KONTRAS
Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan
Commission For Disappearances and Victims of Violence

POSITION PAPER I

Evaluation of the Military Emergency in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam
19 May - 19 November, 2003

Introduction

“A prosecutor said to me, “If you’re asked later if you want a lawyer, you must say no.”

This report was prepared based on investigations carried out between 19 May and 19 november 2003. In this report Kontras tries to identify a number of key points that need to be made clear to the public, as a comprehensive evaluation of the implementation of the military emergency in Aceh. These evaluation notes concern the restoration of security operation, the humanitarian aid operation, the law enforcement operation, and the operation to re-stabilise civilian government. The report will focus its analysis on the condition of civil liberties in Acheh, on law enforcement, on the management of humanitarian assistance funds, and on a number of other problems.

I. Violence towards Civilians

[According to Kontras research], during the military emergency period to October 7th, 342 civilians have been killed, 94 wounded and 101 are missing. Meanwhile statistics published by the Nanggroe Acheh Darussalam police on September 6th recorded that 319 civilians were killed, 117 wounded, and 108 missing, and that 816 GAM members were killed, 607 captured and 466 GAM guerillas surrendered. TNI statistics made public on 25 September recorded that 304 civilians had been killed, and 140 wounded, while 52 TNI soldiers had been killed and 98 wounded, 11 Indonesian Police killed and 23 wounded, and 839 GAM members had been killed, 989 captured and 438 had surrendered themselves.

Table 1. Number of civilian casualties during the Military emergency

Table 2. Number of GAM casualties

[missing]

As we enter the final phase of the Military Emergency in Acheh there have been no significant changes in respect for human rights. The military-focussed approach to solving the Acheh question has only added to the number of civilian causalties. Cases of arbitrary arrest and torture are prominent in the information collected by KontraS. Efforts to involve civilians in military operations are also extremely worrying. There have been several kinds of actions involving the civilian population in searching for GAM members in the jungles. One such method used has been TNI troops taking civilians with them in search operations. There have also been statements that give civilians the authority to put any GAM member that enters their community on trial - such statements run directly against the aim of the military operation to restore the rule of law in Acheh, as they invite the populace to manipulate the law themselves.

The data collected shows that there is still a high intensity of violence experienced by civil society. Arbitary arrests are still taking place regularly. This shows that the security forces (TNI/Police) do not have an information and data-verification system that can accurately determine who is involved in GAM networks and who isn’t. The method of seizing of wives and families to force GAM members out of hiding is an old tactic whose use by the security forces appears to be on the increase again.

The violence that has taken place in Acheh has caused huge civilian casualties, because GAM’s method of guerilla struggle has made it hard for the TNI to distinguish GAM members from civilians. There have also been many cases of hunts for GAM members that proved to be cases of mistaken identity, because they were not backed up by valid intelligence. Murders, kidnappings and seizures have often taken place because of wrong addresses, such as in the case of the Chair of the North Acheh Star-Reformation Party Branch Executive, murdered by Police Mobile Brigade officers. The Nanggroe Acheh Darussalam police have glibly stated that this case complied with procedure, as the victim was a GAM member and carrying a grenade, although the victim Adnansyah had just returned from his party’s office in Cunda Lhokseumawe.

The use of children in armed conflict, as servants, cooks, spies or combatants, is a real occurence which must be stopped immediately. Think of Mus (14 years old), forced to become a servant at a military post in North Acheh. Or Jam (15 yrs old), who was a cook in a GAM base in Greater Acheh for six months. The use of childen in armed conflict is rejected by all civilised society, since it forces the children to live in a world of violence and cruelty, under constant danger of becoming victims of violence or being hit by a stray bullet if there is a gunbattle.

Article 27 of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians in a Time of War obliges both sides in a conflict to obey humanitarian laws that protect civilians. According to articles 27-34 of the Geneva convention of 1949 things that may not be done in a time of war include: using force to extract confessions (article 31), actions which cause physical suffering (article 32), inflicting collective punishment (article 33), terrorism, intimidation and banditry (article 33), carrying out reprisals (article 33), and using people as hostages (article 34).

Because of this, the two parties to the conflict should immediately stop using children - there are no excuses for it. GAM’s recruitment of underage youths makes the young vulnerable to violence. The case of wrongful imprisonment of Indra Saputra, a Junior High School student in Greater Acheh who had just turned 14, can serve as an example - there are many similar cases. On 26 June 2003 Police Mobile Brigade officers seized Indra Saputra because his first name was the same as that of a GAM member, Indra Budiman, who was being hunted by the officers. After being missing for more than two weeks, Indra Saputra’s parents located him at Banda Acheh police station. The village authorities and the police then admitted Indra Saputra was not involved in GAM and was not the person they were looking for, but because his case had progressed so far, they was forced to fight their case through legal procedure.

The commitment of the TNI Commander to carry out a “clean war” in Acheh must be held to account, as we can see from the behaviour of his soldiers in the field, relatively uncontrolled by public scrutiny. In several cases TNI soldiers’ behaviour had crossed the line of propriety. Such was the experience of Erlinawati (37) in Greater Acheh. In the early morning she and her three young children, one of them a baby only 20 days old, were taken to a Police Mobile Brigade post because the police officers had been unable to find her husband, a GAM member. The officers also destroyed the furnishings of their home, saying that they had been bought with “Nanggroe taxes” extorted by GAM.

