to come to one village where approximately 30 GAM former combatants, from various villages gathered for medical examinations. Two were deemed in a critical condition and were rushed to a hospital in Tapaktuan.

"The hospital didn't know that the Bupati (District Head) was paying for everything. We had to chase down the Bupati. So for two days he [the injured former combatant] was just lying there while we tried to arrange the documents from the Bupati. In the end he died. The doctor later said he needed to go to Medan for proper treatment anyway."

*AMM, Aceh Selatan*

Confusion occurred at the hospital and in the end one of the combatants died. Without laying blame for the death with one particular group, it was clear that the death was viewed suspiciously by GAM. Those combatants who had heard of the incident were unwilling, now, to accept medical treatment in Tapaktuan.

"Luckily all of us are healthy and there's no one who is really suffering, unlike in Kluet Utara, where we heard some GAM were taken to the hospital by AMM. If there were some problems it would be better if the assistance were provided in the villages. Where we can rest with our friends and family. That person who went to the hospital with AMM died, I'm not sure why but I don't want to go to the hospital. It's better doctors come and visit us in the village."

*Former combatant, Bakongan Timur, Aceh Selatan*

**Former political prisoners received initial medical checks upon release but many are in need of further assistance.** A number of amnestied prisoners noted that they received visits from the International Committee of the Red Cross while they were in jail and also received a medical check from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) prior to being released from jail. The AMM in some districts is also providing amnestied prisoners with assistance to visit doctors.

## **4. Education and Training**

"Training in whatever field we would really, really appreciate. Personally I would be keen to learn English, learn how to use computers, take up some administration skills like accounting. That is what I am interested in because I know those skills are important if I want to work in the future."

*GAM leader, Keude Gerobak, Aceh Timur*

**GAM returnees do not identify returning to school or full-time education as a high priority.** Respondents prioritized earning money by working over continuing education. When asked what occupation they would like, only 2.7% of former combatants stated that they would like to be students again. Most former combatants believe that they are too old and as such would be

embarrassed to return to school. There are however direct linkages between the age of former combatants and their interest in returning to formal education: 7.3% of those aged 25 or younger, and who were not working, said they would like to become students, compared with 3.4% of those aged 26-35, 0.9% of 36-45 year olds, and 0% of those who are older. Some returnees complain that their applications to re-enroll in school had been rejected.

"Three of my friends and I tried to enroll in Lamno's senior high school. Initially, the teacher said it was fine, but after they checked our ages, the teacher told use we were too old to come to school. We are very disappointed. We were only trying to better ourselves."

*Young former combatant, Jaya, Aceh Jaya*

**However, a large number of GAM returnees are interested in part-time education and/or practical skills training courses.** While few returning GAM combatants and non-combatants want to be full-time students, 18.4% said a priority need was formal education and 18.3% want skills training. Those who expressed interest in continuing their education stressed that classes would need to be provided in a context that would enable them to work at the same time. There would be considerable interest in flexible courses that fit with working hours, are linked to the skills people need for working, and are held in locations that allow returnees to continue their day-to-day activities.

"I want to be able to work while going to school at the same time. That is the complicated part. I realize that the future is moving very fast what will all this new technology. If I don't go to school I will be left behind for ever."

*Former combatant, Alu Bu Jalan, Aceh Timur*

As mentioned previously in this section, former combatants stressed the need for any training to be linked to future programs of assistance that would enable them to use the training they received.

"If we are provided with some sort of skills training, and if we're then provided with capital, then I'm definitely interested."


*Former combatant, Peuken Bada, Aceh Besar*

"If there's training in the future, it needs to be short, like three to six months. I wouldn't want to return to school again, I've already missed out on that part of my life. Although perhaps if there was a special school, I might be interested in returning to finish high school."

*Former combatant, Kluet Tengah, Aceh Selatan*

**Returnees are most interested in learning skills to help them become traders.** As Figure 4.8 shows, 70.5% of those who prioritized skills training as a need want help in this area. This is unsurprising given the large proportion of returnees who said they want to become traders. Active GAM in urban areas are more likely to prioritize education or skills training than those in rural areas. 31.4% of those in urban areas prioritized further education compared to 16.7% in rural areas; for skills-building, 30.5% in urban areas said they would like it, compared with 17.0% in rural areas.

**Figure 4.8: Types of Skills Training Wanted**



Source: AMM/WB survey

**However, many returnees were unable to articulate how they would make use of such training.** Returnees often could not highlight areas of economic opportunity that may exist.

"Definitely I'd prefer if I could join some kind of training rather than return to farming or collecting fruits from the forest gardens. However, I've not thought before about the type of training I would like. Me and my friends here don't really have any real working experience so we don't know what types of skills and training we want."

*Former combatant, Muara Tiga, Pidie*

Training must be accompanied by broader counseling services to help returnees understand opportunities that exist, and to assist them in the job market. IOM already runs such a program for political prisoners through the Information, Counseling and Referral Services in district-level Dinas Sosial (Department of Social Affairs) offices. These services should be expanded to the former combatant population and, as discussed in the next section, other vulnerable groups.

## 5. Land

"If the government wants to come and give land to former TNA (combatants), we would be grateful. Land is the backbone of everyone's livelihood, including former TNA. However, there's plenty of land surrounding these villages so it's not like we're running out of land, and it's owned by the community. I guess the question then becomes, what does it really mean if the government comes and gives us land? If all the land here already belongs to the community, and we're free to use it, then they can't really give us something we already own, right?"

*Former combatant, Kluet Tengah, Aceh Selatan*

**Land was not identified as a major issue in most of the districts visited.** 55.5% of active GAM have access to land, whereas only 30.2% were farmers prior to joining GAM. Returnees who are keen to return to farming either generally still possess land, or, in many locations, feel that there is sufficient land available and what is required instead is capital to be able to clear and replant this land.

"There's loads of land. If one wants to farm, it depends on whether you want to or not ... what's more important is capital. We all have land as the community has always farmed. If there is to be help, provide us with capital. There's no need for land."


*Former combatant, Indrapuri, Aceh Besar*

Land is not an issue for the other returnees who are interested in pursuing non-agricultural opportunities. A significant percentage of those surveyed, however, said they wanted information on access to land (19.5%).

**Of those with access to land, the vast majority indicate it is either owned by their families or themselves.** Figure 4.9 indicates that 63.8% have access to land owned by their families and another 24.4% indicate that they themselves own the land. A very small number of GAM returnees access land through landlords or their communities. This suggests that GAM returnees are much more likely to be working for themselves or their families than for landlords.

