Civil Supremacy and Reform of the Military

TAPOL Bulletin 182, April 2006

One of the most important features of the post-Suharto era is the long And difficult process of reforming the military (TNI). Ever since the birth of the Indonesian Republic, the military have played a dominant role in political life. TNI spokesman Major-General Kohirin Suganda recently acknowledged that returning the military to its proper function will take time. But reform of other institutions, particularly the judiciary and the legislature, is also essential. The process has begun but there is still a long way to go.

The appointment of Air Force chief, Marshall Djoko Suyanto as TNI commander-in-chief in January was a big step forward. This important political decision by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) paved the way for other developments. Never before has an air force officer held this position and the appointment was controversial as at least three key army generals had been named as candidates.

Even more important, the former army chief-of-staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu, a notorious hardliner, had already been assigned to the Position by the President’s predecessor Megawati Sukarnoputri, but as soon as he took over as head of state, SBY shelved the designated appointment. SBY’s agenda was to safeguard the Aceh peace process while Ryacudu was in charge of military operations there. The militarisation of Aceh was crucial and that meant withdrawing troops and ending the hostilities. SBY could not have had a hardliner in such a key position.

Demise of the political role of TNI?

It could be argued that the demise of Ryacudu also indicates an Important thrust within the military top brass in another direction. For decades, top military men have been political decision-makers, not least among them General Suharto himself. The downfall of Suharto in 1998 meant the end of the Dwifungsi doctrine, which justified the military’s role in politics. Despite that, top-ranking generals like General Wiranto and Ryacudu continued to play a major role in politics.

The emergence of pro-reform generals and the battle they fought with The status quo at army headquarters in the name of reformasi was again a typical political battle. But the person who emerged as number one was a rather colourless officer, General Endriartono Sutarto. His appointment was an excellent choice as he turned out to be a cautious reformer.

In 2004 the military lost their seats in parliament, another step Forward in driving the military out of politics. All signs show that General Endriartono and his successor Marshall Djoko Suyanto represent a new generation in the TNI who accept civil supremacy and are willing to proceed along the path of improving professionalism within the TNI.

Political generals like Wiranto, Try Sutrisno and others are now Retired and their role in society is relatively limited. The present batch of military commanders, notably the commanders in major cities like Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta and Surabaya, rarely appear in the press and hardly play a role in the daily life of the community. The dominant security role is now in the hands of police chiefs, who have to deal with such burning issues as crime, terrorism, corruption and other serious problems in any big city. In the Suharto days, the military commander of Jakarta was bound to get a top-level post and was almost daily in the headlines. The present commander, Major-General Agustadi, keeps a low profile and many people in Jakarta don't even know his name. This would have been unthinkable a few years ago. The gradual disappearance of younger officers with political ambitions is a hopeful sign that Indonesia is heading in the right direction. But military reform is far from over and structural reforms still have a long way to go.

SBY and the class of ‘73

The President displayed his political skills by manoeuvring some of his most trusted people at the top of the hierarchy. A few months before the appointment of Djoko Suyanto, Police General Sutanto was appointed National Police Chief. SBY, Suyanto and Sutanto were classmates during their academy years and they all graduated in 1973. By appointing two trusted classmates, SBY has at least secured loyalty and stability at the top of the police force and in the TNI for the next two or three years.

Looking back at the President’s own military career, there were early Signs that he was not merely pursuing a military career but looking also for different possibilities. While climbing the military ladder, he obtained his masters degree in 1991 and a PhD in agricultural economics in 2004. By then, he had already occupied several cabinet posts during the Presidencies of Gus Dur and Megawati.

In 1996, when the crisis in East Timor turned into a heated International issue, SBY adopted a different position by accepting a political settlement for East Timor, challenging the official line and the views of his superior, General Wiranto who was commander-in-chief at the time.

Between 1997 and 2001 SBY was known as a reformist TNI officer, Together with other officers like Agus Wirahadikusumah, Romulo Simbolon, Saurip Kadi and Agus Widjoyo. For a brief period this small group of officers were catapulted by Gus Dur into senior positions but the ploy failed because the majority of TNI officers were solidly against this reformist group. Agus Wirahadikusumah died mysteriously and the others were basically sidestepped. By then, SBY had already secured a high position in the civilian hierarchy and had transformed himself into a national political and civilian leader.

Politik Panglima and Panglima Politik

Roughly translated these terms mean ‘politics of the military commander’ and ‘the commander of politics’. This slogan emerged during the Suharto years. He ruled the country as military commander and at the same time commanded politics. In a certain way SBY has the same credentials but political conditions have changed since the demise of Suharto. Suharto created a totalitarian state where there was no division between the executive, judiciary and legislature.