II. The Military Emergency has killed civilian freedom to control government policy

The strategy of military operations used in Acheh, that is incapable of discriminating between armed activity and political activity, has led to a restriction in the space for public participation in Acheh. Stereotyping Achehnese people as GAM supporters as a strategy has led to the silencing of freedom of expression for the Achenese people. We need only look at the many cases of raids on and dispersion of actions and meetings carried out by students, youth and NGOs. Intimidation of civil organisations had already started when the Military Emergency began. Now, at the end of the Military Emergency period, various groups have been given freedom of expression because they are demanding the prolonging of the Military Emergency, echoing the views expressed by the TNI high command many days beforehand. Indeed, a non-political human rights training event was dispersed, even though it was organised by the government National Human Rights commission Komnas HAM. Actions like demonstrations are not excuses ['for troublemaking'-trans]. The stages of spreading discussion, consolidating awareness of issues, and demonstrations and shows of support are all aimed at achieving something.

Seen from the perspective of [the danger of outside] interests, outside elements taking part in political activity have no significant interests. It’s the TNI and Police who have the clearest interest in the prolonging of the Military Emergency, since all their interests are tied up with it - political, economic, territorial control, power and the use of state facilities. Besides, the Acheh case has a vital importance for the military in improving its image and putting forward its ‘Sishankamrata’ [Total People’s Defence and Security System] political conception (the TNI’s dual function with a new name). The desire of the Achehnese civilian political elite to divide up the region [into new provinces, regencies, etc] dove-tails with the TNI’s desire to put Sishankamrata into practice (and perhaps the TNI are the puppetmasters behind the plans for division?), because the division of Acheh will create a space for the creation of new Kodim (regency-level) and Koramil (district-level) military structures. Meanwhile, at the national level the TNI fraction in parliament is pushing forward the concept of Sishankamrata. This effort was strengthened by TNI Commander General Hendriartono Sutarto’s meeting with [parliamentary] Commission I which led to the commission recommending the rapid creation of Kodim and Koramil in the new divided regencies and districts.

The TNI’s concern with holding on to Military Emergency status invites some difficult questions. Is it true that their demand to keep the Military Emergency is because of their love for and spirit of service to the nation, or are their other interests behind it? As we know, Acheh is a fertile land, with abundant forest products, rich in oil and gas, and with other vital projects. The Acheh Military Emergency Authority chief Major-General Endang Suwarya has stated that the widening illegal trade in timber in Acheh is inseparably connected to backing from elements within the state, whether it be the TNI/Police or the forestry authorities themselves.

III. The rule of law has been neglected during the Military Emergency

From the results of our research, enforcement of the rule of law is the weakest of all the aspects of the Military Emergency. The Military Emergency has not helped in the least to enforce the supremacy of law in Acheh in particular and in Indonesia generally. This can be seen by the acquittal of 12 TNI soldiers from Infantry Battalion 301 who tortured dozens of people from Glumpang Hulu Barat and Glumpang Hulu Timur villages, Dewantara district, North Acheh, on August 30 2003. It can also be seen from the light sentences handed out to perpetrators of rape and the failure to investigate the case of the shooting of Adnansyah, the Chairman of the Star-Reform Party North Acheh Branch Executive - the key witness to the shooting, Masriani, has not yet been found. Law enforcement like this can be seen as lip service, performed in the hope that the public will think that the military operation in Acheh has not forgotten democratic values and human rights.

When public disappointment with practices like this hadn’t yet subsided, the Acheh Police HQ stated publically that the shooting of the Star-Reform Party Branch Chairman Adnansyah (by police), had been handled according to procedure, as the police had found three grenades in his car. It seemed as though the police were searching for excuses to close the case when they stated that Adnansyah was a GAM activist and had tried to flee by leaping from the car.

[The weaknesses in the rule of law] can also be seen from the trials of people accused of insurrection - often the legal evidence offered by the Prosecutor is extremely weak, and their witnesses fail to appear in court. The Prosecutor sometimes just reads the witnesses’ statements in the indictment. Such cases have led to sentences of between one and 15 years in gaol.

In the investigation process the security forces tend to ignore the rights of the accused to legal counsel. There are those whose cases proceed as far as their trial without any legal counsel beside them. Since the Military Emergency began almost all state courts in Acheh have been reopened. To cover the shortage of judges and prosecutors they have been sent to Acheh under the authority of the military operation on 6-month assignments. This decision, too, has not improved the rule of law in Acheh.

Often the prosecutors take the approach to trying to finish cases quickly so that they can get home sooner, and they try to make the examination of witnesses in court easier. This opens up room for the use of force, indeed of violence, to force those accused of insurrection to confess. In Acheh today there are 1 242 cases of insurrection under police investigation, 830 that have already been forwarded to the prosecutor, and 371 that have already been tried by the courts.

Among other irregularities in the legal process in Acheh is the resettlement of rebels who surrender themselves without prior legal process. This resettlement takes place at two places - at BPG Neuheun, where there are 380 people, and at Meulaboh in West Acheh where there are 120. The problem is the legal status of those who have surrendered. This is a reasonable concern, because if history repeats itself, they will be treated like the ex-political prisoners who were accused of PKI [Indonesian Communist Party] membership, who never received a trial by legal process, but suffered a punishment and a social stigma that they have experienced for the rest of their lives and, indeed, that their descendants are also experiencing. This should remind us that what Indonesian Communist Party members detained on Buru Island or in Central Java experienced was a lack of legal certainty.

