RESPONDING TO ACEH'S TSUNAMI: THE FIRST 40 DAYS

April 2005

“We do not want to be relocated to the barracks by the government…if we are forced to move to the barracks, so far from the place of our friends and relatives, the memories will die, just as the people have.”

Research and publication of this report was supported financially by Forum Asia - www.forumasia.org
For further information contact info@eyeonaceh.org

ABREVIATIONS

ADB: Asian Development Bank
AIPRD: Australia - Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development
BAKORNAS PBP: National Co-ordinating Board for Disaster Management
BAPPENAS: National Development Planning Agency
CGI: Consultative Group on Indonesia
CoHA: Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
CRS: Christian Relief Service
DEC: Disasters Emergency Committee
Depdagri: Department of the Interior
Depdiknas: National Education and Culture
Deplu: Department of Foreign Affairs
EU: European Union
ESPNAD: Employment Service for the People of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province
FPI: Islamic Defences Front
GAM: Free Aceh Movement
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
IDP: Internally Displaced Person
ILO: International Labor Organisation
IMET: International Military Education Training
MoU: Memorandum of Understanding
MSF: Medicines sans Frontieres
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO: Non-governmental organisations
OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PWI: Indonesia’s Journalists Association
PCC-Aceh: People Crisis Centre - Aceh
SATKORLAK PBP: Provincial Coordinating Unit for Disaster Management
TNI: Indonesian Armed Forces
UK: United Kingdom
UN: Untied Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
UPC: Urban Poor Consortium
USA: United States of America
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development
WB: World Bank
WFP: World Food Program
WHO: World Health Organisation

INTRODUCTION

At 8:00 am on 26 December 2004, an earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale occurred in the Indian Ocean, just 150 km from Aceh, a province in the north-western corner of Indonesia already ravaged by war. The tremors were followed by a large tsunami that wreaked havoc in more than twelve countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia and East Africa.

The tsunami pounded Aceh and the island of Nias in North Sumatra, sending waves as far inland as 7 kilometres in places. In Aceh, the tsunami first hit the west coast, then the main town of Banda Aceh and finally the northeast coast. Houses, shops, and schools were devastated; cars and trucks were seen surfing the waves, and ships were churned in the waters, eventually finding moorings in or on top of buildings. Among the floating debris, and trapped in buildings and cars were some of the almost 250,000 members of Aceh’s population now counted as dead or missing. In some places, the impact of the tsunami was so great that the coastline of Aceh has been redrawn, the sea engulfing parts of land where houses once stood. In other areas, land has appeared where before there was only sea.

In a matter of minutes, towns and villages in the affected areas were wiped from the map. Local economies and livelihoods were decimated, local fishing and farming capacities lost. Soon after the tsunami ceased its destruction, the fight against disease began. A shortage of clean drinking water, medical assistance, medicines, and lack of sanitation created a public health emergency. Tens of thousands of dead bodies littered the streets; thousands more remained trapped in the wreckage of some of Aceh’s towns and villages. In the days and weeks following the tsunami, as assistance began to reach the most-affected areas, initially from elsewhere in Indonesia, and later from around the world, the scale of death and devastation shocked even the most experienced of relief and rescue workers.

When the waters finally receded and residents were relieved from the immediate life or death struggle, they surveyed a landscape where a force of nature as powerful as any imaginable had swept through their towns and villages. In many areas, the land where houses, government buildings, hospitals and schools, prisons and businesses once stood was completely flat – in some cases not even the floor tiles remained.

The local economy, administration, and infrastructure also sustained immeasurable damage. The provincial government ground to a halt as civilian government, military and police offices, the judicial system, and prisons were destroyed or damaged. The documents of many government departments including the police investigations unit, were destroyed, wiping out all traces of the thousands of cases brought against civilians during martial law, many of whom were guilty of no more than voicing opposition to the government and leading protests. Voting lists, land title deeds and other personal records were also lost in the disaster.

The effect of the tsunami upon Aceh can only be understood in the context of the pre-existing situation of strife and poverty. This report provides that context as it describes the impact that the tsunami had upon the social, political, physical and economic infrastructure of Aceh. It also examines the reaction of the international community and the effects of a foreign aid presence upon the province. Finally, it offers some recommendations for the future which are aimed at ensuring the rehabilitation and reconstruction phases in Aceh take account of the background of the conflict, are responsive to local needs, and are not driven by any alternative agenda.

CONFLICT IN ACEH

In order to fully understand the effect of the tsunami upon Aceh and its people, and also the limitations upon the relief efforts which followed, it is necessary to be aware of the political and economic reality of Aceh prior to the disaster (1). The Indonesian government’s somewhat delayed response to this overwhelming tragedy can only be fully comprehended within the context of the violent and bloody struggle for independence that has waxed and waned in this remote corner of the giant archipelago for almost 30 years.

Aceh’s recent history is one of violent unrest, driven by poverty and the bitter resentment of many local people at the perceived ‘wrongs’ perpetrated against them by the Indonesian authorities. In the early 1970s, foreign exploitation of Aceh’s mineral wealth began in earnest with the discovery of natural gas in North Aceh. The modern industrial complex introduced by the gas industry was something that the majority of Acehnese were unable or unwilling to engage with. As late as the mid 1970s, there was not even a technical high school in the district, so most of the workers employed by the American oil giant Mobil Oil (later to become ExxonMobil) were imported mainly from Java and North Sumatra. The company invested billions of dollars in developing the production capacity and building the infrastructure for the 5,000 workers that it planned to employ.

