FEAR IN THE SHADOWS: MILITIA IN ACEH

July 2004

The militias killed my father, sister, elder brother and five of my neighbours. I saw them die – they were all shot in the head

Contributed to the Eye on Aceh series of publications by Down To Earth (DTE)

Introduction

In Aceh, the Indonesian military is seeking to crush an armed separatist group by employing the use of proxy armies. The presence of such militia groups is not a new phenomenon in conflict in Indonesia. It is an old strategy that has been used to manipulate conflict throughout the archipelago. From very small and relatively localised beginnings, these proxy armies have become an arm of the security forces that operate out with the law and instil fear and terror among the local population. These groups of armed civilians conduct military style ‘search and destroy’ operations, leaving a trail of destruction to the social and economic fabric of Acehnese society that is costly not only to Indonesia, but also to the broader regional economic and security environment.

It is a common secret in Aceh that many of these militia groups have been ‘recruited, trained and armed by the military, and often operate in conjunction with them… There is in fact strong evidence to link the [Indonesian] army's Special Forces command, Kopassus, with the militia.’ (Asia Times, 5 July, 2002) In addition, some members of Aceh’s government administration and local businesspeople are also known to be involved. Support allegedly given to militia groups includes training, financing and logistics such as weapons, food and housing.

On 18 March 2003, the Jakarta based Kompas newspaper reported that a demonstration had taken place in the capital Banda Aceh that for the first time, publicly condemned the presence of militia in the province and called for such groups to be disarmed. The 300 demonstrators were part of a group of 700 villagers driven from their homes in Central Aceh due to militia activity in the area. The villagers demanded security for the communities of Central Aceh, and chanted ‘we need peace, not militia.’ (Ratusan Pengungsi Datangi JSC, Kompas, 18 March 2003)

The conflict in Aceh

The province of Aceh, in the most northwestern corner of Indonesia, is located strategically on the Straits of Malacca, one of the busiest ocean highways in the world. Last year, 50,000 ships passed through it carrying a quarter of the world’s trade.

A majority of Aceh’s population of almost 4 million oppose rule by the central government in Jakarta. This opposition has manifested itself in an increasingly violent struggle for independence. Following decades of dissatisfaction, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was established in 1976. In the 1970s and 80s, it was a widespread perception of economic and political injustices that fuelled the conflict, but more recently the issue of human rights has taken priority. For GAM, the single issue is the same today as it was in the 1970s, that Aceh be free from central government control, and that it be given full independent status. As broad support for this uncompromising position has grown in Aceh, the response of the Indonesian government has been to deploy more military personnel to crush the dissent. Information about increasing levels of human rights abuses by the military and police, largely seen to be acting with impunity, fuelled more resentment and has only served to strengthen support for GAM.

In May last year, a fragile three year peace process ended because the Indonesian government issued an ultimatum to GAM: renounce the push for independence or no more negotiation. GAM refused to comply, the peace talks finally collapsed on 18 May 2003, and at midnight that day martial law was declared. More than 35,000 troops were deployed to the province to pursue the government’s declared objective of crushing GAM – the militarization of Aceh was complete. This deployment was the biggest military operation undertaken by the Indonesian security forces since the invasion of East Timor in 1975.

One year later, in May 2004, Aceh’s security status was downgraded to a civil emergency, but in reality this has meant little change for the Acehnese. The Indonesian government has declared that a majority of the troops deployed there will remain, and that there will be no change to the level of military operations in the areas designated as ‘black’ (conflict) zones. Head of Information for the Aceh military command, Major Ahmad Husein, confirmed that the declared objective of martial law, to crush GAM, will remain. (Kompas, 19 May, 2004)

Waves of militia in Aceh

While the level of militia activity and its violent nature has become more pronounced during martial law, their presence is not a new phenomenon in the province. Three distinct waves of increasing militia activity can be identified:

The DOM period (1989 – 1998)

The establishment of militia began during the period when Aceh was designated a special military operation zone (DOM) from 1989 to 1998. Some members were volunteers, while for others their participation in these groups was ‘compulsory’. At that time the term ‘militia’ was not known, local people simply referred to these armed groups as ‘military proxies’. In fact, it was no secret that the weapons carried by most of these armed civilians were supplied by the military. The volunteers were called cu’ak - civilian informants used by the military to assist with their operations. These cu’ak became a vital source of intelligence for the security forces, often passing misinformation about their neighbours just to satisfy the local commander. Many civilians were arrested, tortured and even killed because of information given by these ‘informers’.