Seen from the perspective of legal certainty for the detainees (the resettled GAM members), at the moment there are at least 1000 people held by the TNI and Police at the Banda Acheh Teachers’ Complex grounds. The government has not clarified the legal status of these detainees.

During the first stage of the Military Emergency the “litsus” [the ‘clean background’ system] phenomenon, once such a central issue [in Indonesian politics], reappeared. Litsus creates an environment which feeds suspicion. Everyone becomes an enemy who should be eliminated, and litsus becomes a tool for creating cycles of revenge and growing hatred. In brief, litsus is an environment of falsehood and a machine of lies that was used by the Suharto regime to eliminate every one of its critics. Perhaps the Megawati regime was inspired by the success of Suharto’s regime, and therfore gave their minister the nod when he proposed the litsus sytem for Acheh. Besides this, the strategy of singling out members of the public will have an impact on their families, not just the victims themselves. In Acheh the litsus process is being used by the Military Emergency Authority with the excuse that it will prevent members and sympathisers of GAM from infilitrating the government.

Although the government has promised to bring in judges and public prosecutors from outside Acheh, but the numbers involved are not enough to accommodate the numbers of prisoners who must be processed – there are 1242 being processed by the police, 830 by the prosecutor’s office and 371 who have been sentenced. So to solve this problem a system of fast and “rough” justice is being used, which is a trial in name only. The trials do not conform to the rules for court cases – a court that meets only twice or sometimes even only once hands down a sentence on the accused, often without hearing from witnesses (their statements are just read out in the lawyers’ statements). What is even more saddening is that there have been several court cases held by the Jantho State Court in Greater Acheh where the accused had no legal representation.

To strengthen the case made above, we present a few examples of “rough” justice;

On 9 Jun 2003, the victim was arrested by the Delima District Military Command (Koramil) in Pidie regency. He was captured because he had been asked by a GAM member to buy cigarettes for him. After being arrested the victim was handed over to the Pidie Regency Police, who held him for five days. He was not questioned by an investigator, but tortured every day to force him to admit to being a GAM member. He refused to confess, as he was not a GAM member. After five days he was transferred to the Criminal Investigation Bureau of the Pidie Police, and questioned for 2 months without any legal representation. After two months he was transferred to Banda Aceh for trial at the Banda Aceh State Court, as the Pidie State Court was not operating [this was done with reference to the Human Rights Minister’s Decree on the moving of court cases to Banda Aceh State court]. Then as the trial was about to begin the Public Prosecutor, Indrawansyah (from Peukan Baru) stated to the defendant: “If you’re asked later if you want a lawyer, you must say no.” The court only sat in session three times, without hearing from any witnesses (their statements were read out, the excuse given was that the witnesses could not be brought to Banda Aceh). Without any legal representation, the accused was indicted under Article 106 juncto Article 55 subsection 1 (part 1) of the Criminal Code (ie insurrection). The prosecution asked for a 4 year gaol term, and the court decided on a 3 year sentence.

The case above, the removal of the rights of an accused person who had never been educated, can create a bad precedent for the justice system in Indonesia. Nearly 85% of cases do not involve legal representation for the accused, which makes us doubt the legitimacy of many confessions, as during the investigation process the accused is very vulnerable to torture to extract confessions.

IV. Rising unemployment, poverty and displacement of people

The Military Emergency has helped to worsen economic problems like unemployment, poverty and displacement of people. The people are less productive, as their freedom to make a living has been reduced by the poor security situation. Massive displacement of people has caused many people to stop being active participants in the economy and instead become passive consumers of state subsidies and charity. In the most extreme cases we are seeing the growth of a new class of beggars and vagrants in the cities of Langsa, Lhokseumawe, Bireun, sigli and Banda Acheh.

The loss of employment opportunities and the destruction of the people’s economic infrastructure in the villages is very bad for Acheh. People’s purchasing power has dropped between 2001 and 2003. The number of people classed as poor in Acheh in 2001 was 1.2 million. In 2003 it was 1 703 897 people or around 40.39% of the population. The number of the poorest people continues to grow in three regencies, namely North Acheh, East Acheh and Pidie. The number of openly unemployed has reached 48.8% of the 2 million-strong workforce.

The destruction of the people’s economic livelihood has caused a rise in the number of street childen and of children working in the informal sector. Information on children obtained by KontraS shows that there are 306 street children and children working in the informal sector in Banda Aceh. 75 % of these children said they were forced to work or to live on the streets because their families’ livelihoods had been destroyed.

The flight of capital and labour power from the regions of Aceh, and from the provincial capital, has weakened the investment climate. Many village workers, accustomed to work in agriculture, plantations, and forestry, have moved to the city, and work in the informal sector as builders’ labourers, street vendors, and, indeed, probably, many have become beggars or criminals. According to the Central Statistics Agency of North Acheh, the conflict in North Acheh has caused 15 000 citizens to move to other areas since 1999. The figure was obtained from comparing population projections before and after the election and household registration was carried out. Before the registration census the projection was a population of 467 000. After 90% of the registrations had been carried out, it was estimated that the real population of North Acheh is now 450 000, caused by the exodus from the terror and kidnappings.