As production of liquid natural gas (LNG) got underway in 1977, a development gap emerged in which the ‘incomers’ benefited more than the indigenous people who remained relatively untouched by this development. In reality, the LNG industry brought little benefit to the local economy or people; most of those employed were not Acehnese and little profit stayed in Aceh. The local people have remained impoverished; in October 2004, local government statistics showed 53% of families in Aceh were living in poverty; an increase over previous years.

Partly in reaction to the perceived economic exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources, in 1976 Hasan di Tiro with a small group of fellow dissenters, established the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). On 4 December 1976, di Tiro unilaterally declared Aceh’s independence from its ‘colonial master’ (Indonesia). The small uprising was quickly quelled by the Indonesian military and di Tiro left for Sweden. For several years it looked as if GAM had quite literally been wiped out. But in the 1980s, GAM members returned from Libya where they had undergone intensive military training, the separatists had strengthened themselves in both quantity and quality – a guerrilla war ensued.

The violent conflict

Aceh is the scene of the most prolonged and violent of Indonesia’s internal conflicts. The two warring parties in question are the security forces of the Republic of Indonesia and the GAM. Since the late 1990s, opposition to rule by Indonesia’s central government in Jakarta has been increasing. What began as discontent at perceived exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources has been overtaken by local outrage at the widespread abuses of human rights during successive military operations in the province. During the decades of conflict, more than 15,000 people have been killed, and thousands more disappeared.

Since the year 2000 when a shaky peace process was begun by former President Abdurrahman Wahid, two peace agreements have been signed - both were short-lived. The most recent was the internationally brokered Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) signed in December 2002. The CoHA had a troubled existence; there was no common understanding from either GAM or the Indonesian government of the document which both had signed, and in the field, violations including deaths, disappearances, torture and damage to infrastructure were common. Finally in April 2003, an ultimatum was issued by the central government: ‘Renounce the push for independence or there will be no further negotiations.’ GAM refused, the only solution for them was full independence. As a result, on 18 May 2003, the Indonesian government pronounced the peace process ended and arrested 5 members of the GAM negotiating team.

On 19 May 2003, in a concerted bid to crush the armed rebellion, the central government in Jakarta placed Aceh under martial law, closing the province to foreigners and imposing restrictions on the content of domestic media, thereby severely curtailing the flow of information to the outside world. Although martial law was downgraded to a state of civil emergency one year later in May 2004, the door to the province remained largely closed to foreigners. Aceh remains under a civil emergency status – to be reviewed in May 2005. This state of emergency is one of the major factors in the tragically delayed response by the Indonesian government to the events of 26 December 2004: elements within the government and military simply did not want a foreign presence in the province. Eventually, faced with such an unprecedented humanitarian disaster, they were left with no choice but to accept the foreign assistance being offered. The door to Aceh was finally prised open.

In order to facilitate a more efficient relief operation after the tsunami, GAM announced a unilateral ceasefire. A press statement declared:

“The field commanders of the Aceh National Armed Forces have been instructed, while increasing their alertness and helping the best they can all the processes of aiding, evacuating and rehabilitating the victims of the earthquake and subsequent tsunami floods, to also restrain their troops from engaging the enemy in armed contact in order to avoid causing the people to feel trapped and panic.” (GAM, 26 December, 2004)

On 29 December 2004, the commander-in-chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) General Endriartono Sutarto followed GAM’s lead with an offer of a cessation of hostilities from the military. No formal cease-fire agreement was reached, but both parties acknowledged the fact that armed clashes would hinder the humanitarian effort and should therefore cease.

IMPACT OF THE TSUNAMI – EARLY ACCOUNTS

In the first days after the tsunami, as the scale of the disaster was unfolding in Sri Lanka, Thailand, India and elsewhere, news of the situation in Aceh was extremely limited. In Jakarta, heated discussions were taking place between hard-line elements of the TNI who wanted Aceh to remain closed and were arguing that the Indonesians themselves could deal with the disaster, and those in government who quickly realised that international logistic and other assistance was not only inevitable, but essential.

On 27 December 2004, Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) declared the situation in Aceh a national disaster, and appointed the National Co-ordinating Board for Disaster Management (BAKORNAS PBP) under the direction of Vice President Jusuf Kalla, to deal with the emergency relief effort. Kalla flew over the west coast city of Meulaboh on 28 December 2004 and reported that 80 percent of the city had been destroyed (Tempointeraktif, 28 December, 2004). These and other aerial surveys, along with eyewitness accounts of waves that were 30 meters high, dashed early hopes that many had survived. The emergency relief effort to the west was made more difficult by the fact that the tsunami rendered the 300 km road, which passes through Banda Aceh, Lhok Nga, west to Teunom, Calang and Meulaboh, impassable for cars and trucks. The areas around the west coast city of Meulaboh were completely cut-off, help could only reach survivors by helicopter or ship.

Twelve days after the tsunami, the death toll across 11 tsunami affected countries, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, Maldives, Bangladesh, Somalia, Tanzania and Kenya had reached more than 150,000, with 98,489 of these in Aceh (2). Referring to the region, the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), Kofi Annan, said that this was “the largest natural disaster the UN has had to respond to on behalf of the world community in the sixty years of its existence.” (3)

By 4 February 2005, 40 days after the tsunami, 112,872 Acehnese had been officially declared dead; most buried in mass graves. An estimated 127,749 remained missing (BAKORNAS PBP, 5 February 2005). At the time this article was written in early March, the respective figures had been adjusted to 125,996 dead and 94,105 missing. The exact number of lives lost remains uncertain and will likely never be known, especially as many did not register missing family members:

“Why should I report my parents, brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles, cousins, nephews, nieces and all almost 300 members of my family missing? They are not missing – they are dead.” (Interview with resident of Lamjabat Banda Aceh, 3 January, 2005)

What is clear however, is that entire communities were decimated; in some places, little of the people or the infrastructure remains. In the worst areas, the only testament to the lost communities is in the memories of survivors. For some, not even a photograph remains of the family they have lost.

