Position Map

The Civilian Figure in the Dynamic Peace Process in Aceh

By Otto Syamsuddin Ishak

Although the current vertical conflict is nothing new for the Acehnese and the Government of Indonesia (established in 1945), the use of  peace negotiations as well as dialogue as political instruments in solving the conflict is a novel phenomenon. 

For  instance, until today there remains an unresolved debate in Indonesian political historiography; Indonesian independence was achieved either through the triumph of armed struggle, as claimed by the military or combatants, or, as claimed by civilians or non-combatants, it was achieved through a series of diplomatic and political negotiations.

The resolution for regional uprisings towards the center—due to political disillusionment and the separatist movement between 1950-1980-- has been undertaken through military operations.  This is the reason that  crimes against humanity in Indonesia are as old as the Republic itself and extend to its territorial boundaries.

In any vertical conflict, the power of the civilian government remains under military political control. At the time of regional uprisings during Sukarno’s era, the political position of the military increased. Thus, as an example, we can see that Darul Islam’s rebellion in Aceh in the 1950’s was resolved in the following three ways:

• The massive military operation engendered a psychological shock amongst the people (Shock Therapy Operation).
• It divided the power within the Darul Islam rebellion, which subsequently weakened the separatist group.
• After the position of belligerents was asymmetric the political solution was carried out until a political and legal agreement was reached.

During Abdurahman Wahid’s presidency (1999-2001), the political position of the military improved as a result of the uprising in Aceh. The military successfully forced Wahid to issue a presidential decree (No.4/2001), which in fact was a political concession for military power within a national political context.

As the result of this double standard, the initiative for peaceful negotiation,  i.e. the combination of Humanitarian Pause Dialogue and limited military operations, failed. Yet, Abdurahman Wahid ultimately had to pay the price for this; he was deposed and replaced by Mr. Megawati, who gave larger concessions to the military, in effect allowing them to maintain their political position. (see. figure one)

Although the decade-long military operation known as DOM (1989-1998) failed to fully conquer Acehnese society, it seems that the Indonesian military retained the political attitude that the only response to uprising in Aceh was through the military. It purported to weaken the power of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) so that any subsequent negotiation process would be asymmetric.

The role of the impartial figure

There were four main actors involved in peace process in Aceh:

• The Free Aceh Movement (GAM), including the civilian political elite.
• The Government of Indonesia, including the military elite.
• The Third party: The Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), which involved four wise men and the Tokyo Groups.
• The Civil Society, which included civilian elites (including social activists).

Fig-II: Map of the Parties in the Peace Process

In this context, I will discuss the roles of Aceh’s civil society figures since the beginning of peace negotiations. The main role of civilian figures was to help the GoI representative and acting state secretary, Mr. Bondan Gunawan, arrange informal meetings with armed guerillas. At first, however, it was to build confidence and trust amongst warring parties.

Later, figures of civil society were invited by the HDC to facilitate its meeting with GAM’s political elites in Aceh. Firstly, these meetings attempted to discover  to what extent the guerillas inside Aceh were under the control of GAM’s leadership abroad.

Secondly, they purported to discover if the various guerillas groups dispersed throughout Aceh were under one command system. Thirdly, they aimed to identify the exact political aspirations of the Acehnese towards the Indonesian government and GAM, and finally, they purported to evaluate the humanitarian conditions inside Aceh.

In the next stage, in early 2000 the HDC invited some civilian figures to be involved in the drafting of  the Geneva Agreement. From this there are two important things that should be observed. First, the presence of those civilian figures was perceived by GAM as part of its ‘negotiation team’. Secondly, the Indonesian representative was suspicious of these resource persons and continually questioned the credibility of the information and ideas presented by those civilian figures throughout the drafting process.

Figure- III: pull-push between parties

Until the Tokyo Meeting in May 2003, Acehnese Civil and Political figures were involved in all subsequent peace talks despite their belonging to a warring party. GAM brought some civil and political elites and GoI brought some civil and political elites, as well as bureaucrats from Aceh. The composition of the participants is shown in the following chart:

Figure- IV: The composition of the participants in the Dialogue

Within this context the position of the civilian elites weakened and was polarized by the different parties. Thus, when CoHA was successfully deprecating, the Acehese civil and political elite involved in the negotiation process became the targets of both parties.

Since then, the GoI has treated those that seek peace or negotiation as defectors against the state, while GAM has accused those that encourage political dialogue and demand civilian involvement of taking Indonesia’s side.

As a result of this polarization, at the time of the agreement’s implementation the involvement of the civilian elite was divided into the dichotomy of GoI and GAM, save in those cases that an independent monitoring committee was present. Thus,  generally speaking, the participation of the civilian elite in previous peace negotiations could be said to be adhering to the interests of the warring parties.

Another very important phenomena during the peace negotiations was the absence of a community initiative to demand peace zones in villages. This concept had not been incorporated in either the Humanitarian Pause Structure or CoHA. This demonstrates that there was no room for ideas and opinions emanating from the experiences of civil society at the local level. Thus, members of the civil society were perceived as mere objects to be reported as victims or recipients of aid when such an  initiative/program existed.

The Peace Zones were decided by the warring parties without council from the civilian population. Furthermore, the parties were also not fully committed to the creation of peace zones and even mobilized militias to sporadically destroy established peace zones, such  as those in West Aceh, Pidie, and Central Aceh. This factor  led to the failure of CoHA.

Conclusion

If we adhere to the objective of encouraging the peace process in Aceh, while learning from the past experience of civil society involvement in the Humanitarian Pause and CoHa, we must also consider the ever-increasing power of the Indonesian military a significant factor.

• The experience from prior negotiation has demonstrated that the four main actors should alter their dichotomous paradigm. The four actors should recognize the existence of other alternatives, be they temporary or final, to the political interests of the two conflicting parties. (Integrative state or Independence). The four actors, particularly the elites of the civil society, should seek an alternative superceding the persistent interests of the two parties.
• The system and mechanisms of the Humanitarian Pause and CoHa which so polarized the civil society elites and CoHA facilitators should be modified so as to eliminate civil society’s burden in the peace building process. This new system should be able to manage the impartiality of the civil society elite while remaining open to ideas at the grass-roots level, however small and minute they may be.
• The trend of transitional politics in Indonesia, which tends to lean towards an authoritarian regime and cronyism, is a liability for non-combatant and civil society approaches. The result of the 2004 presidential election will in itself determine the opportunity for and challenges to peace building in Aceh.

In conclusion, any person either residing in or affiliated with Aceh needs an alternative to the failure of the prior peace negotiation process. These people want freedom as well as a political, economic and cultural system that treats people humanely.