The Military Emergency has led to frequent gun battles and other acts of violence which have caused price instability in traditional markets, as many are afraid to travel to work, and the availability of goods is therefore variable. Members of the security forces have become involved in ‘mafia’ operations smuggling imported goods from Singapore (luxury cars, sugar, etc) through the Sabang free trade port, which has also worsened conditions in traditional markets. The cost of paying for the TNI and police to guard their goods is borne by the traders, which also leads to a rise in prices. The irregularity of supply of goods to Acheh is a secondary factor in all this - the primary factor is the lack of security for business in Acheh.

V. Regional government organisation has been weakened by the Military Emergency

The government policy of dividing up regions which are priority areas for development programs, when seen from a security perspective, seems an appropriate response. However the government should also consider the effect such divisions will have on social imbalances between people in different areas. The setting up of intensive programs to create work opportunities needs to be critiqued - is the model to be used the same as the JPS and IDT programs? Because strengthening and improving the people’s livelihoods requires a lot of political will from the government. While there is still mushrooming collusion, corruption and nepotism, and while the allocation of funds is still focussed on physical development projects [not human development], these intensive programs remain little more than empty jargon. In the 2002 regional budget year 6.6 trillion rupiah was poured into Acheh, but by the time the 2003 regional budget was prepared, and after nearly six months of the Military Emergency, we can see almost no development projects in the province of Acheh. The number of poor in Acheh is now more than 50% of the total population of 4.2 million - well above average for Indonesia. In 2002 Acheh was the second poorest province in Indonesia. Unemployment is more than 38% of the total population of Acheh.

In 2002 the value of funding for projects from the regional budget was 220 232 350 000 rupiah [220 trillion], to be used for 30 projects (this doesn’t include projects funded from the national budget). Its clear that funds for several of these projects has been ‘diverted’ or siphoned off. Sadly, the education sector has also been a victim of such diversion, although its certain that if unemployment and poverty is to overcome, the level of education has to be lifted to improve productivity. There are suspicions of corruption in the use of the 10 trillion rupiah assigned for a project improving education for children affected by the conflict, and in the 88 150 000-rupiah project for providing educational materials and clothing to poor children. Thus 10 088 150 000 rupiah which by rights belonged to children affected by the conflict has been stolen from them. The regional budget allocation and aid funds for education in the budget year 2002 was 850 billion rupiah. This huge sum of money has yet to show any results for the improvement of education, and there is no public transparency in how it was used. Amazingly, the allocation of funds for education in 2003 is more than 900 billion, but there are no clear regulations on who will check on and be responsible for the money. The Governor’s responsibility is merely administrative, and there is no verification by a special committee set up by the regional parliament. Under the Military Emergency financial transparency will get more and more difficult, as can be seen from the fact that the routine operating budget for the province has been used for the needs of the Coordinated Security Operation (the Presidential Decree on the Military Emergency in Acheh authorised this).

Besides indications of corruption in various sectors, the executive and legislative arms of government have been wasteful and excessive in using the routine operating budget. For example, the regional parliament’s routine budget for 2003 was 18 947 900 000 rupiah - far more than it should have been. The governor’s routine budget was 6 656 555 560 rupiah, the deputy governor’s budget 2 296 684 174. The regional parliament’s role as overseer of spending under the Military Emergency must be re-examined. On the other hand, the Regional Military Emergency Authority has been less than expert in analysing the ratio between budget and needs, as can be seen from the routine operating budgets. As we approach six months of Military Emergency, the funds allocated to strengthening the [earlier] peace process still cannot be accounted for - some, for example, was used by the regional government for celebrations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between Indonesia and GAM. The use of budget funds is often dubious. The regional government Contingency Fund for the Humanitarian Operation drew 250 billion rupiah from the 2003 provincial budget, and it was hoped that the central government would provide a further 290 billion rupiah. As at 19 May 2003 only 114 billion rupiah had been allocated.

The level of systemic corruption in the Achehnese regional government bureaucracy is very high, and involves all levels of public servants. Throughout 2001 KONTRAS noted that more than 1.118 trillion rupiah in humanitarian aid had entered Acheh but noone had publicly shown how it was used. There continue to be many cases of projects without tendering processes, from the provincial government down to the level of regencies and cities, although this is illegal.

Dozens of cases of ‘mark-ups’ of development projects have been covered up, without any sanctions being applied to those responsible by bureaucrats or law enforcement officials. Although large amounts of money have been poured into Acheh, 5.5 trillion in 2001 and 6.6 trillion in 2002, almost no development projects can be seen in Acheh. The security forces and the public prosecutor have not take on the corrupt, the regional parliament has not carried out its function as oversight body, and instead they have taken part in the corruption. This can be seen in the recent case of 75 million rupiah handed out as ‘credit’ to provincial parliamentarians - a case of naked collusion between the governor, the parliamentary leadership and the Director of the Development Bank.

The uselessness of the Achehnese provincial government can be seen from their lack of interest in creating clean government in Acheh. Research by the Bank Indonesia Centre for Education and Study of Central Banks, for example, found that Acheh was the most corrupt of the 26 provinces surveyed. Therefore there is almost no potential for investment from outside the province, and what little there is is focussed on programs that enrich the powerful. The Agro-industry sector, plantations and agriculture, which have the potential to reduce unemployment, are receiving no attention. Unemployment and poverty will produce more disturbance and potential for more conflict.