Although no systematic survey has been conducted, early indications are that more women and children died than men. The earthquake and tsunami struck on a Sunday morning when many women were at home with their children while the men had gone to the market or on other errands, giving them more chance to escape the waves that swept inland. It is also the case that many more men than women can swim, and that the women, many taking care of children and others, were probably less able to climb trees and scrabble onto buildings. Lists compiled by local government workers and NGOs contained the names of thousands more women than men. And in the camps, women were noticeable only by their absence. Some were too traumatised to live in such rough conditions and stayed with friends or relatives whose houses remained intact, but many more had been crushed or drowned as the earthquake and then the tsunami ended their lives.

A DEVASTATED PROVINCE

With telecommunications down, and the province still closed, it was several days before news of the scale of the disaster in Aceh was known. On the first day, national and international media reported 500 dead, but Kalla was already estimating 5-10 thousand victims (Tempo Interaktif, 26 and 27 December 2004). It was only when the media and relief agencies entered Aceh that the true horror of the devastation was revealed. Apart from the loss of tens of thousands of lives, infrastructure in the affected areas was almost totally wiped out. In the main town of Banda Aceh, and along the west and east coast and the islands, hundreds of towns and villages had been swept away or partially damaged.

Physical Infrastructure

The impact of the tsunami was presented by the Department of the Interior (Depdagri) to a shocked Indonesian Cabinet: the districts worst affected by the tsunami were Aceh Jaya, where damage to buildings was 85%, Aceh Besar 80%, the capital city of Banda Aceh 75%, Simeulu island 50%, Sabang island 45% and West Aceh 60%. See map. An estimate of preliminary damage and loss by the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS PBP) for the province of Aceh and North Sumatra was Rp 42.7 trillion or US$ 4.5 billion. This included more than 250,000 houses, 8 ports and 4 fuel depots; 85 percent of water supplies and 92% of the sanitation system in the worst affected areas (BAPPENAS, 19 January 2005 and data from State Ministry of People’s Housing). As many as 2,704 mosques, 8 churches, and 2 temples were also damaged. In addition, 423 km of primary road, and 2,191km of secondary roads in the province were closed (BAKORNAS PBP, 7 January 2005).

In the west coast city of Meulaboh, 80% of electricity cables fell, leaving the area in almost total darkness. Even in the Central Aceh town of Takengon, which was unaffected by the tsunami, the earthquake caused 100 electricity poles to topple, affecting thousands of homes and businesses. In Banda Aceh, electricity supplies were disrupted but due to the decrease in demand because so many buildings had been destroyed, those who required electricity received at least a disrupted supply very quickly.

Government

The events of 26 December 2004 also left Aceh with no effective functioning local government. Thirteen of Aceh’s 21 districts were affected by the tsunami, 6 of them severely. Aceh has 235 sub districts and a total of 5,967 villages. Of these, 52 sub districts were unable to function, and 921 villages were badly affected (Department of the Interior - Depdagri, 26 January 2005). The Aceh provincial government and many local level administrations suffered substantial loss of personnel, expertise, and infrastructure. According to Depdagri, 1,083 of Aceh’s civil servants were killed, and a further 3,510 are missing (26 January 2005). Of the 20 prisons in Aceh, four were damaged or completely destroyed; many prisoners and staff were killed as the buildings collapsed. All that remains of Lhok’nga prison in Aceh Besar are the green floor tiles. Trapped in the cells, 93 of the 100 women being held there died; 248 of 278 prisoners in Keudah prison in Banda Aceh perished, and 36 of the 56 in Calang prison in West Aceh were also victims of the tsunami (Department of Law and Human Rights, Banda Aceh, 29 January, 2005).

Health & Education

In the worst tsunami-affected areas, health services were severely disrupted as hospitals and clinics were washed away, collapsed or were so badly damaged that they became inoperable. Three of Aceh’s 32 hospitals were totally destroyed, another 4 badly damaged. Many sub-district health clinics (puskesmas) were also lost: 37 were destroyed, 40 damaged, and 15 small local clinics were also rendered useless. The local Department of Health reported 337 health workers confirmed dead, and another 441 missing.

Damage to the education sector was also substantial; 387 schools were destroyed, and 954 were damaged (National Education and Culture Department – Depdiknas, 28 January 2005). On 20 January, the head of the Department of Education in Aceh reported that 1,148 [teachers] had been confirmed dead and around 1,000 others were missing. The department conceded that this number could rise as access to the devastated areas improved and more information became available. The Department of Religion also reported that 209 of its religious schools were damaged, and 155 traditional Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) were damaged

For a small population of only 4 million people, Aceh has a surprisingly high number of universities; student numbers vary from only a few hundred to several thousands. The two biggest universities in Aceh in terms of student numbers and academic reputation are the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) and Syiah Kuala University (UNSYIAH), both located in Banda Aceh. IAIN sustained the most damage in the tsunami, affecting the education of thousands of university students. The Directorate General of Higher Education reported that 23 universities in Aceh have been destroyed and as many as 200 university lecturers swept away by the tsunami (Sinar Indonesia Baru, 25 February 2005).