**Land is only an issue for GAM returnees in areas where it is also an issue for receiving communities more generally.** Although the sample size is too small to make generalized conclusions across the entire province, the quantitative survey suggests that approximately half of those without work but wanting to return to farming do not have access to land. The qualitative data indicates that this is often the case in villages where land was identified as an issue for the entire community. These villages are generally rice-growing areas where the amount of land available is limited either by neighboring villages or by geographic constraints. Similarly, in tsunami areas former combatants face the same land issues as others in the community. In the tsunami villages visited, however, these land issues have largely been resolved by communities.

**Figure 4.9: Who Owns the Land Active GAM Access**



Source: AMM/WB survey

## 6. Administrative Needs

"Here, none of the GAM members who have come back have received KTPs (identity cards). Not because we haven't asked. We have already informed the returnees about creating KTP's but they stay silent. However, if they don't have it, it is pretty hard too."

*Village official, Kuala Batee, Aceh Barat Daya*

"I wanted to open a business. To do that, I need to open bank account but I can't because I don't have an ID card. I went to the District Office to get one, but the staff told me that there no more forms available. It is frustrating! My business is stuck."

*Former combatant, Glejung, Aceh Jaya*


**GAM returnees have difficulties accessing administrative services, in particular receiving identity cards.** In a number of specific sub - districts visited, former combatants have had difficulties obtaining the *Kartu Tanda Penduduk* (KTP or identity card), also commonly referred to in Aceh as the *Kartu Merah-Putih* (red-white card). The latter were issued during the conflict and differentiated villagers from GAM combatants. Some former combatants have complained

that government authorities have refused to issue GAM members with these cards following the MoU. In other areas, the problem lies with the GAM leadership who refuse to allow those under their command to apply for the cards. This limits former combatants' ability to move freely outside their village, to access government services or to perform functions like opening bank accounts. The existence of a parallel administrative system for GAM members also means that some GAM members do not use the government system to undertake other bureaucratic acts such as registering births and marriages. This may create difficulties in the future.

## **7. Political Participation and Representation**

**A small number of GAM returnees in each village are interested in taking an active role in village, district, or provincial level politics.** Figure 4.8 above indicates that for active GAM skills training on politics ranked third highest with 28.9% rating it as a priority. This is rarely their first but more often their second or third priority. Similarly, 36.5% of GAM surveyed indicated their interest in obtaining political information. This suggests combatants and non-combatants are broadly interested in the political future of GAM, and indeed Aceh, but do not consider that this will occupy the majority of their time. The qualitative research confirmed this conclusion. Generally, in each village there are one or two particularly articulate GAM returnees who are interested in either local community leadership positions or a political future. Similar proportions of male (36.2%) and female (44.2%) GAM members ranked receiving political information as a priority.

**These findings suggest that programs to address GAM's political training needs and aspirations should focus on two distinct groups.** One program should provide more in-depth training for those aspiring to local leadership positions. At the same time, a broader civic education program, including more targeted socialization, is necessary for those interested in politics more generally. It is important women are given the opportunity to participate in any such programs.



## V. The Needs and Aspirations of Receiving Communities

## V. The Needs and Aspirations of Receiving Communities

"We cannot only talk about the needs of the combatants, the needs of community also need to be addressed. We don't wish to become different amongst the community. Don't help us if you're not also going to help the community."

*GAM spokesperson, Aceh Selatan*

Successful reintegration is a two-sided proposition. Both those returning and those receiving must feel that continued peace is in their interests. The MoU also promises assistance to "affected citizens" by way of economic facilitation (Clause 3.2.3) and the rehabilitation of public and private infrastructure (Clause 3.2.4). This section looks at the needs and aspirations of those in the communities to which GAM members are returning. Addressing these is important for a number of reasons.

**First, both GAM and the communities feel that equity requires that ordinary citizens who were affected by the conflict should also receive benefits.** Indeed, some community members interviewed saw the delivery of benefits to non-GAM as an issue of justice, as villagers - in their view - were just as much affected by the conflict as those who directly participated in it (see Box 5.1).

### Box 5.1: Justice and Aid Provision - A View from Bener Meriah

During the conflict one respondent in Bener Meriah was forced to pay pajak nanggroe (tax collected by GAM) of Rp. 5 million to GAM in order to keep his buffalo. After paying the tax, all of his buffalo, and therefore his family's livelihood, was taken from him anyway. He spoke emotionally about the need to ensure that former combatants didn't receive special treatment whilst villagers continued to suffer.

"I don't hope for any assistance. If it comes, it should not only be given to the healthy [referring to GAM], whilst the sick [the victims of the conflict] get nothing. That will make my heart hurt. It would be better if no-one was helped at all."

*Villager, Permata, Bener Meriah*

**Second, the provision of benefits to recipient communities is necessary in order to ensure that reintegration programs do not cause or deepen tensions.** This is consistent with evidence from elsewhere that has shown that the provision of benefits only to groups who were parties to the conflict can cause jealousies from other elements of society and that this can provide a basis for a resumption of conflict. For reintegration to go smoothly, benefits must be targeted widely. Former combatants frequently stressed the need for such an integrated approach.

"Our needs are the same as the people's. We want to be treated the same. If we are treated differently that will create tension. It is best if you create programs for the people. As we are the people, we will also be covered."

*Former combatant, Manggeng, Aceh Barat Daya*

"Suppose that the assistance is only for the former combatants, not to be shared with the villagers, later there will be villagers who are left behind. If there are villagers left behind, injustice will occur again. Therefore all the people here hope for the same assistance. In giving assistance it must be the same."

*Former combatant, Nisam, Aceh Utara*

**Third, long-term reintegration requires, over time, an end to the differentiation between those who fought as GAM and those in the community.** Providing aid and benefits to a category of persons (such as GAM former combatants or political prisoners) helps perpetuate the identity of that group. From a peace-building perspective, creating new identities that cross former categories is necessary. The provision of aid can help or hinder that process.

**Support to communities can be achieved through the provision of both public and private goods.** The MoU stipulates that the reintegration program should include the provision of benefits to "affected civilians". If this term is interpreted widely, it can be applied to almost the whole population of Aceh. For this wider group, public goods, such as the rebuilding of local infrastructure damaged in the conflict, can be provided. However, private goods such as livelihoods support (capital and training) and the rebuilding of damaged or destroyed property are also required. To deliver these benefits, it is necessary to refine the definition of "affected civilians" to determine which individuals and groups in the community are most vulnerable and deserving of targeted support.