The facts show that very few physical development projects were actually built in 2003. As explained by the Head of Acheh Agency for Regional Development, Prof Dr Chairul Ichsan MSc, the realisation of projects planned in the 2003 regional and national budgets has been very disappointing. As at October 2003, with 45 days left in the year, less than 50% of the projects had been completed. Indeed, in the cases of around 60 projects, no reports had been received whatsoever.

Chairul discussed the projects funded by allocations from the national budget. As at October, 367.1 billion rupiah had been accounted for and ‘realised’, 39% of the 1 trillion that had been allocated. More than 53% of the projects had been built - that is, 69 projects of the 130 paid for by national funds. So 61 projects were less than 30% complete. It is the same with projects funded by the regional budget. From a total of 126 projects and a budget allocation of 1.2 trillion, 66 projects have sent in reports on their realisation, leaving 60 that have not reported back.

The tardiness of regionally funded projects, said Chairul, began with the tardiness of discussion in the Regional Parliament. The 2003 regional budget was only approved in June 2003. After approval, it was discussed again at the executive level and work unit budget documents prepared. Another factor, according to Chairul, was that the funds to be used for development, were mostly dependent on the province’s share of gas revenues. The division of gas revenue between the central government and the province takes place in four stages, and is often delayed. These factors have led to delays in development projects. He gave the example of an education project worth 700 billion rupiah. As of this month, according to a report by the head of Finance Bureau, the funds received amount to 262 billion rupiah. Chairul said that it is very likely that the 60 regionally-funded projects unaccounted for are education projects, as the working group budget documents for most of the education funds are still being discussed, either at the regency/city-level or at the provincial level.

The Deputy Governor of Acheh Ir. Azwar Abubakar, asked the heads of government departments and agencies to make work reports on what projects could be achieved by the end of December 2003. The different departments were also asked to produce S-curves to show the progress of their projects over the weeks and months. Strangely, in 2003 the provincial parliament accepted the responsibility report for 2002 of Governor Abdullah Puteh. Thus the provincial parliament showed no concern over the crisis of governance - in fact, it showed its impotence in carrying out its legislative tasks, because of the collusion between the parliament and the governor. By acccepting the Governor’s report the provincial parliament opened the way for the remaining 2002 projects and the new 2003 projects to meet the same fate as those that came before. Inefficiency and corruption have been legitimised by the provincial parliament which has perverted the facts about the government’s services to the people.

VI. The state of education is disappointing

The widespread burning of schools as a strategy of war by the two parties to the conflict has left 40 000 children without an opportunity to study, because more than 600 schools (with 4029 rooms, including classrooms and teachers’ offices) were destroyed between the start of the Military Emergency on 19 May 2003 and October 27 2003. 400 more had been destroyed before the Emergency, and have yet to be rebuilt. This phenomenon is clearly a ‘grand scenario’ created by the two parties to the conflict to increase their political bargaining positions, since the idea of burning schools would not appear without some political calculation behind it. Apart from the political interests of the two parties to the conflict, the arsons will have a strong effect on the progress of the younger generation, and Achehnese society will be held back several decades as a result. Acheh will lose its potential to develop itself. A systematic process of creating ignorance like this will have lasting results and weaken the people of Acheh.

These distressing occurrences in Achehnese education did not need to take place if there had been a government willing to tackle the Acheh problem with sensitivity and tact. The Megawati regime should learn from the history of the previous regime’s violence. Mishandling of conflicts in Indonesia has always ended in tragedy, as the history of violence repeats itself.

Statistics from the Acheh provincial Education Department state that 130 467 pupils in Acheh have stopped their schooling – the number of illiterate people is not yet counted. In Pidie regency the rebuilding of burnt schools has been delayed, although the regency government claims that 80-100% have been completed. There have been debates over who has authority over the lucrative development projects between the Education Department and the local government, and there has been no efficient use of time, such that there are no signs of the development projects being completed. It’s feared that the next school term will be cut short.

Corruption in the Acheh Islands has taken money not only from aid funds for housing for the poor, but also from education aid funds, as was experienced by a primary school in Deudap village, Acheh Islands district, that has received no aid funding at all. The school in question is sadly in need of aid, because it is very close to the shore and during the western monsoon is often flooded. According to the testimony to the media of Mustafa, the principal of Deudap primary school, the only aid that the pupils of his school have so far received is 15 school bags from the Social Security Minister when he visited the region at the beginning of the military emergency. During the conflict period the principal has received no aid – no schoolbooks, equipment or other assistance - from the provincial education ministry or the Greater Acheh regency government. The conditions in this school by the sea are tragic, while there are only 45 pupils and six teachers – 4 permanent and 2 casual.

At the moment the education sector in Acheh is truly in a terrible state. It won’t belong before Acheh will be ranked most backward of all the provinces, made worse by the prolonged armed conflict. The burnings and destruction of more than 905 schools has left thousands of children studying in emergency makeshift conditions. Shootings of and terroristic threats against teachers have made the education system even worse. Thousands of children are threatened with the possibility of having to give up school. From the Acheh province Education Department’s figures, at least 55 000 children have been forced to stop their schooling for various reasons. 15 000 of those were forced to stop their schooling while still in primary school.