Media & Information

Apart from power outages causing a media blackout, Aceh’s only daily newspaper Serambi Indonesia was also a victim of the tsunami as were other newspapers with offices in the province, and numerous radio stations. Serambi Indonesia was unable to cover the biggest story in its history. For five days, the newspaper was not seen in the villages and towns in Aceh. Located only 500 meters from the coast, Serambi’s office and printing presses were destroyed by the events, and almost half of its staff are dead or missing:

“We have lost 52 of our staff, 11 of them are our senior journalists. Our office is completely wiped out, and the printing machine was also swept away, we could not print the paper from 27 till 31 December 2004. We started to print again on 1 January 2005, and distributed free of charge until 8 January 2005 with only 8 pages. Our new office is small, but anyway, we have to continue this work.” (Interview, Banda Aceh, Nurdin Hasan, 10 January 2005)

Banda Aceh also lost 16 radio stations; while in Meulaboh, all four local radio stations were either completely damaged or partially destroyed. The Aceh branch of the Indonesian Journalists Association (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia - PWI) reported that 23 journalists were killed or are missing.

Economy

Economic activity in Aceh has largely developed around traditional farming, forestry and fishing, as well as local crafts such as embroidery and weaving. Aceh’s workforce numbers 2.5 million; of these, more than 1 million work in the agriculture sector (4). While in the coastal villages, most people are involved in the fishing industry. The local branch of the Maritime and Fishery Ministry reported that more than 14,000 fishermen were killed in the disaster, while between 6,000 to 8,000 fishing boats were either destroyed or lost. Meanwhile in farming sector, the devastation occurred in 9 districts, causing 51,446 hectares of land used for rice, beans, chilli, and other food crops to be rendered useless. In addition, a further 56,500 – 102,461 hectares of plantation land for rubber, palm oil, cloves, cocoa, and coffee was affected. The land has been heavily contaminated by mud and salt, and was covered in debris, bringing farming in many areas to a complete halt. Livestock were affected: 141,011 cows and buffalo, 89,233 goats and lambs, and 1,624,431 chicken and ducks were lost (Indonesian Agency for Agricultural Research and Development, 22 February 2005).

RESPONDING TO THE TSUNAMI

Early Relief Efforts

The strategy for the relief effort in the first few days was quite simple: attend to the living, leave the tens of thousands already dead until later. Lack of human resources demanded that to reach survivors, rescue workers would simply step over or push aside the bodies that littered the streets, and were piled up in doorways of partly ruined buildings. Many in Aceh are grateful to the military and police who performed this gruesome task: “If those guys hadn’t been here in the first few days, many more people would be dead” (Interview with Becak driver, Lhok’nga, 9 January, 2005). It wasn’t until 28 December 2004, when military and political hardliners submitted to demands to allow foreign humanitarian and relief assistance into Aceh that the government of Indonesia made an official request to the United Nations and others assist in the province.

Thousands of relief workers poured into Aceh to help: multilateral and bilateral agencies, local and international NGOs, emergency organizations, universities, trade unions, and individual local, national and international volunteers. Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs (Deplu) expressed it’s gratitude to the international community, and acknowledged that:

“One of the most difficult challenges at this stage is to transport and distribute relief materials to isolated areas in which communications systems and other infrastructure is no longer operational. We further appreciate offers by friendly countries to mobilise more air transport to reach out to isolated areas” (Deplu press release, 30 December, 2004).

The close to obsolete state of much of the Indonesian military’s air and sea capabilities meant that substantial assistance reached those stranded in the more remote areas only with the arrival of foreign militaries from Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, America, and other countries. Militaries from more than 23 foreign countries brought heavy lifting equipment and large transport capabilities that were so vital to the relief effort. Repairs to roads and bridges were high on the priority list.

As international help arrived, the TNI, together with teams of volunteers, hastened efforts to complete the task of burying the dead in order to prevent the spread of diseases such as typhoid and cholera. Most were buried – unidentified – in lime-coated mass graves scattered throughout the affected areas in Aceh. In Banda Aceh, the sight of teams of military, police and volunteers in masks, rubber gloves and rubber boots collecting bloated and rotting corpses from the streets, and pulling them from Banda Aceh’s rivers and wreckage of the buildings was common for more than a month after the disaster.

By week three, teams collecting bodies from the debris no longer even attempted to identify the victims:

“We can still tell if the body is a man or woman, but facial identification is impossible because of the rapid decay. In most cases there is no hope of identifying the body, since most are naked and so have no identity card. Our teams just wrap the bodies in plastic and leave them at the side of the road. Later, a truck will collect them to be taken to one of the many mass graves.” (Interview with volunteer team coordinator, Banda Aceh, 17 January, 2005)

Throughout January, an average of 1,500 bodies were recovered each day from the wreckage of Banda Aceh’s buildings, or pulled from the city’s rivers. On day 40 after the tsunami (4 February): 721 bodies were buried. By early March, the number of bodies being collected daily had decreased to less than 200. There was a growing consensus that most of the more than 100,000 who remained missing would never be found. Many living in Aceh, afraid of another quake, suffering from trauma and afraid of the spread of disease, began to leave the province by any available means, leaving the military and (largely non-Acehnese) volunteers to do the majority of the early cleanup operation.

With every passing day, as infrastructure improved, the scale of the disaster in the more remote areas became clearer. Thousands more were missing, swept away by the giant waves or trapped in the rubble of the ruined buildings; family members wandered the streets searching in the official camps, and the informal settlements that had sprung up in the towns and villages, desperately looking for any evidence those missing might still be alive. It was very likely however, that many of these people had already been buried. The sight of trucks piled high with bodies heading to the mass graves and the thought that relatives and friends might be one of those wrapped in black plastic, haunted many.

Local coordination and support centres (poskos) quickly sprung up all over Aceh to deal with the logistics of distributing aid to such a large number of people. These centres not only provided food, water and medical assistance, but many operated an informal tracing system; connecting survivors, and giving information about the dead already identified and those still missing. These poskos were run by local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), students groups, community based organizations, and even the TNI and police. But there was very little any of them could do to help those searching, except to offer a mechanism that gave people some hope – for a short time at least.