This section examines priority public and private goods for communities and vulnerable groups. The concluding section that follows then discusses potential principles and mechanisms for delivering these benefits, and how to combine assistance for GAM returnees and conflict-affected civilians.

## **1. The Provision of Public Goods to Conflict-Affected Communities**

By and large, community needs are similar to those identified for GAM returnees. Some can be addressed through targeting affected communities. Rebuilding public infrastructure damaged or destroyed by conflict is a priority. Improving access to services such as health and education were also identified as being important. Improving the investment climate and market linkages can aid in restarting local economies, and in doing so can help create sustainable employment opportunities. A central requirement for addressing the needs of returnees and communities is the continuation of a positive security climate.

### ***Rebuilding Public Infrastructure***

**The reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed or damaged during the conflict is a priority for communities.** A Conflict Damage Assessment will soon be conducted. However, the present assessment also highlighted the extent to which there is a need for a large infrastructure rebuilding program. Table 5.1 outlines infrastructure damage in the villages visited during the qualitative component of the assessment. The table is based on the 38 qualitative research villages, four of which were hit by the tsunami.

**Table 5.1: Public Infrastructure Needs in 38 Research Villages**

Reconstruction Need	Conflict-related	Tsunami-related	Total
Bridges (units)	10	4	14
Village Roads (villages)	21	4	25
Schools (unit)	10	3	17
Health clinics (unit)	9	3	12
Mosques/Meunasah (unit)	5	2	7
Irrigation			
Channels (villages)	20	4	24
Dams (unit)	3	-	3
Electricity			
No electrification (village)	4	3	7
Partial electrification (village)	12	2	14

Source: Qualitative fieldwork

**A large number of villages visited have pressing infrastructure needs.** This relates not only to conflict damage, but also because the conflict meant that infrastructure could not be built or properly maintained. The conflict impacted on the provision of roads, electricity and irrigation at the village level, particularly in more remote villages. As Table 5.1 above indicates, village roads are needed in 25 of 38 (66%) villages; 24 villages (63%) require the reconstruction of irrigation channels; and seven villages (18%) do not have access to electricity.

"This village really needs roads and bridges. This would help us to sell our goods in the Lamno market with ease. Right now, we have to travel through muddy, flooded pathways and cross three rivers on bamboo rafts to get to the market. The cost of transportation is more expensive than the goods we are selling. When will we ever get out of this poverty cycle?"

*Villager, Lamno, Aceh Jaya*

"If there is a way, our hope is that assistance can be given to us for electricity to be brought to the village. This village is already over one hundred years old, but it has never known electricity. However, we really need it. If we don't have electricity our fish catch goes off quickly because we don't have ice. If we have electricity we can make ice."

*Villager, Kuala Batee, Aceh Barat Daya*

**Rebuilding infrastructure damaged by the conflict can be a vital component of a livelihoods assistance strategy and can help solidify reintegration.** Large-scale public works programs can help provide short- to medium-term employment for returnees and other villagers. At the local level, involving local labor in the rebuilding of small-scale infrastructure not only provides sources of income, but also visibly shows the benefits of peace. Rebuilt infrastructure can also help improve access to markets and increase productivity.

### **Improving Access to Services: Education and Health**

"The villagers here are not educated ... in the past it was because of conflict ... we would go to school only two or at best three days a week ... the rest of the time it was not safe to go outside. The nearest school is one hour away. Some of us would go for one year of schooling and then stop because there was no money for schooling. At best, we would finish elementary school, although most of us have not even completed that. If there was the opportunity we would like to go to school ... even me, although I am already so old. But I liked going to school and I want to do better."

*Villager, Serba Jadi, Aceh Timur*

Villagers place a high degree of importance on the longer-term improvement of service delivery in their villages and sub-districts. Improving access to education and health are the two areas identified by communities as being most important.

**Villagers want to increase the education levels of their children but are constrained by limitations in being able to access education.** This is true both for the families of returnees and the broader community. There are four major factors that constrain access to quality education. First, the cost of schooling limits the ability of village children to attend schools; this is compounded by the distance of schools from many villages. Third, a large proportion of school infrastructure was damaged or destroyed in the conflict. Fourth, schools are lacking resources, including teachers, and this impacts on the quality of education provided.

"All of us here are adults now. There is no chance of us going back to school again. Later, however, our children must reach high levels of education."

*Former combatant, Nisam, Aceh Utara*

"I have seven children: three in elementary school; one in high school. Those in elementary school pay Rp. 3,000 a day whereas the older one needs Rp. 10,000 including transportation. That's a total of Rp. 19,000 per day. How am I supposed to afford that when I work as a farmer? We cannot continue to send the other three children to school. They graduated from elementary school and we can't afford more than that."

*Villager, Peukan Bada, Aceh Besar*

**The main limitation in improving education standards is the cost burden of sending students to school.** This is related to both direct school costs and other costs, particularly for transportation. Villagers understand the importance of education for their children. They are, however, often faced with the very real choice of supporting their children's continued education or withdrawing their children from school and pushing them into the workforce. For this reason, the education level across the villages visited was generally quite low with most villagers only having completed elementary or, at most, middle school.

**The distance of schools from villages is a barrier to education for those in rural villages.** In a large number of villages visited, students have to travel some distance to attend school, in particular middle and senior school, and this was identified as one of the main constraints to continued education. Particularly since the fuel price rise in 2005, the cost of transporting children to school has become untenable for many.

**One of the reasons that children have to travel so far to attend school is because many schools were damaged or destroyed during the conflict.** It is estimated that overall, 527 schools were burnt between the period 1989 and June 2002 and over 500 schools were destroyed in the period following the start of martial law in 2003.<sup>32</sup>

**A common complaint throughout the districts visited was related to the quality of education facilities.** The quality of education was heavily impacted upon by the conflict. Schools, particularly those in remote locations, found it difficult to attract and keep teachers. In one such village in Kluet Tengah, Aceh Selatan, finding teachers willing to work in what was once a conflict hot-spot is more difficult than rebuilding school infrastructure. Salaries were often subject to the *pajak nanggroe* tax and teachers, as with many other public officials, were targeted by GAM.

<sup>32</sup> Schulze, Kirsten (2004, p. 36). "The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization". *Policy Studies 2*. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.

"I pay all the salaries for Senior High School teachers (SMA) ...The government pays salaries for state junior high school teachers only. That's eight or ten people. The others receive honorariums. There are 30 teachers in junior high school. The local government pays the honorariums. I pay all 14 Senior High schoolteachers."