VII. Social and cultural life

In the area of social life the conflict in Acheh and the continuation of Military Operational Area status has clearly damaged relations between Achehnese people and between the Achehnese and residents of other provinces. The weakening of ties between Achehnese people has taken place all over Acheh. Many social and economic ties between people have been damaged by the military operation.

The conditions of conflict have influenced behaviour and reduced communication between Achehnese people. Achehnese people are not free to visit friends and relatives. The narrowing of democratic space has made it hard for Achehnese people to gather and socialise on a day-to-day level. This has damaged the Achehnese cultural habits of tolerance, mutual assistance and egalitarianism. An individualist attitude has developed, because there is no security for ones’ self or one’s family. How can anyone help others if their own lives and their family’s are threatened? This phenomenon has been made worse by psychological illness that has become epidemic, so thatalmost everyone in Acheh is paranoid of outsiders, suspecting anyone considered new to an area is suspected.

In the area of culture, the freedom to create art and culture has been severely restricted. Those who want to dance, organise a cultural performance, or read poetry must obtain a permit beforehand. This objective fact has made life harder for Achehnese people, because appreciation of art, culture and tradition has also declined. Marriage celebrations must be shortened drastically. Religious and traditional activities that are traditionally held at night, such as Intat Linto (among bridegrooms), the Tablik Akbarmass gathering on an open field, Art Festivals, Wirid Yasin, Qu’ran readings and other activities, must now be held during the day.

Changes in behaviour have not only happened among adults, but also young people. Achehnese children have become intimate with toys connected to armed violence and war. Children are more happy to play at war, armed robbery, ‘sweepings’ and kidnapping, with AK-47 and M-16 toys. This is a result of their empirical, everyday experience. Every bomb explosion or gunshot becomes a sensation or a joke at school. The bodies of those shot dead are daily viewing entertainment for Achehnese children. Soldiers or GAM guerrillas with guns in their hands passing through villages or along the highway is an everyday sight for these children. These conditions have changed the childrens’ behaviour, and will undoubtedly have an effect on their psychological development. A generation is being created that will always solve its problems with a culture of violence. The psychological condition of Achehnese children will get worse unless there is a serious effort to overcome this as soon as possible.

VIII. Displacement of people during the Military Emergency

Since the declaration of the Military Emergency in Acheh on May 19 2003 by way of Presidential Decree No.28 Year 2003, which took place after the failure of the Indonesia-GAM talks in Japan, there was displacement of internal refugees in various places almost all over Acheh, the only exceptions being the islands of Sabang and Simeulue, the cities of Langsa and Lhokseumawe, and the regency of Gayo Lues. Besides these almost every regency or city in Acheh experienced a flow of refugees into places that had been prepared beforehand by the government.

There have been various descriptions of the internally displacement in Acheh since the Military Emergency began. First, the number of refugees. The number of refugees in 2003 was far greater than in proceeding years. Up to 21 August 2003 the number of people internally displaced since the Military Emergency began was 107 267, and the number of people who are still in the camps now is 10 425 people or 2 541 families. These figures are greater than the number of refugees in 1999, which reached 309 927 people and was the year of the greatest number of refugees from 1999-2002. If we compare this to the situation today, in one-quarter of a year the figure has already reached 100 000 people – if the Military Emergency lasts for a year, then the figure will be 107 267 x 4 = 429 068people.

Second: Funding and Logistics for Refugees. Because the program of displacement is part of the Military Emergency and part of the efforts to separate GAM from the people, the government has organised 200 billion rupiah in special funding for the refugee program.

In July 2003 28 homes were burnt in Alue Kuejruen village, Kluet Tengah, South Aceh causing hundreds of people to lose their homes. As a result all the residents, numbering around 470 people were forced to flee to Koto Manggamat, the capital of the Kluet Tengah district. When he was told that there were refugees in Koto Manggamat, the regent of South Aceh, T Machsalmina Ali, stated that there would be no assistance given to refugees who were not at Lhok Bengkuang camp in Tapaktuan, as these were instructions he had been given from higher up.

This was also the case with around 700 refugees from Alue Buloh village, Senangan district, Nagan Raya, who fled on September 12 2003 because of regular gunbattles in their village between the military and GAM. They fled to Latong village where those who had relatives stayed with them, and those who had no family there were forced to stay in inappropriate dwellings. This is not just evidence of government discrimination against refugees, but also that the refugees have been used as political tools of the governmentto be used as they wish. The government has directly contravened the Principles of Behaviour towards Internal Refugees, because according to Section 1 principle 1 of these principles one of the rights of refugees is the right not to be forced [to move] by any power.

Three: The Safety and health of Refugees. From the declaration of the Military Emergency to 29 October 2003, at least 53 refugees have died, including 4 babies who had been born in refugee camps. This death rate is too high for the numbers of refugees who had been prepared for beforehand, and it is worse that not all of those who died were of advanced age. For example in Lhokbengkuang camp in Tapaktuan, Teungku Yusman, aged 38, a refugee from Lhok Sialang village, Pasie Raja district, and the father of four small children, died on the night of Monday 19/8 as a resultof diarrhoea and fever. This shows that the refugee committee is not working seriously [to provide heathcare].