SBY became head of state through direct elections and won convincingly. But he inherited a different Indonesia where, on paper, independent institutions do exist. In this transitional period, it will take quite some time before the independence of the judiciary and the legislature becomes a fact of life. In the meantime both institutions frequently reflect the old politics of the Suharto days and portray decay, corruption and collusion.

SBY is known as a cautious man and he will proceed very slowly. Many retired generals still function in key positions all over the place, as civil servants, as members of local parliaments, as provincial governors and so on. Some hold key positions like retired Lt General Sudi Silalahi who functions as SBY’s cabinet secretary or retired Lt General Syafrie Syamsuddin who is secretary-general at the Defence Department. Whether intentionally or not, these people are keeping the Dwifungsi alive.

A new group of conservative nationalists is emerging as an unofficial opposition outside parliament. The group includes civilians like Akbar Tandjung, formerly chair of GOLKAR, and former president, Megawati, as Well as former army heavyweights like retired General Try Sutrisno and Retired General Wiranto. They are using every opportunity to criticise the government with nationalistic arguments such as allowing foreign corporations to squander the country’s wealth.

Reform under Habibie and Gus Dur

The fall of the dictatorship in May 1998 became the signal for reformers to demand a complete overhaul of the TNI and an end to impunity. It is worthwhile to scrutinise what has happened with TNI reform since May 1998.

Since the fall of Suharto many parameters have changed in Indonesia, Not least the fact that in the last eight years there have been four presidents, several terrorist attacks have hit important urban areas, there have been two general elections, a law on autonomy has been adopted and implemented and the TNI has lost much of its political power.

Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), the two first presidents after reformasi, tried very hard to reform the military but without much success. Megawati didn’t even try and her presidency can be seen as wasted years as far as military reform is concerned.

The Habibie administration tried to end impunity by taking some Hardline generals to court. But as nothing had yet been done to reform the judiciary, all the officers were acquitted. Habibie’s presidency lasted for only one year, which was far too short, and the structure of the TNI was left untouched.

Gus Dur tried to reform the military but in hindsight all analysts Conclude that he lacked the necessary statesmanship skills to implement this. Less than two years later, he was removed from office through a humiliating impeachment. Gus Dur was ousted by two forces: the army who carried out a parade in front of the palace in an act of defiance and the next day, the MPR, the People’s Congress, full of members who were retired generals or politicians from the Suharto era.

Despite their many flaws, Habibie and Gus Dur achieved a few important things. POLRI, the Police Force, was removed from the TNI, making it clear that law and order was a police task and that the TNI should be transformed into a proper professional defence force.

Gus Dur tried to get rid of the hardliners and actually removed the powerhouse General Wiranto, arguably the most influential officer from 1997 to 2001. He also tried to dispense with General Ryamizard Ryacudu, the new army chief-of-staff, but failed and paid the price. It became clear to political analysts that reform within TNI was sluggish and consisted of much more than simply replacing officers.

While the top brass of the TNI is now moving towards a more Professional attitude, by becoming a defence force, it lacks all the basics to achieve this.

Toothless and ruthless

It is often argued that brutality by TNI soldiers in places like East Timor in the past, West Papua now and Aceh until very recently is the result of a lack of professionalism and the basics of military training. This is not a problem unique to Indonesia; in many other countries, the military in combat behaves ruthlessly towards the local population. In the past fifty years, wars have increasingly victimised the civilian population. One explanation is that the military is not capable of pacifying a region and starts behaving in a brutal way as a result of a lack of confidence, to such an extent that resistance from the local population is bound to intensify.

If one assesses the TNI’s performance on the battlefield, in particular In East Timor and Aceh, it can be concluded that it has performed woefully and was never capable of containing any security threats. The reason is lack of proper training and suitable equipment and the lack of an appropriate mindset.

The basics of the TNI are indeed fundamentally flawed. Juwono Sudarsono, the defence minister, has admitted that the 380,000 TNI troops have ‘no deterrent capability’. Only 65 of the navy’s 121 ships and half of the air force’s 114 aircraft are operational, while most of the army’s 100-odd battalions are below-strength, under-equipped and under-trained. (Financial Times, 18 February 2006)

In the first weeks of the tsunami disaster, the poor quality of TNI Units again became apparent when professional military units from Neighbouring countries such as Singapore and Malaysia came to help the victims. Well equipped, using the most advanced helicopters and heavy material, teamed by skilled medical stuff, the neighbouring armies were very useful while TNI assistance was limited to basic tasks such as handing out food, removing corpses and so on.

Armed forces budget

Arguably one of the major stumbling blocks in the way of structural Reform of the TNI is the notorious 30-70 figure: the armed forces gets only 30 per cent of the money it needs from the state while it must find the remaining 70 per cent itself. Since Juwono Sudarsono became defence minister, the TNI budget has increased by 7.5 per cent as compared with 2005 but the 30-70 figure still holds.