*Village official, Nisam, Aceh Utara*

**In the medium- to long-term it will be necessary to provide assistance to villagers to ensure that youths continue their education.** Some of the schools burnt in the conflict have been, or are in the process of being, reconstructed. It will also be necessary to assess whether or not new school facilities are required at a village level. It would also be useful to consider increasing the amount of financial assistance provided by the Government for students to reflect the actual amount associated with keeping children in school, including transportation costs.

**Villagers, as well as returnees, have problems accessing health services.** This is particularly the case in more remote villagers where the *Puskesmas* (sub-district level health post) is located some distance from the village. In these cases, villagers are reluctant to use these health services for anything except the most serious health issues due to the costs involved in traveling to the clinic.

**According to the National Socio-economic Survey (SUSENAS) data, of Acehnese who reported health problems in 2004, 62.3% did not seek treatment.** Among those who reported that their ailments had affected their work or studies, only 50.3% sought medical treatment. These numbers were close to the national average (61.8% and 50.8% respectively). However, these were pre-tsunami numbers. The tsunami destroyed or damaged a substantive number of health facilities - including six hospitals and hundreds of village-level public clinics.<sup>33</sup>

### **Community-Wide Approaches to Stimulating Livelihoods**

"We didn't have the courage to expand our network of coffee suppliers. We only took coffee from people who brought it here. We were scared of meeting GAM. If they knew we were buying coffee, they would know we had money."

*Coffee trader, Permata, Bener Meriah*

**Although villagers were able to return full-time to their occupations almost immediately after the start of the peace process, they require assistance to increase productivity.** That receiving communities returned quickly to their agricultural and fishing livelihoods soon after the peace, combined with the fact that they were still able to farm to some extent during the conflict, means that villagers generally have a head start on former combatants and released political prisoners. Nevertheless, their livelihood needs are still great.

**The conflict had a heavy impact on livelihoods across Aceh.** Villagers were not able to maintain their fields. This has meant, in particular, that many plantations have fallen into a state of disrepair with trees no longer producing harvests.

"We can only collect 15 *kaleng* (1 *kaleng* = approximately 25 liters) of red coffee nowadays. However, before the conflict we could collect 150-200 *kaleng*."

*Villager, Permata, Bener Meriah*

"With nutmeg plantations almost 100% can be restored. But with chocolate and coffee it is more difficult. Almost 80% has gone wild."

*Villager, Kuala Batee, Aceh Barat Daya*

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<sup>33</sup> World Bank/BRR (2005). *Aceh and Nias One Year After the Tsunami: The Recovery Effort and Way Forward*. Banda Aceh/Jakarta: World Bank/BRR.

In all of the districts visited, villagers experienced curfews and restrictions on their movement that limited their ability to farm and fish. The size of harvests declined rapidly as villagers were not able to spend the required time to maintain their fields. Villagers drew on their savings to meet day-to-day needs and investor confidence disappeared due to increased extortion and distorted markets (Box 5.2).

### Box 5.2: The Impact of Distorted Markets on Village Livelihoods

The conflict distorted local markets with negative impacts on villagers. Farmers and fishermen both told stories of how they had been forced to enter into loan agreements with local traders. They borrowed money to buy equipment but were required to sell their harvest to the traders at well below, often half, the market rate. Fishermen in Aceh Utara lost their vessels due to the tsunami. However, not only were they still required to repay the loans but they no longer had an opportunity to make a living.

"If we want to plant peanuts, we have to go into debt with the taoke (local money lenders) to get capital to buy seeds. When it is harvested, we have to sell only to the same taoke in Lamno market. Taoke in Lamno monopolise everything. We need to be free of this taoke monopoly because the prices they set are not market prices. If we want to break the monopoly, the villagers themselves must have enough capital so they would not get into the debt trap of these taoke."

*Village official, Lamno, Aceh Jaya*

In Aceh Barat Daya and Bener Meriah, villagers complained that the TNI operated local plantations during the conflict and this restricted the villagers' ability to trade freely. Villagers were forced to sell their produce to local military posts or were restricted from growing produce that the military posts were trading in.

"During the conflict there was a TNI post here. They bought nutmeg from the people. They bought it for Rp. 5000 per kilo. However, the price from an agent was Rp. 7,500 per kilo. You see, they weren't searching for GAM but searching for the economic harvest of the villagers."

*Villager, Kuala Batee, Aceh Barat Daya*

Traders in Aceh Timur claimed extortion during the conflict drove down the price villagers received for rice from Rp. 2,000 to Rp. 1,600-1,800 per kilo. Traders would be hit up for money from either GAM or the military and would be required to pass on the burden of this extortion to farmers with the result that the price of rice fell. Some respondents in Aceh Timur also claimed that local businesses which were previously controlled by TNI have now been taken over by GAM since the MoU. Former combatants have started farming rubber plantations that were abandoned by IDPs during the conflict and subsequently operated by the TNI. This is likely to create tensions when the IDPs try to reclaim their land.

**Livelihood strategies for community members also require the provision of capital and training.** However, community-wide approaches can also help. Villagers, similar to GAM returnees, often said they want and need capital to restart their livelihoods. It is impossible to provide this for all those in need in Aceh; an approach targeted at individuals in vulnerable groups is needed (see discussion below). However, strategies aimed at improving the functioning of the market can help create livelihood opportunities for communities. Improving the local private sector investment climate, and market linkages, can be effective. This requires interventions at numerous levels. At the provincial and district level, reducing distorting barriers to investment, in the form of erroneous taxes may be helpful. Improving large-scale infrastructure, such as the main roads in Aceh and harbors, is also important. At the more local level, improving smaller roads can help link rural villagers with broader markets.

## **Security**

### **Continued security is a prerequisite to addressing all of the other needs identified above.**

As Section 3 described, there has been a significant improvement in the security situation since the signing of the peace agreement. People are now free to move between villages and to go to their fields, and this is having a significant impact on their ability to undertake economic activities. Improving service provision, the operation of local markets, rebuilding houses, creating new jobs: all are dependent on a positive security environment.

**Despite positive changes, many potential challenges remain.** Section 3 outlined many of the potential obstacles to reintegration over the course of 2006. The credibility of law enforcement agencies is still low. These agencies will be tested in the lead up to the planned elections in mid-2006. In some areas, particularly in central Aceh, GAM members continue to fear reprisal acts from militias or anti-separatist groups and have little confidence in the ability of law enforcement agencies to ensure their security. Law enforcement agencies will need to act efficiently and justly in response to actual conflicts so as to strengthen their credibility. In the short-term, there is a need for thought to be given to transitional arrangements as AMM phases out. In the longer-run, law enforcement agencies will require capacity building assistance to address security concerns appropriately.