As the weeks passed, attention turned away from searching for the missing as people began to think about the future; many communities returned to the area of their original village. Forty days after the earthquake and tsunami, official figures showed that 412,438 people were displaced, scattered in 66 locations (Department of Social Affairs - Depsos, 5 February, 2005). But in fact, this data included only those in recognised camps, and did not include the thousands displaced in the communities. Many who lost their homes preferred not to live in the official camps where conditions were initially very poor, finding shelter instead in public buildings such as schools and government offices; mosques; under tarpaulin shelters or in makeshift camps – sometimes with no tents, while others lived with host families in communities unaffected by the tsunami. Certainly, in the first two weeks or more, the living conditions for many were miserable. Fear and trauma continued to plague many as smaller earthquakes were almost a daily occurrence; buildings shook and electricity supplies were cut.

Local women’s groups became active in trying to address the special needs of women survivors by gathering data on numbers of pregnant women and those who had newly given birth. The Bureau of Women Empowerment Bureau of the provincial government originally stated it had no special plans to address the needs of women. A member of the Bureau explained the reason why they adopted that position: “Men and women suffered equally in the earthquake and tsunami, we don’t need to address women in a special way” (Interview, Banda Aceh, 7 January, 2005). But later, under the ‘engaged’ eye of the UN and other international agencies via a sectoral working group on gender, the Bureau began working to ensure that gender issues were also included in the government-led blueprint on the recovery and reconstruction of Aceh.

The logistics of response

Mechanisms for the national response were established and operationalised within the framework of the ongoing civil emergency. The relief effort was simply integrated into the existing military operation which in theory consisted of several programmes: restoring security, economics, humanitarian initiatives, law enforcement, and the empowerment of local government. The relief operation simply became part of the humanitarian component of the civil emergency.

The National Co-ordinating Board for Disaster Management (BAKORNAS PBP), directed by the Vice President, was given the task of co-ordinating the emergency relief effort, while the rehabilitation and reconstruction effort was assigned to the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS). Restoration of economic activity in Aceh and North Sumatra was mandated to the Coordinating Ministry for the Economy.

Responsibility for the administration of the relief effort in Aceh lies with the provincial extension of BAKORNAS PBP, the Provincial Coordinating Unit for Disaster Management (SATKORLAK PBP). It is unusual in Indonesia for the central government to assign a Minister to be involved in disasters in the provinces, but due to the scale of the disaster in Aceh, the Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare was assigned to sit in the three person committee together with a senior army figure and the temporary governor of the province Azwar Abubakar who was promoted as temporary replacement for the troubled former governor, Abdullah Puteh, who was suspended in July 2004 after coming under investigation for corruption and misuse of provincial funds. Puteh is accused of corruption of Rp 10.8 billion (US$1.2 million) of local government money. In early March, prosecutors asked the court to sentence Puteh to eight years imprisonment.

The military plays a key role

The military in Indonesia has, until very recently, enjoyed an influential role in the social, economic and political affairs of the country. It is logical therefore, that they are also involved in the disaster management body SATKORLAK PBP (5). The military’s territorial command structure, running almost parallel to the civilian administration, is best placed (in theory at least) to mobilise quickly and efficiently in times of disaster. Moreover, in terms of manpower, it has more capacity that any other organisation in the country to play a substantial role in reconstruction.

During martial law, additional military and police were deployed to the province to ‘crush’ GAM, bringing the total number of TNI in the province to almost 50,000. After the tsunami, the mission for the majority of these troops already in Aceh changed from one of destruction, to one of search and rescue. The military themselves suffered substantial loss of life and infrastructure, an estimated 552 troops were killed, and 470 weapons were lost (Serambi Indonesia, 10 January 2005).

Along the main road between Medan in North Sumatra and Banda Aceh, the military and police posts where only a few days earlier, arrests, intimidation, harassment and extortion was still common, lay largely empty after the tsunami; the military personnel had been redeployed to the disaster areas. The TNI said it had deployed 15,000 of those troops already in Aceh, to the disaster area. Immediate tasks were rescue, sheltering and feeding those who survived, and clearing rubble to ensure supply lines were open for relief efforts. Teams of volunteers came from all over Indonesian to participate in this effort. And on 14 January 2005, the TNI sent another 12,000 military personnel to Aceh to be deployed to hasten the evacuation of bodies and to clear the debris. (Indonesia Defence Department news, 14 January 2005). Additional police were also committed to the effort.

Distributing aid

The military institution has its own structure for handling the disaster, including aid distribution procedures. Foreign military liaison officers arriving in Aceh were briefed on the operational mechanisms for foreign military aid. It was made clear that responsibility for aid distribution rests with the TNI’s humanitarian operation task force situated in Banda Aceh air port under the command of Major General TNI, Bambang Darmono (TNI briefing at Banda Aceh airport, 11 January, 2005). The task force has five division teams: information, internally displaced persons (IDPs), logistics, body evacuation, and a health care team. As a point of interest, Darmono was also commander of martial law and the civil emergency in Aceh.

Beyond the military task force, distribution of aid at the district and sub district level is the responsibility of a local extension of the provincial SATKORLAK PBP. This local body – SATLAK PBP – has significant military presence within its structure. In fact, this agency’s activities are facilitated by the three military commands in Aceh.