For the 2006 budget, Rp 23.6 trillion (US$ 2.6 billion) has been Allocated but the actual needs have gone up to Rp 56.9 trillion (US 6.2 billion).

In every sense, the TNI is mini-sized. For a large country with the world’s fourth largest population, Indonesia only has 279.000 troops, divided between the army (around 220,000), the air force (24,000) and the navy (35,000). It is relatively speaking, much smaller than the armed forces in neighbouring countries. Wages are also very low; a low-ranking soldier earns Rp700,000 (US$77) a month which needs to be topped up with food and operational bonuses in order to survive. It is far from easy for Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono to fill the huge gap in the budget and much time and energy has therefore been devoted to reorganising and revitalizing military businesses.

Military businesses

Having its own source of income has been a tradition within the TNI Since it was formed in 1945. As military commander of Central Java in the fifties, Suharto was notorious for his involvement in all kinds of Illegal business schemes including barter (smuggling of goods) to and from Singapore. Each division or regional command owned companies, Cooperatives and foundations. They were all supposed to improve the welfare of the soldiers but more often than not, the top layer of officers became rich while ordinary soldiers lived in woeful conditions in shabbily-built barracks.

Over the years, in particular after 1965, military businesses mushroomed. Some of the most juicy state companies, like the state oil company Pertamina, fell into the hands of the military and billion of dollars were siphoned off. The nouveaux riche of Jakarta in the seventies were mostly army officers functioning as CEOs in state companies. Mismanagement and rampant corruption soon became the norm of these companies.

Military business reached its peak in the eighties when the economy of Indonesia (and Southeast Asia) was booming. Special relations were Built with businessmen who were often Chinese, in mutually beneficial, highly lucrative deals. But the fairy tale didn’t last long. The monetary crisis in 1997 hit the Indonesian economy very hard, resulting in the bankruptcy of many military businesses.

Already in the early eighties, the TNI tried to re-organise the many companies it owned. A Chinese businessman, Sofyan Wanandi was asked to carry out a big overhaul. Companies which were badly run and had huge losses were closed while the profit-making ones were revitalised and in many cases merged. A trust company was set up, PT Truba, to put all the companies under one roof. For a while things went well, but the monetary crisis in 1997 delivered an almost fatal blow to military businesses. Former chief of staff General Ryacudu, recently frankly admitted that military businesses could only mark up an annual profit of Rp30 billion (US$ 3.3 million).

Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono has now decided to bring all the Military businesses under his department which will be regulated by law. Of the 219 companies that are listed as military companies, only about ten are reasonably profitable. The TNI top brass has agreed in principle that the Defence Department will supervise the companies but still expect to continue receiving a hefty sum. There is still major disagreement about the future of several foundations (actually profit-making corporations). Most of these foundations emerged in the Suharto period and became mega-size corporations.

TNI supremo, Marshall Djoko Suyanto, argues that some of the key foundations are being run for the benefit and welfare of the soldiers. If these are taken away, the TNI will lose the extra income that is so desperately needed.

In reality, things are much more complex. Investments and shareholders Are very much intertwined. The military foundations often have considerable assets and shares in a variety of private businesses. Recently Yayasan Kartika Eka Pakci, one the major military foundations, sold its shares (11 per cent) in Bank Artha Graha and reaped Rp121 billion (US$ 13,5 million). Assets may have been invested in land, real estate, banking or other enterprises. It will take years before all the military assets can be properly accounted for.

Another difficulty is the wealth of certain officers. While the salary Of Indonesian generals is around US$300 a month, their life style shows That some of them are millionaires, much of their wealth being in foreign currency. Corruption, additional incomes and so on have been rampant in the last three decades. It will be a hard for the several anti-corruption institutions to track this down, but some cases are obvious. The Bank Artha Graha mentioned above, which is run by a notorious Chinese tycoon Tommy Winata, is often referred to as the bank of the generals. It is a public secret that high-ranking officers put their money in this bank in return for which Bank Artha Graha enjoys extra protection.

The bottom line is that since the birth of the TNI, military business practices have been accepted as normal and have even been legalised. A great deal of effort and time will be needed to control this, assuming that the end result is achievable.

Illegal business activities

Next to murky military businesses there is a much larger sector of Illegal and extra-curricular activity of the military. Official figures say that the state loses some US$ 22 billion a year through smuggling, illegal logging, piracy and other crimes. Most of these lucrative businesses are based in the outer islands. Analysts claim that military involvement has increased enormously, in particular in the wake of the 1997 monetary crisis. While the political and economic activities of the TNI have decreased significantly in Jakarta, their activities in the regions have steadily increased. The regional autonomy law provides more money and political power in the districts, which means that the territorial structure of the army can be very beneficial for legal and illegal business activities.