## **2. The Provision of Private Goods to Vulnerable Groups**

The MoU promises "economic facilitation" for "affected civilians". Almost everyone who lived in Aceh during the conflict was affected in some way or other. The livelihoods of most were negatively impacted upon, as security concerns meant that people could not tend their fields and plantations, or move freely to conduct business. The conflict reduced the quality of service provision; infrastructure was damaged or destroyed, persuading doctors and teachers to work in conflict-affected areas was challenging.

**While the community-wide approaches outlined above can help address the needs of affected civilians, more narrowly targeted approaches are also necessary.** These should be targeted at members of particularly vulnerable groups. Communities by and large can identify who is most in need for assistance. Some of these were directly affected by the conflict - for example, IDPs, conflict victims (see Box 5.4 below) including widows who lost their husbands in the conflict, and those whose houses were destroyed. In some places, women were targeted (Box 5.3).

### **Box 5.3: Sexual Harassment and Women Villagers**

The issue of sexual harassment of women villagers during the conflict is a particularly sensitive topic in Aceh. The issue was raised in 3 of the 4 villages visited in Aceh Barat Daya, suggesting that it was a serious issue during the conflict. Respondents in two of the villages claimed that the Indonesian armed forces had raped women from those villages. One of these women was a sister of a GAM combatant. The sensitive nature of these issues was highlighted by questioning of a village official about the incidence. At first reluctant to answer the question, he then stated that he had heard rumors that a rape had occurred but the woman in question had subsequently left the village and so it could not be pursued.

*"Brimob is much more savage than those during PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia - Indonesia Communist Party) times. Our belongings are theirs, our wives are theirs, even our little sisters too. That's really what had happened in this village. Brimob brought a girl, about 20 years old, into the house. There were people*

in the house, but *Brimob* forced them to leave, and then they raped her and left marks. Where could we go to complain? They had weapons, so we couldn't do anything but watch. The owner of the house had to run away, otherwise they would kill him. See, they're much more savage than PKI."

*Villager, Kuala Batee, Aceh Barat Daya*

In another village, villagers claimed that non-organic troops would frequently bring women back to their barracks and that this made the villages uncomfortable.

"When Battalion 142 was withdrawn, it was like being separated from our brothers. But when 143 arrived, we spent all our time praying to Allah that they would leave quickly. Battalion 142 respected the villagers. They often provided us with advice. But Battalion 143 'played with' women."

*Community leader, Babahrot, Aceh Barat Daya*

Given the difficulties that villagers normally have in discussing these issues openly, it can be assumed that the cases reported represent only a fraction of the actual cases and that sexual harassment was a serious concern for women during the conflict.

For others, the conflict merely worsened their existing exclusion from local economic life. In deciding *which* conflict-affected individuals should get access to private benefits (such as short-term cash transfers, housing compensation and capital to restart livelihoods), it is necessary to establish who are the most vulnerable groups in receiving communities.

### **Rebuilding Destroyed Housing**

**Housing continues to be an urgent need in specific areas throughout Aceh.** As discussed in the previous section, in several of the villages visited there was substantial destruction of property, including of villagers' houses. In many cases, villagers were forced to find temporary shelter in new villages. Some - in particular in Aceh Selatan and central Aceh - have returned to their original villages following the peace process, while others are still waiting for a greater degree of certainty or have little to return to. The housing needs of many of these IDPs remain urgent. Efforts have been made to address these needs (see Box 5.4). However, these efforts have invariably been less than effective.

#### **Box 5.4: The Problem of Dealing with Housing in Aceh Selatan**

In all the research villages in Aceh Selatan there is, to various degrees, a need for housing. The different ways this urgent need is being met highlights some of the difficulties in delivering assistance in a post-conflict situation.

In one village, 24 houses were destroyed in 2003. In early 2005, prior to the MoU, the *Koramil* (sub-district military post) announced they would fund their reconstruction and requested that the *Geuchik* provide a list. He did, but it was rejected and GAM households were removed. In the end, the *Koramil* only built 15 sub-standard, timber houses. The community, particularly GAM households, were particularly bitter and felt the new houses were not adequate compensation.

In another village, all 130 private dwellings were destroyed in 2004. Only the mosque and one public building used as a TNI post was spared. After the TNI withdrew, the government announced they would rebuild 76 houses, using a contractor. Shortly after construction began, the contractor stopped work because the price of materials had risen. The community continues to wait. Villagers are also disappointed with the housing design. They claim the houses are too expensive for what they are and are not high enough above the ground to prevent regular flooding.

In two other villages many houses abandoned during the conflict are still now either seriously damaged, largely from firefights, or are falling apart from disuse. Further, all the villagers' belongings have been looted. As of November 2005, villagers in both these villages had received no assistance for repairing their homes. One villager, whose house was used as the TNI post, is still bitter that he was forced to pay the house electricity bill while the house was occupied by the TNI.

Most communities, although grateful, tend to see housing assistance as compensation rather than aid, particularly if the funds are from the government. Their expectations, therefore, differ significantly from, for example, tsunami victims. They are more likely to want a say in the type and quality of housing they are to receive.

### **Targeted Livelihoods Support: Capital and Training**

**Capital is identified as the most pressing need for most villagers.** As with active GAM, the potential use of capital varies from area to area depending on the economic opportunities in each area. However, villagers are, in general, confident that if the peace continues they will be able to re-build their lives and become economically self-sufficient, dependent on an initial investment of capital.

"We already estimated, Rp. 15 million can rehabilitate 2.5 hectares of fishpond. If we use an excavator, that takes four days of work. After two weeks, we can begin to add in the breeding prawns. In three months, if there is 15,000-20,000 prawns, we can begin to harvest and that can fetch about Rp. 10-15 million. So you see, in a short time frame, we can recoup that Rp. 15m and it is going to benefit us for the long term."

*Village leader, Meurandeh, Aceh Tamiang*

**It is impossible to give working capital to all villagers who would like to receive it.** Providing capital to all is untenable, both because of the cost of such a program and because it is clear that the Acehnese economy could not absorb such an injection of money without significant negative inflationary impacts. As such, it will be necessary to target capital at those most in need and who can make effective use of it.

**The potential for capital to be misused means that other types of assistance will also be necessary to ensure sustainability, and that its provision should be closely monitored.** Some respondents highlighted the risks of wastage in providing direct grants to villagers. A number of other alternatives were identified that could assist in improving livelihoods. In some instances villages and local level authorities requested assistance to improve the quality of agricultural harvests. This ranged from the provision of better equipment and access to seedlings and fertilizer to expert technical assistance to increase harvest yields. Villagers also requested training on financial management.