The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (2002 – 2003)

After two years of negotiations, on 9 December 2002, a shaky peace agreement was signed between the Indonesian government and GAM. But the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) suffered from many problems, probably most important of which was that several prominent politicians and senior military officers were hostile to the agreement, preferring the pursuit of a military solution to the conflict. Once again, the militia were mobilised in Aceh and by March 2003, the use of such groups to undermine the agreement had become highly visible.

In Central Aceh angry mobs attacked the facilities and staff of the CoHA international peace monitoring team. Demonstrations took place throughout Aceh, calling for the international observers to leave, and charging that violations of the ceasefire agreement were not being satisfactorily investigated by the international team. According to eyewitnesses of one such incident in Central Aceh, the demonstrations were being orchestrated by the military and police: I saw it for myself; about 3,000 protesters arrived with a military escort. It is illegal to hold a demonstration without a permit, why did the police not arrest these people? (Interview, April, 2003) Local villagers also report that several hundred of this group were known to be militia, trained at local military run camps. In several incidents when monitoring team vehicles, offices and personnel were attacked, local police and military did not intervene to stop the violence.

During this time, Central Aceh was one of the ‘hot spots’ of militia activity. In part due to the large number of Javanese living in the area, also the fact that GAM was (and remains) relatively weak in Central Aceh, and finally because of the number of coffee plantations that offer opportunities for income generation. Many people were driven from their farms and lost their homes, animals and other belongings as the militia and military pursued profit. In Kreung Tuan in the north of the province, a group of 300 villagers including women and children walked several days over mountains to flee from militia attacks in Central Aceh:

The militia came often to the village, each time they would rob some houses, then they began to burn some of the houses. After that the violence against people began and we could not stay. They began by killing the animals, then one day my neighbour was taken from his house and shot in the forest. The same thing happened to 4 others. The militia wanted us to leave; they wanted our coffee farms, now they have them. We have nothing, but at least we are alive. The militia weapons came from the military; where else would they get sophisticated weapons? (Interview, Kreung Tuan, March, 2003)

Martial Law (2003 – 2004)

The increase in militia activity seen in the closing months of the CoHA ceasefire continued and escalated with the introduction of martial law. With Aceh under the full control of the military, the mobilisation of militia throughout the province quickly expanded, groups emerged in almost all districts.

Adopting a declared position of ‘You are either with us or against us’ the Indonesian military implemented martial law in Aceh with an enthusiasm rarely seen in that organisation. An integral part of the martial law strategy was the mobilisation of civilians: to gather intelligence for the military and to help achieve this objective. (Pikiran Rakyat Daily, 6 November, 2003)

These new militias declared themselves as ‘anti-GAM’ groups. Throughout Aceh thousands of people were mobilized to attend ceremonies to celebrate the establishment of groups such as the Anti Aceh Separatist Front (FPAS GAM) in Aceh Besar and Bireun; the Anti-Free Aceh Movement Front (FAGSAM) in Aceh Jaya; the Anti-Separatist Movement (GPSG) in South Aceh; Geurasa in Pidie district, and the People's Fortress to Fight Aceh Separatists (Berantas) in North Aceh.’(The Jakarta Post, 19 January, 2004)

Once captured and under suspicion as a member of GAM, death, torture or disappearance were the most likely outcomes. In June 2004, a search operation by militia near Takengon, the main town in Central Aceh left 20 people dead. Of the 20 victims, local people say that none were actually members of the separatist movement. Eyewitnesses report that all had refused to reveal the whereabouts of GAM in the area: the price of their silence was death.

The anatomy of militia groups in Aceh

Two methods of recruitment have been used for these militias – forced and voluntary. Initially it was assumed that coercion was used to recruit all members, but in fact, many have their own reasons for signing up voluntarily to join the activities of these groups.

Voluntary membership

Two factors dominate the understanding of why some people offer their services to the militia. The first is the pursuit of personal interest, usually financial gain. The second is in the interests of the broader community in which they live. These groups are often – but not always – grouped along ethnic (usually Javanese) lines.