There is no doubt that in some cases, the distribution of hundreds of thousands of tons of aid was made more difficult by the presence of the military bureaucracy in the distribution mechanism. An Australian military officer commented:

“In the beginning, getting goods into Banda Aceh was not a problem, but as time passed and the Indonesia military tightened its bureaucracy, it became – quite frankly – a nightmare. We will try to stop flying goods to Banda Aceh, perhaps Sabang airport will be less problematic. I’m not saying the military are stealing the goods, but they seem to like to store everything in the warehouse. I’m frustrated that distribution is slow; there is no need for that. People out there [in Aceh] are desperate.” (Interview, Medan, 25 January, 2005)

A staff at SATKORLAK PBP at Banda Aceh airport confirmed:

“Relief supplies are stored in the local warehouses. SATLAK PBP will then distribute to the camps or the communities. If camp coordinators want to request logistics, they must apply to this local level administration, often run by the military.” (Interview, Banda Aceh, 2 March 2005)

The burdensome bureaucracy to obtain food, medicines, tents and other relief items instituted by the TNI is justified by the military hierarchy in the context of the ongoing conflict. The military is wary that some of the relief might end up in the hands of GAM who it has accused of establishing camps in order to obtain logistics intended for IDPs.

The legacy of the conflict in which the military enjoys impunity in its perpetration of abuses, corruption and other violations of political, social and economic rights, means many people in Aceh are reluctant to approach the military run distribution centres to ask for help. This is a province where a psyche of fear is all pervasive, there are very few who have not experienced the death, torture, disappearance, rape or arrest of a family member, friend or work colleague:

“I heard there is a lot of aid at the airport, so I went there to ask whether I could get something for the IDPs in my village. But when I got there, I was ‘interrogated’ about many things: ‘Who are those IDPs?’ and many other questions. Finally, they did not want to give the aid because they said that my village is a stronghold area of GAM, so the people are not really displaced, but just pretending so they can have some food for GAM. They also suspected that some of the IDPs were in fact GAM.” (Interview, Cot Ke’ung, Aceh Besar, 11 January 2005)

Opportunism and profit

For many years, it has been a ‘common secret’ in Aceh, that some elements of the military and police have been able to pursue profit while on a tour of duty in the province. They do this by their involvement in illegal logging, the drugs economy, protection rackets for plantations, oil, gas and other companies. The security forces have been able to build a lucrative business climate for themselves in the province, by monopolising local production, extraction, transport and processing of some natural resources; controlling prices; appropriating land for themselves and on behalf of other parties; and many other commercial activities. In fact, it is virtually impossible to do business in Aceh without dealing with the military.

At the military and police checkpoints that line most roads in Aceh, an illegal ‘fee’ is usually demanded, making travel around the province somewhat more expensive than necessary. But, since the tsunami, military and police ‘business’ activities have been disrupted in the worst hit areas. In the devastated coastal areas of West Aceh, Aceh Besar, Banda Aceh, the northeast and others, there is no sign of the checkpoints or of those who lived and worked there; the former inhabitants deployed elsewhere to assist in the cleaning up operation. At checkpoints that remain operational in these tsunami hit areas, money is still extorted but much less so than in the past.

While the tsunami destroyed business opportunities for the military in some sectors, the devastation of 26 December brought ample new opportunity for profit. In the first few days after the tsunami, the military and some civilians were already looting houses and business premises that were left standing. An eyewitness explains:

“It was the day after the tsunami, I went to my house in Punge [in Banda Aceh] to check how it was. Actually, my house had collapsed. On the way, I saw some military troops go into houses and shops and take boxes full of things. I don’t know what was in the boxes, but they put them in military trucks. I also saw one soldier bend over the body of a dead woman. I think he was taking her gold rings or money.” (Interview, Banda Aceh, 10 January, 2005)

Growing evidence that profiteering was very much back on the agenda of the military began to surface with time. A member of staff with an international agency said:

“As the days passed we could see the military become much more inclined to ask for our paperwork, and on a few occasions we were denied access to certain areas around Meulaboh ‘for our own safety’. On one occasion, the military said a fee had been imposed for that stretch of road – to help with repairs. We were naïve, we paid Rp750,000.” (Banda Aceh, 17 January, 2005)

There is in fact, much anecdotal evidence to suggest that the military is in fact profiting from the relief effort. While it appears unlikely there is large scale organized theft of aid, members of the military and police are known to be siphoning supplies from the stock of general aid held at the distribution centres for their own use. They also make regular visits to the poskos to ‘request’ aid for the troops.

New Zealand’s Foreign Minister, Phil Goff has asked the country’s embassy in Jakarta to investigate allegations made by Newsweek magazine that the Indonesian military has been accepting bribes to allow people to fly out of Aceh on refugee flights (New Zealand Herald, 28 January, 2005). This request was made following a report by Newsweek magazine that half of those who flew on a Royal New Zealand Air Force flight from Aceh to Jakarta in January had paid up to US$80 to the Indonesian military whose job it was to screen the passengers for refugees who were most in need.

The prevailing military culture in Aceh of greed and impunity, and of prioritising profit before peace, is a system that has been in place for almost 30 years. It is a system that has gone largely unchallenged; and one that will take some time to overcome.

INVOLVEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The international presence in Aceh

It was three days after the tsunami that, the Indonesian government finally requested that the UN and others assist with the relief effort. Michael Elmquist, deputy chief of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) explained: “It wasn’t until the late afternoon of 28 December 2004, that BAKORNAS PBP requested UN OCHA to assist in co-ordinating international relief aid and international aid workers to enter Aceh” (Interview, Jakarta, 26 January 2005). In fact, the international community was ready to respond to the disaster much earlier and dispatched emergency medical and rescue teams to standby in neighbouring areas to wait for permission to enter Aceh. After days of waiting, Aceh was at last opened: the international response was immediate. On the evening of 28 December 2004, a French based medical organization, Medicines sans Frontiers (MSF) moved a team it had on standby in North Sumatra into Aceh: two mobile clinics were operational by the following day (MSF press release, 29 December 2004). Many other international NGOs and foreign government relief teams followed. The government decision to open Aceh was a necessary and correct - if late - response to an unprecedented disaster.