### **Mental Health Care**

"Of course men feel more easy towards the peace, but we are different. Women have emotional responses to the past traumas and disturbances, we still bear the scars in our hearts: these cannot simply be erased by an MoU or by a few months of peace."

*Female Paramedic, Paya Gajah, Aceh Timur*

"We are still afraid. The second we would hear any gunshots or hear of GAM coming to our village, we hide in the bushes. Some of us choose to sleep in the bushes because we are still afraid of being expelled. Many houses here were burned down because we are transmigrants."

*Villager, Penaron, Aceh Timur*

**In addition to improving health care facilities, and improving overall access to them, there is a need for targeted mental health care.** As with GAM returnees, villagers showed signs of suffering from mental health problems as a result of the conflict. The degree of trauma that exists amongst receiving communities varies from village to village and is linked to issues including proximity to armed clashes, whether or not there were non-organic military posts in the village and relationships between different ethnicities within a village.





## **VI. Conclusions and Recommendations**

## VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

This report set out to assess the linked processes of social and economic reintegration in the seven months since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in August 2005. It provides insights and suggests priorities for addressing the needs and aspirations of GAM returnees and recipient communities, and to help design development programs and mechanisms that enhance human security whilst addressing need.

Overall, the peace process has progressed smoothly. The political context for transitional and development programming in Aceh is positive. Security has improved significantly, which means that peoples' confidence to work their fields and forest plantations, and their willingness to invest in sustainable livelihoods, has been boosted. More specifically, the reintegration of GAM returnees has not caused significant problems and there is a high level of acceptance of their return. Challenges do remain, particularly with regard to the economic and civic reintegration of returnees. Further, in a small number of areas, latent tensions remain, often between anti-separatist front members and GAM returnees.

Conflict-sensitive social and economic development programming can help to consolidate this progress and, also, support the resolution of some of the more complex and longer-term issues that remain. This will require transitional and developmental programs that address the needs of GAM returnees, vulnerable groups and the communities more generally in a balanced manner.

This report makes three sets of recommendations that, taken together, provide an action framework for consolidating peace and responding to the challenges identified. The first set of recommendations focus on the supporting programs necessary to sustain an environment conducive to deeper reintegration and reconciliation. The second set identifies and summarizes the priority needs and sectors that reintegration programming should address. These sectoral needs are categorized by whether they are private goods or public goods. The final set of recommendations suggests delivery mechanisms for addressing the sectoral needs in a timely and transparent fashion.

Cutting across these recommendations are a number of conflict-sensitive programming principles:

1. To facilitate initial reintegration, assistance targeted at individuals and/or conflict-affected households is necessary, but programs need to be time bound and transition into longer-term and more sustainable strategies and programs.
2. Assistance provided needs to strike a balance between private goods for severely conflict-affected people, and public goods improving access to means of production and markets, social services, and credit for conflict-affected communities.
3. Bottom-up planning processes, involving appropriate local, traditional and religious community-level actors, should be utilized to set priorities, identify those vulnerable, and ensure transparency.
4. Reintegration programming should incorporate strong socialization strategies so to ensure participation, particularly of vulnerable groups, and transparent decision-making.
5. In those conflict-affected locations where tensions remain high or where conflict has

undermined community capacity for conflict sensitive and reconciliation-oriented decision-making, reintegration programs will need to anticipate additional facilitation and mediation assistance.

6. Individual assistance needs to be delivered concurrently to antagonistic groups of conflict-affected populations so as to minimize the risk that the delivery of assistance will deepen existing conflict-related divisions and tensions.

## 1. Peace Process Supporting Programs

### **Continued attention must be given to further improve the (human) security climate.**

During the conflict, the geographical reach of development activities was uneven because of conflict-related insecurity. There has been an immense improvement in the security environment since the signing of the MoU. Conflict incidents are scarce and there is freedom of movement across Aceh. However, latent tensions remain relating to past grievances between GAM returnees and anti-separatist fronts, as well as to incidents of on-going extortion. In addition, there is a potential for increased tensions in the lead-up to the elections later this year, with some GAM leaders already positioning themselves to challenge the status quo at the local level. Transitional support and development programs will only be able to achieve results if the overall security situation remains stable and if that translates into increased human security at the grassroots level.

**Continued monitoring will be required to ensure the achievements of the peace process to-date are sustained.** Serious consideration needs to be given to the development of impartial and legitimate monitoring mechanisms to fill the vacuum in the transitional period following the withdrawal of AMM. This will be particularly important around the upcoming elections when political competition could result in mass mobilization and conflict.

**In the medium to long-term, support to increase the capacity of local law enforcement agencies and justice sector institutions will be necessary.** Relations between police and communities are poor and the province's legal system has systemic weaknesses. Institutional capacity building should not only focus at the provincial level but also at the district and sub-district, particularly in those areas where latent tensions remain. Concurrently, programs to increase access to justice for communities and support non-state informal justice mechanisms would be useful. Gender sensitivity in all these programs is essential.

**Socialization efforts are important but need to change focus.** Immediate post-MoU socialization has focused on increasing knowledge of the MoU. This has achieved high levels of general awareness. However, the peace process is entering a new phase and GAM returnees and communities want information on programs and processes that directly affect them. They prioritize information on employment opportunities, reintegration programming, and political matters, including information related to the upcoming elections. For this reason, socialization activities should be embedded into and be seen as a core component of all reintegration programming. Necessarily, then, the focus will need to be on getting information to rural villagers. Socialization should also focus on supporting the development of open spaces for dialogue about Aceh's past, present and future.

## 2. Priority Sectoral Needs for Reintegration Programming

As mentioned above, support to GAM returnees and communities can be achieved through the provision of both individual benefits (private goods) to vulnerable groups, including GAM returnees, as well as community benefits (public goods) for all those "conflict affected". These benefits are mutually reinforcing.

**Reintegration programming for both private and public goods needs to have a rural focus.** The survey shows that GAM returnees predominately live in rural areas. Similarly, the qualitative fieldwork indicated that rural villages, particularly those more remote, were disproportionately more likely to have experienced physical conflict damage during the conflict.

**Short-term transitional assistance is necessary to fulfill day-to-day needs and to facilitate reinsertion.** In most of rural Aceh, both GAM returnees and communities are struggling to fulfill their day-to-day needs. Vulnerable groups will not be able to make productive investments in livelihoods and small-scale public infrastructure, such as irrigation, as long these needs are not being met. Realistically such initial support can only hope to achieve a situation of "sama-sama miskin" or "reintegration into poverty", and further steps will be needed beyond this. Transitional assistance needs to remain a short-term initiative so as not to foster dependency, and there must be a strategy for linkages to longer-term development.