Illegal logging is an extremely serious threat to the environment and it is a public secret that timber barons from Malaysia together with local tycoons have been involved in cutting down forests in remote places in Kalimantan and other islands. All this cannot occur without the knowledge and collusion of the local authorities, including the military. Other illegal activities show the same pattern: piracy and smuggling are rampant because of the involvement of the military and police authorities.

Another lucrative activity falls under the broad category of moonlighting. This can be something quite innocent like taking a job as the driver or bodyguard of a rich businessman or something far less savoury like making threats or beating up business competitors. Lower down the scale, moonlighters are used as hit men to eliminate rivals.

Protecting big companies like the copper and gold mine Freeport is Being coordinated by the military command in West Papua. The US-based company pays millions of dollars annually to the military commander as well as to ordinary soldiers [see separate article].

Binter and Binyah

Ever since the reform of the armed forces started, one of the main demands of civil society has been to abolish the territorial structure of the army. The army structure reaches right down to village level as a shadow structure of the civil administration. In the first two decades of Suharto’s New Order, the army territorial structure was the dominant structure. That explains why the TNI has so far refused to abandon the territorial structure as it has become a lucrative money-making machine.

At the top of the TNI structure, the special commander for territorial affairs (Aster, Asisten Territorial, Assistant for Territorial Affairs) has been abolished, but the territorial structure at the bottom is alive and kicking.

Nowadays the structure is better known by such abbreviations as binyah (bina wilayah, regional guidance) and binter (bina territorial, territorial guidance). The term bina or guidance smacks strongly of the former New Order structure of the military ruling the civilians.

Soon after the Dwifungsi doctrine was abolished in 1998, it was Replaced by a set of new paradigms by which territorial commanders retain their territorial role for improving social conditions and can be used to try to end domestic ethnic and religious divides. Broadly interpreted, the territorial structure allows the military to continue its role in politics and ‘guidance’ can often mean guidance over the village head, sub-district chief or district chief.

At the village level, the TNI territorial structure is represented by a babinsa (village NCO officer) at the sub-district, a Koramil (sub-district military command) and at the district level, a Kodim (district military command) structure. In the more remote, conflict-prone places like West Papua, the military structures remain dominant.

Pancasila and the guardian of the state

Military watchers argue that in the end, it is the ideological interpretation of the average TNI officer about their military duties that ultimately determines whether reform of the TNI has been successful. TNI officers, in particular army officers, are more often than not convinced of the uniqueness of their role as military. In particular military stalwarts who experienced the period between 1945 till 1949 are convinced of their predominant role in the struggle for independence.

The two most prominent military men, General Abdul Harris Nasution and General Suharto, differ on many things but not on the uniqueness of the TNI. As they see it, the TNI cannot be compared with other armies in The developed world, and for that reason TNI has is own doctrines, Strategies and tactics.

In the Nasution days, pre-1965, distrust towards civilian politicians Was prominent and this distrust continues to this very day. In the Suharto days, especially in the 1980s, the Pancasila teaching of Sukarno was promoted from a loose kind of guidance into a strict ideology whereby unity and common thinking became prevalent. The TNI became the guardian of that principle. Whenever state unity was under threat, the TNI was obliged to step in on the assumption that it could not rely on the policies of a civilian government.

The present batch of officers have accepted in principle the new Paradigm of civilian supremacy. At the same time they were groomed in the spirit and ideology of the New Order. Some pessimistic military watchers state that we will have to wait at least another decade for a new generation of officers to graduate from the military academy who are not polluted by old totalitarian views.

Civilian supremacy

In theory this may be simple, but realisation is more complex. The two Keys elements of civilian supremacy are democratic control over the military and military professionalism.

Again, in theory, post-Suharto Indonesia fulfils all the criteria of a democracy, with an elected government and legislature. But in this transitional stage of a young democracy, military thinking is still persistent, in particular in parliament and within the civil service.

Most political parties, including the major ones like Golkar and PDI-P Have many retired officers on their boards and also in parliament. The old style of politics, the patron-client system remains the dominant structure within the parties. In the civil service, many high-ranking posts are still occupied by military, and the same is true at provincial level.


Civilian politicians often lack the confidence to defy the old Prevailing structures. The military structure was and arguably still is the best organised institutional and political force. More often than not, if candidates are being nominated for governor or district chief, the military candidate will be selected and elected, not least because he previously served as military commander while civilian candidates are seen as inexperienced.

As we have already seen, achieving military professionalism is a long And winding road. It was not all that long ago that a civilian was appointed as minister of defence and efforts to place the TNI headquarters fully under his department are still in the making. The long and the short of it is that TNI reform will take time but having a government with a strong political will can hasten this process.

The experience of the Megawati years is clear; they were wasted years. The present team - SBY and Yusuf Kalla - have started very well with the withdrawal (without any significant problems) of the TNI from Aceh. The government should be encouraged to continue along this line, including by overseeing the demilitarisation of West Papua.