Local government data shows that 40 percent of the province’s population is poor. (NAD statistics, October, 2003) Such a high incidence of poverty has made recruitment to these groups much easier. Those who back the militia have taken advantage of the situation, offering incentives to join such as money, food, and in some cases shelter and even clothing. In many areas of Aceh, high unemployment with little prospect of earning sufficient money to sustain a family has, according to some, left them with no option but to sign up.

An Acehnese refugee, recently arrived in Malaysia, explained the situation:

Where my family lives in Kreung Mane, North Aceh, the people feel they have no choice but to join the militia. The Indonesian military has a recruitment strategy: they disrupt, sometimes even prohibit economic activities of the young people there. Then a few months later, they return to the village with a program to join the militia. The daily rate of pay is Rp 20,000 [US $ 2.3]. That is just enough to buy basic food for survival. So, if after a few months the people have no money, what other option do they have? Of course they will join. (Interview 1 June 2004)

The local government has also been part of the strategy for recruiting militia members. In the west of Aceh, Zulfian Ahmad, head of Aceh Jaya district, declared the local government’s appreciation and support for the establishment of several militia groups in his area. Moreover, to encourage further membership of what he called ‘the people’s struggle against GAM’, he promised to give 10 million Rupiah [approx. US $1,200] to anyone who succeeded in seizing a fire arm from a GAM member. (Kompas, 19 December, 2003)

In some groups, membership comes from a sense of ethnic solidarity. Of these groups formed along ethnic lines, the most pronounced are those who comprise of Javanese. During previous President Suharto’s dictatorship (1966 -1998), people were encouraged to move to Aceh from other parts of Indonesia, predominately from Java, Indonesia’s most populous island. Many of these migrants settled in two areas of Aceh; in East and in Central. And it is these two areas where militia of non-Acehnese make-up can be clearly identified.

Spokesperson for the local military in Aceh, Lieutenant Colonel Rochana Hardiyanto acknowledged that ‘the main membership is the transmigrants from Java Island’ and that these militias have been active in the area since 2000. (Radio Netherlands, 12 July, 2001) Indeed, the names of some of these groups give away their ethnic identity, for example Militia Pujukusama in Central Aceh. The word Pujukusama means literally ‘Javanese born in Sumatra’ (Aceh is located on the northern of Sumatra). Resembling ethnic resistance groups, the distrust linked to the existence of these militias has led to tensions between local Acehnese and non Acehnese.

Forced membership

Coercion has been used in Aceh as a method of recruitment for militia since 1989. Many people report that refusal to comply has resulted in accusations of GAM membership, leaving them open to arrest, torture, even death. Article 30 of Law 23/1959 allows the Military Emergency Authority to instruct inhabitants of a region under military emergency to perform compulsory labour in the interests of security and defence.

In the early 1990s, civilians were often forced by the military to express their loyalty to Indonesia’s state integrity by chanting the slogan: ‘we are villagers of [name of village], and will be together with ABRI (the previous name of the Indonesian military) to wipe out GAM to it’s root.’ At the same time, several youths from each village were trained to assist in military operations. As recalled by an Acehnese from Sigli:

I remember one of the groups was called RATIH (trained people), its members were asked to join with the military in searching for GAM in the jungle. Many civilians were mobilised in the period 1990 to 1998, especially in the districts of Pidie, North Aceh (including Bireun) and East Aceh. (Interview, April, 2004)

Using law 23/1959, the government has recently initiated what it prefers to call ‘neighbourhood watch’ schemes in Aceh, but in reality their profile is that of militia. Membership of these neighbourhood watch schemes is ‘encouraged’ in several ways. The first is usually via the heads of villages who are ordered by the local military to designate specific tasks to members of their village – usually young men. Reports from Bireun tell of village chiefs receiving death threats if they are unable to supply representatives from their village for the militia. (Acehkita.com, 16 July, 2004) A villager explained ‘We were asked recently to gather here by the head of the village. He told us to hunt for GAM rebels in the mountainous area, I'm afraid the military will say I am a GAM member if I refuse to join [the militia group].’ (The Jakarta Post, 19 January 2004)

The second method of forced recruitment involves former members or sympathisers of GAM. During martial law many have been sent to re-education camps for periods of three to six months. In the camps, the military together with civilian trainers have sought to ‘persuade’ these former GAM sympathisers that support for the Republic is the only guarantee of personal security. Banners in the dormitories read ‘If you support the rebels you will have nothing but grief. If you support the Republic of Indonesia you will get welfare.’ (BBC, 24 February, 2004)

When I left the re-education camp, I had to sign a letter to say that I wouldn’t leave Indonesia for six months. But now I am trying to escape because the military has told me I must join the local ‘neighbourhood watch’ group to help them search for GAM supporters. I told them I could not join as I am sick and cannot go to the jungle. They told me not to worry, better I die in the jungle during my duties for the Republic, than am shot for being a traitor. What can I do? I must leave Indonesia. I don’t want to bring trouble to my Acehnese brothers. (Interview, May, 2004)

Over time, the distinction between groups of militia that have voluntarily established themselves and those whose membership has been forcibly mobilised has become blurred. In some cases, those who were originally forced to join later enjoyed financial and other benefits and were no longer ‘reluctant militia’. Not only did they enjoy material gain, some even appeared to embrace a militaristic culture that became visible in the way they carried out their duties. A mentality of nationalism, little regard for the human rights of neighbouring Acehnese, viewing democracy as a threat and not an opportunity have all become trademarks of some, although not all, of these groups.

Militia havoc in Aceh

For the past fifteen years, the sinister presence of the militia has contributed to the fear and violent chaos in Aceh. Throughout the province, but especially in the more remote villages, many of which are accessible only by dirt track, these groups have killed, tortured, burned and looted on behalf of their military or civilian commanders. As they sweep through the province in search of GAM, their military style operations have targeted not only sympathisers of the separatist movement and their villages, but many schools have been burned, economic infrastructure destroyed and innocent civilians have been terrorised.

Mariani had been living in a communal shelter in the capital Banda Aceh for more than two years when she was interviewed by a local journalist. She told how her family had been chased from their farms in Central Aceh: ‘It was the militia who burned our houses. They said that if we didn’t want to leave, they would kill us.’ (Kompas, 26 May, 2003) Many of the 600 homeless taking shelter in the same place told similar stories, the pattern of threats followed by violence was always the same, and in several incidents the militias were accompanied in their operations by troops from local military battalions.

Responding to renewed accusations of the military’s involvement with militia in Central Aceh, military spokesman Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin admitted that members of the anti-separatist movements recruited from villages in the province had indeed been given basic training by soldiers. (The Jakarta Post, 21 May 2004) District military commander for Central Aceh, Lieutenant Colonel Amrin, contradicted this by stating that the Indonesian Military (TNI) has never trained or formed militia in the area, but that TNI ‘only requested the people to form the system of village guardians (siskamling). They [the villagers] responded to this with much enthusiasm because they wanted to help the TNI to wipe out GAM.’ (Harian Surya, 13 June, 2003) He denied however, that these groups could be classified as militia.

Some militia groups even take the name of the military units that trained them, for example militia Buaya Putih (White Crocodile) from Ketol in Central Aceh. The Buaya Putih unit of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) is believed to have trained and armed this militia with machine guns. (Milisi-Milisi di Aceh, Kontras, 2003)

In the past year, during martial law, the backing of militia activity by the military, local politicians and businesspeople has become more obvious. A local journalist said: Yes, it is true that some businessmen and politicians are leaders of anti-separatism fronts, although they do not call these groups militia. But if you want concrete evidence of elite involvement, that is very difficult, rarely do people admit backing these militia groups. Let me just say that the Acehnese know it happens like that. (Interview, 14 July, 2004) According to the same source, the recent (April 2004) election of local politician Helmi Almujahid to the national parliament was partly due to the fact that the local military was pleased with his ‘performance’ relating to the militia groups and supported his election. For several years, Helmi Almujahid has been instrumental in the establishment of militia groups in East Aceh, under the watchful and approving eye of the local military command.

In the rising tide of nationalism that has swept Indonesia in the past few years, financial backing for these groups has increased, several civilian district heads have also contributed to these funds. For example, a district chief in Pidie, in the northern part of Aceh, Abdullah Yahya, is reported to have pledged to help fund the activities of Geurasa (a militia group operating in his district). (Kompas, 24 February, 2004) Meanwhile in West Aceh, one district chief Nasruddin, said he would give basic military training to the Anti-GAM Front (a group of militia mobilised to hunt for members and sympathisers of GAM) in that area. He said that state defence training is a citizens’ obligation. (Tempo, 1 February, 2004) According to a civil servant in West Aceh: ‘about 500 civil servants have been given military training, introduced to assault rifles such as M-16, AK-47, SS-1, and taught how to shoot.’ (Tempo, 1 February, 2004)

A group in North Aceh, Berantas, has reportedly asked the local government for financial assistance in order to pay for their military style operations. The group has also allegedly demanded that contracts for local government infrastructure projects are awarded to companies with whom they have connections. (Acehkita.com, 16 July, 2004)

Local district head in Bireun, Mustafa Glanggang, praised the militia in his area: ‘the presence of this group [anti-GAM militia] must be welcomed. Because a group who stood up against GAM has appeared, this group’s activities should be expanded to all villages.’(Liputan 6, SCTV 7 December, 2003)

On 14 July 2003, a local fisherman was targeted by militias supported by Mustafa Glanggang. In a village in Bate Iliek, he was relaxing with his family when they arrived:

About ten militias came with weapons. I was sitting outside my house with my son, they accused me of being GAM. I am not GAM, I am a fisherman. I was afraid and sent my son inside the house. They hit me with their rifles and stole my chickens. They also took my motorbike. I’m afraid they will come back. Some of my neighbours have left the village and live in the forest. I think I might leave too. I know that militia receives support from Glanggang, everyone here knows it. (Interview, 18 July, 2003)

In the same area, a prominent businessman Sofyan Ali set up a militia group that has recently been expanded to other parts of the province. A Jakarta based newspaper reported that Ali, a well known contractor and a former member of the local parliament, is now ‘a top leader of Anti-GAM front militia in Bireun, and has encouraged a similar trend across Aceh.’ (Tempo, 1 February, 2004)

Together with the Indonesian security forces, these militia groups have waged a devastating attack on the social and economic fabric of society in Aceh. Throughout Aceh, the smell of fear is tangible: the economy has almost ground to a halt, the health and education system has been disrupted and entire villages have been burned or deserted. An ex-militia member who is now in hiding, is quoted as saying: ‘We had orders from the army to make the Acehnese suffer, to show them they cannot win, to destroy their society.’ (Asia Times, 5 July 2002)

On 10 June 2003, four villagers from Syiah Utama in central Aceh were ambushed by 20 members of Militia Seroja. Eyewitnesses say the militia worked together with members of the paramilitary police, BRIMOB. All four villagers were later found dead, their throats had been cut.

Militia mayhem is common, the stories are all very similar, but some stand out as being particularly shocking. ‘D’ who survived from militia attack said:

Eight members of the militia came to my house looking for me. But I was not home at that time and my wife told them she did not know where I was.

Eventually the militia found me. They accused me of being a member of the independence movement. I told them I am not. They took me to the edge of the village where they beat me with an iron bar to force a confession.

When the militia began to hit me around the head I thought I would lose consciousness. I begged them for mercy. The beating stopped for a short while, I think they wanted to give me time to recover a little. But then the torture began again, even more viciously than before. Then the militia took me to the local graveyard where they told me to dig my own grave. But I was very weak and the grave was shallow. I thought then I would die. The iron bar was used to push me into the grave, where I was buried.

When they had covered me with earth and everything was dark, they started to stab me with their bayonets through the grave. I lost consciousness. Just before the darkness covered my brain, I thought of my wife and baby, and asked God to keep them safe. Later I wakened up and realised I was still alive, it was a miracle. I don’t know how long I was unconscious.

I couldn’t walk so I began to crawl toward the village. Friends found me and took me to the local hospital. (Interview with ‘D’, June, 2002)

The interviewer notes:

The mental scars suffered by D from this trauma are almost as visible as the physical ones. He speaks in barely a whisper, his mind frozen in the moment of horror when he thought he would die. His chilling account of what happened to him is not so unusual in Aceh. D was interviewed in a place far from his village, he was living in the mountains with GAM where he had a place to shelter and live in relative safety. Plans were being made to bring his wife and child to the GAM village.

Conclusion

The Indonesian government and military continues to officially deny the presence of militia in Aceh, but encourages a ‘people’s war’ against GAM by promoting the establishment of ‘neighbourhood watch’ schemes. In reality, the military training, weapons and combat uniforms that are common to these groups result in a profile that is more militaristic than civilian.

The involvement of some members of the political and business elite in the province affords protection to the militia, and means that local people are afraid to speak out about either the recruitment process or activities, to do so would only bring greater suffering. Although many of the examples in this booklet are from Central Aceh, similar incidents have taken place throughout the province and have spread in the past year, adding a new layer to the already complex security situation.

The devastating result of these group’s activities instils fear into local communities, and has contributed to the destruction of life, property and local economy. Since Aceh is all but closed to the outside world, militia havoc takes place behind closed doors, with very little outside scrutiny. Furthermore, it all takes place under the watchful eye of the security forces and its influential patrons.

Recommendations

The following the parties are urged

Indonesian government

• To recognise its security forces have established numbers of militia organisations in Aceh and have used coercion to boost membership.

• To revoke the law (which law) that allows establishment of these vigilante groups.

• To stop encouraging the establishment of these ‘neighbourhood watch’ schemes that either by default or design, become sources of terror for sectors of the local community.

• Outlaw the possession of firearms or weapons of any sort by members of these groups.

• To enact legislation forbidding members of the security forces to be involved in the establishment of such groups and punishes those who violate the law.

• To enact legislation that prohibits members of the community from involvement in the establishment of such groups and punishes those who violate the law.

The International community

• To condemn in the strongest terms possible the sanctioning of these ‘neighbourhood watch’ groups by the Indonesia government.

• To recognize the presence and the establishment of the militia groups in Aceh have worsened the prolonged conflict.

• To cease all military supplies to Indonesia given overwhelming evidence that the security forces are arming and training such groups.


DETAILS OF SOME MILITIA GROUPS IN ACEH

Central Aceh (Voluntary)

Militia PujaKusuma
Location: Training centre and barracks are located in Kekuyang village, 18 kilometres from Central Aceh’s main town of Takengon.
Who and how many members: Javanese.
Supervised by: H. Marsito Mertorejo, an official at KONI (the National Sport Committee of Indonesia, Central Aceh branch), and non-organic troops of Rajawali based in Timang Gajah, also KOSTRAD infantry battalion 413/SSP.
Equipment: Military standard and home made rifles, for example M-16 or SS-1 (from the military). Ammunition can be bought from the military at Rp 5000 per bullet. Militia Pujakusuma also has a uniform.
Funding: Local businessmen and members of local government give substantial financial assistance to this group. There have also been several reports of incidents when group members have extorted money in the name of GAM.

Komando Jihad (Holy War Command)
Location: Post of KOSTRAD 413/SSP in Pondok Gajah village (Bandar sub district), and the former warehouse of PT Aceh Kongsi Cooperation in the same village.
Who and how many members: Mostly from the Gayo community.
Supervised by: District military command (KODIM) 0106 Central Aceh; Intelligence unit forces (Satuan Gabungan Intelijen- SGI), and KOSTRAD Yonif Linud 431/SSP. Local businessman Masriadi, from Jongok village, and Suyatiman, a civil servant who works at sub district office in Bandar are also involved.
Equipment: Assault rifles (commercial and home made); swords; masks; ID cards; two-way radios.
Funding: Donations from local businessmen and self-funding.

Brigade Lauser Antara / “Militia Gayo 15
Location: Timang gajah II village, Timang Gajah sub district, Central Aceh.
Who and how many members: Gayonese, 15 members.
Supervised by: Tagore, member of the Golkar party in Central Aceh, also two untis of the Indonesian military special intelligence located at Paya Tumpi and Digul. (SGI’s Pak Anwar and Pak Ketut are the two key military personnel involved. In addition, Ikmal Hakim, a teacher at senior high school in Timang Gajah also helps to supervise this group.
Equipment: Weapons supplied by Sukur Kobat, head of the youth wing of Golkar: homemade riffles and rifles supplied by the local military intelligence unit. Green uniforms displaying the names of the militia groups.
Funding: Salary and bonus made to members.

Militia Soroja
Location: Ten villages in Bandar and Syiah Utama.
Who and how many members: Javanese.
Supervised by: KODIM 0106 Central Aceh; battalion TNI Sriwijaya based in Bandar and Syiah Utama sub district; BRIMOB in Banda and Syiah Utama sub districts, and integrated troops of Rajawali.
Equipment: Standard assault rifles: SS1.
Funding: From local businessmen and politicians, and some small revenue raising activities.