### ***Individual Benefits (Private Goods)***

**The greatest priority need for active GAM, political prisoners and vulnerable conflict-affected community members is livelihoods assistance.** Seven months on, most GAM returnees still remain unemployed. The vast majority want to stay in their villages and want to either remain in their previous occupations (43.1%) or find new occupations (26.0%). Women often have different preferences to men. Although capital is often identified as the greatest impediment, the provision of such should be augmented with other inputs including training/skills building, and market access. Job creation schemes can assist those who do plan to move away from their village. The provision of livelihood support can only be finite. Community decision-making on how to allocate programs is most effective, because it can ensure that benefits are allocated fairly and transparently, and limits resultant tensions. However, significant facilitation to ensure the involvement of marginalized groups may be necessary to ensure community decision-making does not reinforce exclusionary power dynamics.

**A second priority is a house building or repair program aimed at those whose homes were destroyed or damaged during the conflict.** The houses of almost half of those active GAM surveyed were affected by the conflict, and very few have received compensation. There are also large numbers of IDPs who lost their houses. Further, there is considerable overlap between conflict and tsunami areas. As a minimum, tsunami shelter programs should ensure that they include GAM returnees and conflict victims in need in those areas. Although many GAM returnees, conflict IDPs and other conflict victims currently have some form of shelter, addressing their housing needs in the medium-term is seen as a justice issue and will send strong signals that the parties to the peace process are committed to addressing past grievances.

**Ensuring access to health care for GAM returnees and some conflict victims must be a priority.** Many returnees have immediate health needs because of wounds, chronic diseases or

mental scars contracted during incarceration, armed conflict or prolonged periods in the mountains. Many ordinary villagers also have health problems, particularly relating to mental health. There is need for a common response mechanism for identifying and responding to the health needs of GAM returnees and conflict victims. This could include consideration of a demand driven voucher system managed by communities.

**Training and education programs should be focused on the skills needed to allow returnees and other populations to access jobs and succeed in the workplace.** GAM returnees prioritized skills-building over conventional education. Therefore training should not be provided alone, but should rather link into livelihood strategies.

**Programs to reintegrate active GAM and political prisoners civically and politically as well as socially and economically are important.** Of those who prioritised skills training, politics was the third most requested skill type. Further, some GAM expressed a desire to play a role in local community leadership and, in isolated incidents, some returnees are struggling to reintegrate into civic life. These needs and aspirations need to be accommodated so as to ensure reintegration is holistic. Activities could include community and youth leadership training, political information and training, as well as assistance to facilitate a role for returnees in Acehese civil society.

### ***Community Benefits (Public Goods)***

**A priority for communities is small- and medium-scale infrastructure.** Throughout Aceh, and particularly in rural areas, infrastructure sustained serious damage during conflict and furthered deteriorated because the security situation made maintenance impossible. Improving infrastructure, including roads, irrigation systems and access to electricity, can contribute to improved livelihood opportunities by facilitating market access and improving economic output. Communities are generally well aware of what small-scale public infrastructure projects are required in their areas. Their participation in identifying local priorities, and in implementing projects, can help to ensure local preferences are incorporated and can contribute to short-term job creation. Programs that involve returnees and recipient community members working together can also solidify reintegration.

**Improve the private sector development climate, market linkages and access to credit.** A holistic livelihood strategy needs to ensure that the local economy is capable of absorbing an expansion of the workforce. Similarly, access to equitable credit systems is a crucial input to livelihoods and could reduce reliance on money lenders (see Box 5.2). As well as focusing on the broader economic and investment climate, programs should focus on initiatives that reach down to the village. Micro-credit and sub-district production cooperatives could be considered.

**It is necessary to speed up the implementation of existing community-driven development projects.** As reintegration programming moves beyond addressing individual needs of GAM returnees and other vulnerable groups, the focus must shift to addressing community-wide needs. Over the longer run, programs such as KDP already exist which are capable of providing such local-level public goods. However, there is a need to channel extra resources through such programs in specific areas in the short-term transitional phase.

### 3. Targeting and Delivery Mechanisms

The provision of private and public goods will require two distinct types of programs: individual support programs and community support programs. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the two are dealt with quite separately in the MoU. Second, the aims of providing such benefits differ. Third, the programs have different timeframes and urgency; individual benefit programs need to start quickly but should last only no longer than one or two years to prevent dependency. Fourth, the programs will require different information and implementation mechanisms. Table 6.1 summarizes the key characteristics and mechanisms of these programs.

**Table 6.1: Delivery Mechanisms for Reintegration Programming**

		<b>Individual support programs (Private goods)</b>	<b>Community support programs (Public goods)</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Link to MoU</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “assist persons who have participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration” (Clause 3.2.3).</li> <li>• “allocate suitable farming land, employment or social security for former combatants, political prisoners and affected civilians” (Clause 3.2.4)</li> <li>• “all civilians who have suffered a demonstrable loss due to the conflict will receive” various forms of compensation” (Clause 3.2.5)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “allocate funds for the rehabilitation of public and private property” (Clause 3.2.4).</li> <li>• “an independent and impartial court system ... will be established” (Clause 1.4.3)</li> </ul>
<b>2</b>	<b>Aims</b>	Address immediate individual and household level needs of vulnerable groups	Address immediate to medium to longer-term needs as prioritized by communities and systemic factors in the Aceh conflict context
<b>3</b>	<b>Timeframe</b>	1-2 years. Thereafter aim at addressing vulnerabilities through mainstream programs and local government capacities	Special, rapid mobilization, programs for 1-2 years. Thereafter mainstream community driven development based on local development programs
<b>4</b>	<b>Target Groups</b>	<b>Vulnerable individuals &amp; groups</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict-affected civilians, including women and children</li> <li>• Widows</li> <li>• IDPs</li> <li>• GAM returnees, including political prisoners</li> <li>• Tsunami victims</li> </ul>	<b>Conflict-affected communities</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High impact communities</li> <li>• High numbers of GAM returnees</li> <li>• Ongoing and/or latent tensions</li> <li>• High numbers of vulnerable people or groups</li> </ul>
<b>5</b>	<b>Sectoral Focus</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Livelihoods</li> <li>• Housing</li> <li>• Access to health care, including mental health support</li> <li>• Training and education, skills development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community cash for work infrastructure improvement</li> <li>• Small and medium-scale infrastructure</li> <li>• Private sector development and market access</li> <li>• Basic services, including health and education</li> <li>• Access to credit</li> <li>• Access to justice and informal dispute resolution at the grassroots level</li> </ul>
<b>6</b>	<b>Identification/prioritization</b>	Community-level Vulnerability Assessment Mechanism.	Community-driven Development Mechanism
<b>7</b>	<b>Eligibility and verification</b>	Eligibility and Screening Mechanism	Screening and Technical Verification Mechanism
<b>8</b>	<b>Support mechanisms</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Socialization of eligibility implementation</li> <li>• Handling disputes over eligibility</li> <li>• Responding to gaps</li> <li>• Facilitation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Socialization of program supply</li> <li>• Monitoring implementation</li> <li>• Responding to gaps</li> </ul>