A grateful but nervous Indonesian government, military and police watched as thousands of foreign aid workers and foreign military personnel flowed across the North Sumatra land border and began to arrive by air and sea. Of great significance to the emergency response was the fact that foreign militaries arrived in Aceh with helicopters, transport aircrafts and ships to facilitate the movement of logistics and key personnel to the areas that were cut off. Neighbouring countries such as Singapore and Malaysia provided early and critical assistance to Indonesia, and by 1 January, the American aircraft carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln was leading US military relief efforts, and provided a base and transport from which other agencies were able to undertake assessments of the devastated west coast. In fact, it was the helicopters from the Abraham Lincoln that first reached the desperate survivors stranded in west Aceh, taking vital supplies of water, food and medicines. A TNI press release on 17 January noted that 4,478 foreign troops were already in Aceh (TNI Information Center (Puspen), 17 January 2005). Military assistance from the United States of America (USA), Singapore, Germany, Australia and others, helped with water purification, medical care, distributing food, providing tents and helping to clean out and rehabilitate hospitals. The province that had remained closed for so long was finally open. A joint Disaster Management Center (DMC) was established by the UN and the Indonesian government on 10 January to set priorities for the management and co-ordination of disaster relief.

The enormous relief effort took its toll on Aceh’s weak infrastructure. Before the tsunami, the only international airport in Aceh, the Sultan Iskandar Muda airport in Banda Aceh, received less than ten flights a day. During the emergency response, more than 170 relief and passenger flights landed and departed daily on the small runways causing the tarmac to rupture and sink in places. This created new problems as the airport runways became flooded with rainwater and mud. Heavy lifting equipment, vehicles, construction equipment, and relief supplies were desperately needed, but careless planning caused even further damage. In late January, the US and Australian military humanitarian operation were moved to a new base on Sabang island where hard base parking was sufficient for small aircraft.

Overwhelming generosity

In rapid response to the disaster, global aid agencies launched urgent appeals for donations of food, medicines, clothing etc, and also for money. The level of public compassion and generosity these appeals attracted was rare. Foreign governments and international financial institutions also responded immediately and generously, preferring to pledge assistance to the general region-wide effort rather than to earmark specific amounts for certain countries.

Only a few days after the tsunami, the international community had already pledged a combined half-a-billion dollars in support to the affected countries in the region; that figure jumped to more than $800 million by the end of December when the United States increased its pledge from US$35 million to US$350 million. On 6 January 2005, loans and grants were sought by the Indonesian President from a sympathetic international community:

“We have requested the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and other international financial institutions to provide the funds necessary to ensure the viability and sustainability of national rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes (6).”

On the same day (6 January, 2005), the UN Secretary General launched a Flash Appeal and requested US$977 million for immediate relief to the five worst affected countries in the region – $371 million of which was for Indonesia. At a donor meeting in Geneva on 11 January 2005, 77% of this amount was pledged, paralleling the incredible generosity that was evident in response to appeals throughout the world.

A damage assessment by the Indonesian government together with several international donors, including the World Bank estimated the costs of ‘replacements’ (including lost income) in Aceh and North Sumatra to be US$4.5 billion. This is equal to 97% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Aceh.

In the first days after the tsunami, the European Union (EU) Commission immediately committed €23 million (US$30 million) for emergency relief in the affected countries. On 6 January, the President of the Commission announced a further €450 million (US$585) to the region as a whole, €100 million of that to be spent on short-term humanitarian needs (7). This brought total support from the EU Commission and the 25 EU member states to around €1.5 billion (approximately US$2 billion). Further contributions from member states are expected to add to that figure. The Commission intends to allocate €200 million via the World Bank Trust Fund for Indonesia to assist in the task of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

As Indonesia’s nearest neighbour, Australia announced on 5 January 2005, a $1 billion Australian dollar contribution to a newly formed Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD). Announcing the offer, Prime Minister John Howard said the funds – available over five years – would prioritise the tsunami hit areas but would also benefit other areas of Indonesia. Of the $1 billion contribution over five years, $500 million would be grant assistance and the other $500 million would be interest-free loans for ‘the reconstruction and rehabilitation of major infrastructure in the first instance.’

The American government also gave immediate assistance and made a further commitment to longer term support. In a statement released by the White House on 9 February, US President George Bush said:

“I will seek $950 million as part of the supplemental appropriations request to support the areas recovering from the tsunami and to cover the costs of relief efforts to date… We will use these resources to provide assistance to work with the affected nations on rebuilding vital infrastructure that re-energizes economies and strengthens societies (8).”

In early January, the World Bank announced a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Government of Indonesia for reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Aceh and North Sumatra committed to projects aimed at rebuilding communities and physical infrastructure through investments in housing, health, education, roads, and important social assets. The program brings together more than $300 million in reconstruction funds through reallocation within existing projects and also new funds, nearly all in the form of grants and soft loans with zero interest and to be repaid over 40 years.

On 12 January, the Paris Club, a group of 19 creditor nations, announced that:

“Considering the exceptional scale and the devastating effects of this catastrophe… [The Paris Club] will not expect debt payments from affected countries that request such forbearance until the World Bank and the IMF have made a full assessment of their reconstruction and financing needs.” (Press release, 12 January 2005)

One week later, the influential Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), a 30 member group of bilateral and multilateral donors, met to discuss the budgetary implications of the tsunami. It agreed a package of US$1.7 billion reconstruction aid, US$1.2 billion in grants, and US$500 million in soft loans. This was in addition to the US$2.8 billion in new loans that had already been approved.

The efforts mentioned above represent only an example of the international assistance pledged to the affected areas and to Indonesia. The list of donors is seemingly endless and is less important to note here, other than the fact that they provided enough money for the task at hand.

Some international NGOs and other organisations, overwhelmed by the amount of money they received, felt morally obligated to close their tsunami appeals. For example, included in this list is the American based charity Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which by early February had already received US$126 million in donations. The CRS closed its appeal fearing its own lack of capacity to use any further funding effectively. Similarly, the UK Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), an umbrella group for a dozen British charities, closed its Indian Ocean earthquake appeal – the biggest ever fundraising campaign in UK history – on February 26. The DEC said the total amount raised exceeded £300 million. British charities have separately raised another £60m-70m. Many other organisations such as the Australian Red Cross, MSF and others also closed appeals to raise money specifically for the tsunami. A member of Save the Children Fund commented: “This is the first time I’ve been involved in a relief effort where there is absolutely more money available than we actually need – we might even struggle to spend it” (Interview, Banda Aceh, 23, January 2005).

To allay concerns about the possibility of mismanagement of such large sums of money, the UN announced that it was working with the international auditor PriceWaterhouseCoopers to strengthen “existing financial tracking systems and ensure transparency in the use of funds donated for the Flash Appeal” (UN Press Release, 18 January, 2005, SG/SM/9679, GA/10327). The auditing company has donated thousands of hours of advisory services to help ensure that the hundreds of millions of dollars available will be used for the purposes for which it is intended. A second example of the concern resulting from such large sums of money being made available is the EU’s plan to establish a ‘European House’ in Aceh to coordinate the efforts of its member states, and to monitor implementation and ensure transparency of resources.

International presence brings relief and new problems

A variety of groups arrived in Aceh: faith based, unions, students and women’s groups, and various community organisations from elsewhere in Indonesia and overseas. By 15 January, BAKORNAS PBP reported that 2,026 Indonesian nationals were registered as volunteers with the authorities while foreigners numbered 385. This number increased rapidly through January and February. In recognition of the need for more volunteers to help with the relief effort and to bury bodies and clear debris, the Indonesian government sponsored transport and logistics for many national groups to go to Aceh

While most people who went to Aceh simply wanted to help, some were driven by a more troubling set of motives. For example, several Indonesian Islamic groups have used the tsunami as an opportunity to enter Aceh after many years of being rejected by the Acehnese. Only two days after the tsunami, one such group, the Islamic Defense Front (Front Pembela Islam - FPI), sent hundreds of volunteers to Aceh. Transport was provided by the Indonesian government. A central board member of FPI said:

“We arrived in Aceh on 29 December 2004. Transport was provided by the Indonesian Department of Defence, food and other needs were supported by SATKORLAK PBP. The aim of our presence here is to help evacuate the bodies and we plan to stay longer to ensure shariah [Islamic] law will be enforced in Aceh.” (Interview with a member of Central Board Council of FPI, Banda Aceh, 14 January 2005)

FPI was praised by many locals for its role in the task of retrieving bodies, and clearing up (9). But many were wary because of the groups’ previous statements against independence for Aceh, and its known links to the government in Jakarta. Other similar groups also arrived in Aceh after the tsunami. The GAM and many Acehnese have, for many years, made efforts to distance themselves from these more radical Islamic elements in Indonesia. Moreover, the imposition of sharia [Islamic] law which came into force in Aceh in 2001, has never been strictly implemented in the province because of opposition by many local people.

Many Indonesian and international based groups that had previously shown little interest in Aceh suddenly arrived to help. For many years, Acehnese civil society groups have lobbied international human rights groups and others to take an interest in the issue of the conflict in Aceh. Such appeals were met largely with ineptitude. The tsunami has generated interest in Aceh, but done little to strengthen support for the issue of human rights in the province. Most international groups show little prospect of adopting a stance on this sensitive issue, preferring instead to protect their own in-country ‘interests’ rather than engage in what the Indonesian government insists is a domestic issue, and not the business of ‘outsiders’. Bank-rolled by the millions of dollars raised in the tsunami appeals, international groups quickly established ‘offices’ in Aceh, and rented large houses for staff and foreign volunteers to implement projects that are being planned for the coming five or more years. The ‘cost’ of ‘interfering’ in human rights might jeopardise such plans; it is this that explains the lack of willingness by so many to frame their work within the context of a conflict-ridden society.

Some foreign groups arrived in Aceh with very little knowledge of the local situation; of the culture, religion, and of the fact that Aceh was in a state of continuous and violent conflict. While many of these groups worked comfortably within the Acehnese context, some were less in tune with the local cultural and religious environment. One such example is the US based missionary group WorldHelp, whose lack of local understanding can be seen in their attempts to address the issue of orphans in Aceh. Initial fears that up to 40,000 children were orphaned by the tsunami led WorldHelp and other organisations, to plan to bring some of these children out of Indonesia. However, when news of this was heard in Aceh, there was an outcry from local people who insisted that the children should be cared for by members of extended family, friends and neighbours. The issue of human trafficking began to rear its head in the media, the Indonesian government intervened, saying no children should be taken out of province (Washington Post, 15 January, 2005).

A phenomenon not specific to the case of Aceh, but a common negative impact of relief efforts around the world, is that a dual economy develops. In Aceh, the large budgets available to international groups has led to a cavalier attitude when renting houses, vehicles, and paying for goods and services. For example, the cost of renting a house has increased 15 to 20 times (sometimes more). A four bedroom house in Banda Aceh that would have cost Rp 10 million before the tsunami is now anywhere between Rp 100 to 200 million. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was not alone in paying as much as Rp 1 million per day to rent a house, several other media and other groups also committed this ‘social crime’. With such inflated prices, people living in camps and in overcrowded houses, have little, if any, hope of being able – in the near future at least – to rent somewhere to live. In addition, in the fir