At Cot Gapu II refugee centre in Bireuen regency, a 5-month old baby was sprawled out, sick, while his four-year old sibling lay sick beside it. The baby’s skin had turned white after nearly a week of illness, he had been treated at Bireuen district hospital for three days, but had been forced to return to the camp as his disease was not improving. Because medicine was difficult to get and medical attention scarce, his mother could only give him traditional remedies. Bariah’s mother, with tears in her eyes, gave him “village medicine”. “My child was in hospital, but was ordered home. Both my children are sick and I don’t know how to treat them,” shetold the newspaper Serambi. When they met the press, the refugees complained about the lack of food and clean water, the filthy environment, and diseases, particularly those that were attacking their children. Adult refugees were generally suffering from diarrhoea, had trouble breathing, had headaches, fever and rashes. Hundreds of them were taking medicine every day. This was acknowledged by Dokter Asriani, the health worker at the camp.

The refugees said that when they asked for water for cooking, drinking, washing or prayer the camp officials always made problems for them. Many refugees said that they were unable to wash for several days at a time. They wanted humanitarian aid to be provided directly to them and not held for them by others.

For the refugees at a camp in Alue Peunyareng village, Meureubo district, West Acheh, the case was different again. Here hundreds of refugees had come down with diseases. Every day around 60 people arrived at the health care post to get treatment. According to the official at the healthcare post, after 8 days in the camp, on Friday 27/6, 679 people had received treatment. This figure included those who had been treated more than once. The illnesses commonly experienced were rashes, flu and anaemia.

In South Acheh around 150 people also sufferedfrom diarrhoea according to statistics collected on 15 July 2003. In Ujong Fatihah refugee camp,Kuala district, Nagan Raya regency, the problems included an unhygienic location for the camp, and many children suffering from rashes and diarrhoea. Hundreds of refugees in Nisam district, North Acheh, fell victim to a number of illnesses. From the beginning of June to the present at least 251 refugees in high schools in Kedue Amplah, Nisam district, have suffered from diarrhoea and rashes, 64 of them have been takento Lhokseumawe general hospital.

Meanwhile in Trumon and East Trumon districts, three refugees died of malaria and diarrhoea. Two of them were children aged 12-18 months. M. Khadafi (18 months) from Teupin Tinggi died at Kedue Trumon camp, Maimunah (12 months) from Jambo Dalem died in Krueng Luas camp, East Trumon. At Reuleut refugee camp in Muara Batu district, North Acheh, hundreds of refugees fell victim to a number of illnesses, including coughing, fever, and most of all rashes. Housewives with young children were forced to travel up to 300 metres on foot from the camp to find water to wash their clothes, stained by their sick childrens’ urine.

In Bireuen regency, the refugees camped at Cot Gapu hadlost all their belongings after they fled, as was reported by Serambi. The sufferings these residents of Juli district experienced while in the camp at Cot Gapu have not ended although they were returned to their villages a week ago. Many have become poverty-stricken because their homes and stores have been seized. The security forces say they have not yet received a report on this caseof theft that has ruined so many villagers. Because of the seizures the home-owners say they have lost televisions, fridges, tape recorders, bicycles and other household goods.

The same fate has been experienced by the owners of food and coffee kiosks. They’ve lost stock like cigarettes, snacks, clothes and medicines. They don’t know who has taken these things, and they hope the government will enforce the law. As well as the losses in goods and household items, there are not a few who have lost livestock, homes and shops are destroyed, and thousands of hectares of rice-paddy has dried out because the irrigation was not maintained for nearly a month. This was reported by a number of residents of Juli Kedue Dua and Setuy. The keuchik - village head –of Juli Keude Dua added that he lost a 29-inch TV and Phoenix-brand bicycle.

There are differences between the pattern of displacement of people in the 1999-2002 period and in the period since the beginning of the Military Emergency. During the Military Emergency period the displaced have been order (forced) to gather together and be taken to refugee camps, or they have been told when a certain area is to be relocated/displaced, and the committee has visited the location and taken them to a place that has been prepared beforehand as a refugee camp. This is what has happened to refugees from Juli district, Bireun regency, Nisam district, North Acheh, and others.

In Bireuen regency, the majority of refugee camps were built at the start of the Military Emergency. A number of refugees have said that they fled because their home areas were dangerous - gunbattles were often taking place there. In Juli district, Bireuen, around 10 000 people have fled to avoid being caught in the battles there, and to separate themselves from the GAM armed group. One of them said that he had been asked to leave his village at the start of the Military Emergency. He said he had been a refugee three times in 2003. Other refugees said that they were scared by the sounds of gunfire and bombs, and were forced to save themselves by leaving.

Several refugees that we met hoped that the gun-battles would stop immediately and the security situation improve so that they could return home and look after their houses, fields and livestock. They wanted to return to their home villages before the school holidays ended, so that their children could return to normal schooling. It was very clear that wherever there has been displacement of people during the Military Emergency, some of the refugees had been forced to move to places that had been determined beforehand.

The Military Emergency Authority’s policy, that prioritises the military operation at the expenseof the humanitarian operation, has played a role in the large number of refugees who have not been well cared for. The death of three refugees in Trumon and East Trumon from malaria and diarrhoea proves to the public that the Military Emergency Authority isn’t serious about looking after refugees during the Coordinated Operation in Acheh. The facts show us that the interest of the Military Emergency Authority in displacing people is purely military, to separate GAM from the people, and not aimed at safety and reducing civilian casualities.