**The MoU provides a strong basis for targeting reintegration programming widely so as to include GAM returnees but also vulnerable groups and conflict-affected communities** (row 1).<sup>35</sup> The MoU states the authorities of Aceh will provide assistance to "those who participated in GAM activities", "former combatants" and "political prisoners" in clauses 3.2.3, 3.2.4, and 3.2.4 respectively. Further, clause 3.2.4 also states that assistance will be extended to "affected civilians" and, again, clause 3.2.5 sub-clause (c) states "[a]ll civilians who have suffered a demonstrable loss" have the right to various forms of compensation. Clause 3.2.4 notes funds will be allocated "for the rehabilitation of public and private property destroyed" during the conflict. More generally, the MoU discusses improvements in public goods such as the rule of law (sub-section 1.4).

**The aims of providing private goods to individual and public goods to communities are distinct** (row 2). As argued in the preceding sections, both programs that deliver public goods and those that provide private goods are necessary to aid reintegration.

Assistance to individuals aims to:

- (a) facilitate economic reintegration for GAM returnees;
- (b) placate tensions likely to occur if assistance is provided to GAM returnees only, and not to other vulnerable groups;
- (c) provide some form of compensation to those who have suffered most seriously; and
- (d) assist those most in need.

The provision of public goods aims to:

- (a) facilitate a positive economic environment;
- (b) compensate communities for infrastructure destroyed or damaged during the conflict;
- (c) generate short-term jobs for communities;
- (d) strengthen community support for and ownership of the peace process through provision of identifiable peace-dividends; and
- (e) stimulate the economy.

**Individual support programs are short- to medium- term initiatives, whereas community support programs are necessary over the longer run** (row 3). Individual support programs should run for between one and two years so as not to create dependency. These programs should incorporate an exit strategy and ensure they leave individuals in a self-sustaining position. Community support programs should be designed with the long-term impact they can have on communities in mind.

**Together, individual and community support programs will cover the respective private and public needs of GAM returnees, vulnerable groups and conflict-affected communities** (rows 4 and 5). The needs of GAM returnees and vulnerable groups are best covered in the same programs, as their private needs are very similar. Both GAM and community members see equity of treatment as an issue of fairness; treating returnees and victims jointly will also help to break down GAM-community distinctions. Community support programs should target, for example, those communities particularly affected by the conflict, where latent communal tensions remain, and those communities receiving large numbers of IDPs. Across these "conflict-affected" communities the public needs are similar, including small-scale infrastructure, and health and education services.

<sup>35</sup> The rows mentioned refer to Table 6.1, above.

**Community themselves should be directly involved in mechanisms for allocating private and public benefits** (row 6). The greatest challenge for delivering individual benefits will be identifying eligible vulnerable groups and individuals in a way that does not cause tension, facilitates reintegration and is perceived to be fair. Similarly, it will be a challenge to identify the most conflict-affected communities and to identify their priority needs. The research showed that community members (including GAM returnees) are able to identify those most in need, and those most deserving, of assistance. Further, there is sufficient social cohesion in villages for villagers to make collective decisions on how community benefits should be prioritized. Even in areas where tensions do exist, the research suggested that joint decision-making could take place, if appropriate representation from all parties was ensured. However, there is a need for intensive facilitation in some places to ensure marginalized groups are included in these processes.


**Mechanisms that verify community-level assessments of vulnerability and feasibility are necessary** (row 7). Although communities should be provided with considerable scope to determine vulnerability, there will be a need for some interface between the 'demand' and 'supply' of benefits. As such, there is some need for some screening of names and proposals at a higher level. There are also many dimensions to 'conflict-affectedness' - it is difficult to place conflict-related vulnerability on a metric as can be done, for example, for income poverty - so clear and transparent eligibility criteria must be developed. The challenge will be balancing community and 'program-driven' definitions of vulnerability.

**In addition to the core community identification assessment and verification mechanisms, supporting processes will be necessary** (row 8). These include, socialization of eligibility and benefits; ongoing monitoring of participation and implementation; facilitation and mediation support if necessary; and complaint handling for those individuals and communities that slip through the gaps.

Figure 6.1 provides a conceptual framework for how the mechanisms of individual and community support programs interact with the sectoral needs and target groups. Needs are depicted on the bottom third of the diagram. On the left are private goods, on the right are public goods. This is overlaid with their respective target groups: private goods for vulnerable groups, and public goods for conflict-affected communities. GAM returnees potentially have access to private goods through either their inclusion in the 3,000 specified in the MoU (if included in this group, they have automatic entitlement) or in their position as conflict 'victims' (where they would need to go through a vulnerability assessment mechanism, whereby the community determines if they should be included in the list of those eligible for benefits).

In the middle and top third of the framework are the key parallel mechanisms of identification/prioritization and verification for individual and community programs. The arrows indicate the information flows that these mechanisms will facilitate.

**Figure 6.1: Response Framework for Reintegration Programming**



**The next step is to get reintegration programming moving in the field.** Seven months has passed since the signing of the MoU, yet few programs are operational at the village level. This report has highlighted that conflict-sensitive reintegration programming is urgently required to build on the initial successes of the peace process and has provided some ideas for what these program might look like, and how they might be implemented. Support must be provided to GAM returnees to assist them in re-starting their livelihoods. Such assistance must be provided in a manner that consolidates reintegration and minimizes the risk of creating jealousies or tensions. The MoU provides a framework for doing this by ensuring support for all conflict-affected persons, including but not limited to GAM returnees. The opportunity now exists to use reintegration programming to build on the initial successes of decommissioning weapons, return of ex-combatants and troop withdrawal, to help ensure the longer-term peace that remains the hope of the vast majority of people in Aceh.



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Photographs by Luthfi Ashari