Militia Sapu Jagad
Location: Fifteen villages in Timang Gajah sub district of Central Aceh. This group was trained in two different locations in the villages of Lampahan and Lubuk Cengkeh.
Who and how many members: Javanese and Gayonese.
Supervised by: H. Marsito Mertorejo (also head of Pujakusuma’s militia), Ir. Tagore (local politician), non-organic troops, Rajawali, Timang Gajah based and KOSTRAD battalion infantry 413/SSP.
Equipment: Home-made and traditional weapons; uniforms that are worn only during operations; militia identity cards with the code 001/ND/SJ/2000 (001 is the person code-name, ND is the name of village where each member lives, SJ is Sapu Jaga, 2000 as year registered).
Funding: From local businessmen and local government officials; extorting money from buses and trucks.

NOTE: Data on other militia groups in Central Aceh is not included here as more investigation is needed to verify existing information.

East Aceh (Voluntary)

Militia Front Pembela Aceh (Aceh Defense Front), FPA
Location: East Aceh.
Who and how many members: Initially 16 members, but now many more.
Supervised by: Syarifuddin Latief, Mayor Adam Soewarno as a Commander of the special unit of TNI/Rajawali and military officers from KOREM Lilawangsa.
Equipment: Bayonet and firing assault rifle M-16 and SS-1, also Colt revolvers and military supplied uniforms.
Funding: Money from Satgas Rajawali (military) because the militias work closely with the military and are often being based in TNI posts. Daily allowances for basic needs such as rice is given by battalion 111, East Aceh.

Militia Pasukan Merah Putih ( Red White Force)
Location: East Aceh.
Who and how many members: Javanese estimated 300 members.
Supervised by: Artillery battalion of Medan (ARMED), North Sumatra
Equipment: Small arms; pistol, grenades, and two-way radios.
Funding: Members receive a monthly salary of RP 250,000 plus bonuses of RP 50,000 per operation for insurance and logistics.

‘New’ militias established during martial law.
Membership by coercion.

Front Anti Separatism GAM (FPSG)
Location: Aceh Besar. Formed in December 2003.
Leader: Suhaimi / civil servant.

Protecting Movement on Aceh within Republic on Indonesia (GPA-RI)
Location: Banda Aceh. Formed in January 2004.
Leader: Agus / Entrepreneur.

People Organization to Defense NKRI
Location: Sabang. Formed in January 2004.
Leader: Adnan Hasyim / civil servant.

The anti Aceh separatism movement (Geurasa)
Location: Pidie. Formed in December 2003.
Leader: Zulkifli Gade / member of local parliament .

The People's Fortress to Fight Aceh Separatists (Berantas)
Location: Lhokseumawe municipal city. Formed in November 2003.
Leader: Satria Ikhsan Kamil / member of PKPI.

The Anti Separatism GAM Front (FPSG)
Location: Bireun. Formed in November 2003.
Leader: Sofyan Ali / businessman (contractor) and former local parliament.

Red white Resistance Front (FPMP)
Location: East Aceh. Formed in January 2004.
Leader: Drs Marzuki / civil servant.

Red White Unit Anti GAM
Location: Langsa and Aceh Tamiang. Formed in March 2004.
Leader: Said Samsul / entrepreneur.

Teuku Umar People Resistance Front (Front TUM)
Location: West Aceh. Formed in December 2003.
Leader: T. Hasyim Ubit / civil servant.

Anti Separatism GAM Front (FAGSAM)
Location: Aceh Jaya. Formed in December 2003.
Leader: Hasbi Yunus / member of local parliament.

Red White Garuda’s Front (FPGMP)
Location: Nagan District. Formed in December 2003.
Leader: Tjut Ali / entrepreneur.

The anti-separatism GAM Movement (FPSG)
Location: Southeast Aceh. Formed in March 2004.
Leader: M.Salam / member of local parliament.

The anti-separatism GAM Movement (FPSG)
Location: South Aceh. Formed in December 2003.
Leader: Hafidh / civil servant.

The anti-separatism GAM movement (FPSG)
Location: Aceh Singkil. Formed in January 2004.
Leader: Ali Hazmi / entrepreneur.

Note: The data on militias listed here during martial law was provided by SIRA investigators. The true level of support remains unverified and so is not included here. There is however, substantial evidence to suggest that these groups are supervised and funded by the military and local government officials..