Dilihat dari penangganan pengungsi. First, so far the regional governments have no concept of how to guarantee the self-sufficiency of ex-residents who are displaced. This can be seen in a number of cases during this Military Emergency period. For example, in Cot Gapu camp in Bireuen regency, the displaced people had no supervision or care for the first two days of their stay, and received no food rations. Their tents and sanitation did not meet international standards, and if we consider that more than 15 000 people were displaced in Bireuen, it can be seen that it was important their care was up to international standards. Second: The care of victims of conflict. This includes: direct assistance to widows, the crippled, scholarships for children who have been left behind, free healthcare at government health centres and selective free healthcare at public hospitals. Many of these policies have not been consistently applied and many hospitals and health centres have not advertised the policies, so that the public are still paying for services they should receive free.

Three, Social Rehabilitation. This involves: repairing homes, schools and other buildings that have been burnt or destroyed. KONTRAS found a number of schools being rebuilt by School Committees, and many homes being rebuilt out of bamboo with the final costs being paid by the victims. Four: Other activities. This includes programs to strengthen the Central Team for Restoring Peace in Acheh, the Satkorlak [?] at province and city/regency level and with Bakornas at the national level, to involve strategic components and the people in humanitarian aid and rehabilitation, to carry out continual public information campaigns, to increase cooperation with NGOs, to involve the populace directly in humanitarian aid work, and to distribute public aid funds in a transparent and accountable way.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The government’s handling of the Acheh conflict, which always prioritises military means, has caused a number of tragic outcomes. From violence and other humanitarian tragedies, the burning of homes and schools, the displacement of people, to unemployment and the high level of poverty – these are the legacies left to the people of Acheh since joining the Republic. The distressing occurrences in the education field did not need to happen if the government had been more tactful in its handling of the Acheh situation. The Megawati government should learn from the history of violence carried out by the regime before it. Handling conflict in Indonesia like this has always ended in tragedies, and the repetition of history continues in Acheh today.

Besides this, its also clear that the Military Emergency Authority has little control over the aid that flows into Acheh, and that there has been little progress on trying those guilty of corruption because the Authority’s efforts go into chasing cases of insurrection, letting economic crimes committed by the elite go unpunished.

In the political field, the Military Emergency has killed the critical capacities of the people to control state policy, because it has closed off democratic space and strengthened military dominance. Military dominance has become a threat to civilian supremacy in Acheh, such that the national election cannot possibly take place in Acheh in a democratic, free, honest and just environment. The Military Emergency in Acheh has also caused a fragmentation of society, so that the Achehnese people have been divided into several groups and interests, allowing horizontal conflicts to emerge among the people. The emergence of militia as ‘extra hands’ for the military is clear evidence that these conflicts are beginning to happen.

In the field of education, the real impact of the Military Operational Region status of Acheh has been that educational institutions have been burnt and many school-age people have had to stop their schooling, either because their school has been destroyed or because they can no longer afford to study as a result of the destruction of Acheh’s economy by the Military Emergency.

In the economic field, the Military Emergency has helped to increase the number of people officially unemployed and underemployed, because the security situation makes people too scared to freely make a living. There have been blockades of suspected [rebel] regions which make the localsunable to trade with other regions.

In the social and cultural realm, traditional activities have had to change, and many artistic and cultural activities have been curtailed by the Emergency. It is also very disappointing that a culture of violence is emerging among the people and especially the younger generation, who have been educated in violence by watching naked violence around them.

In the legal field, the Military Emergency has given impunity to some in cases of violence, such as the acquittal of a number of TNI troops who carried out violence against civilians, has led to ‘rough’ justice in the courts and legal practices that are in violation of national regulations.

In light of the above, the Commission for the Missing and Victims of Violence recommends:

a. Pressing for a comprehensive evaluation of the first 6 months of the Military Emergency in Nanggroe Acheh Darussalam. The evaluation is important to measurehow far the security restoration operation, humanitarian operation, law enforcement operation and stable civil government restoration operation have taken place in accord with principles of humanitarian law and human rights. The evaluation should also include examining the management of state budget funds for the four operations.

b. Pressing for opening access to Acheh for independent international monitoring institutions, so that they can see directly the situation and the condition of human rights in Acheh.

c. Demanding that the Central and Regional Military Emergency Authorities protect humanitarian workers, journalists and human rights defenders, open up information access, guarantee protection to the distribution of humanitarian aid and take action against every violation and misuse of power that has taken place during the Military Emergency.

d. Pressuring GAM to immediately release Ersa Siregar and Ferry Santoro who have been hostages for a long time. Also demanding that they respect the journalistic work carried out by the media. GAM must also honour without exception the 1949 Geneva Conventions concerning the minimal requirements for non-international armed conflict, above all those connected with the safety of civilian non-combatants.

e. Pressure the insitutions of the justice system – the police, the public prosecutors and the courts, to carry out their obligations to enforce the existing laws against every form of violence and violation of human rights.

f. Demand a credible investigation into cases of civilian deaths and severe injuries. The government, along with the National Human Rights Commission, should be more pro-active in investigating every suspected serious human rights abuse in Acheh so that they may be taken to trial.

g. If there is not an honest effort to build a control mechanism over the Military Emergency in Acheh, nor to enforce the law and carry out humanitarian functions while obeying national and international law, then the military operation should be immediately ended, to avoid the deaths that will continue to happen.


Signed,

Jakarta, 10 December 2003,

Comission For the Missing and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS)