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April - June 2002
An Insider Speaks About
Peace Negotiations on Aceh
Otto Syamsuddin Ishak
Dialogue was first discussed late 1999, but the Free
Aceh Movement (GAM) was reluctant. The great service
of the Swiss-based organisation the Henry Dunant
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) is that they
were able to sit the two sides down at one table. The
first HDC mission came to Aceh early in 2000. HDC had
to decide which Acehnese resistance faction they would
deal with - GAM or MP-GAM. Each was led by exiles in
Sweden who had fought in Aceh in 1976. Indonesia
preferred MP-GAM, but GAM had the biggest presence on
the ground. The choice fell on GAM, and they formed a
delegation with representatives from the Swedish
leadership as well as commanders from Aceh. It was
difficult. GAM feared being deceived by Indonesia,
while the Indonesian government thought of GAM as
intractable.
I went to Geneva for the first meeting on 24 April
2000. The atmosphere was tense. As a resource person,
I had to provide information about human rights after
1998 that might help lead to a peaceful resolution.
HDC took a humanitarian approach. GAM accordingly
stressed Indonesian human rights abuses. Indonesian
representative Hassan Wirayuda, by contrast, said
little about the situation on the ground and wanted to
discuss a special autonomy solution like the one he
helped broker in the southern Philippines. He was
accompanied by the military attache from the Paris
embassy, so the Indonesian delegation tended to ignore
human rights. However, the agreement signed on 12 May
2000 was fairly good in that it did revolve around
humanitarian issues, and it called on both sides to
show restraint. A Joint Forum was established in
Geneva, to meet once in three months.
In Aceh there were two joint committees, for security
and for humanitarian action, as well as an independent
team to monitor implementation of security aspects -
of which I was secretary. Four district monitoring
teams were formed in December 2000 as well. In order
to create a conducive sense of security, the agreement
stipulated that all troop movements whether GAM or
Indonesian should be reported to the joint security
committee in Banda Aceh. However, President Wahid was
unable to control his military, and the TNI just
ignored that provision. After the agreement was
signed, Indonesia unilaterally put in place a set of
'permanent procedures' (prosedur tetap, or protap).
But GAM rejected them because they made no allowance
for reporting troop movements.
Chivalrous
For me it was the first time I had met many of the top
Acehnese in the resistance. They struck me as
chivalrous. They were so committed. But I felt nervous
that upon my return to Aceh I might be intimidated by
both sides. So I asked HDC to guarantee my security.
They produced a letter signed by GAM and by the
Indonesian Foreign Affairs Department. Foreign Affairs
picked me up at the airport. But the differences
between them and TNI Headquarters became obvious when
we went out to the field. Foreign Affairs had no
authority there. I was often intimidated. Police
Colonel Ridwan Karim, Indonesian delegation leader on
the joint committee for security, and former commander
of the force sent in to Aceh following the troop
withdrawal in 1999, said in public that I was pro-GAM.
In Jakarta, President Wahid was under attack.
Parliamentary speaker Akbar Tanjung of Golkar blamed
Wahid for initiating the Aceh dialogue without
consulting parliament. The TNI, meanwhile, made it
clear it was not about to acknowledge GAM as an equal
negotiating partner because GAM was 'not a state'.
Nevertheless, the 12 May agreement was unprecedented
in Indonesian history. Unlike the final resolution of
the Darul Islam revolt in 1962, which was a personal
affair between Acehnese leader Daud Beureueh and
Indonesian military commander LtGen M Jasin, this was
an institutional agreement not dependent on
personalities. Its big weakness was that HDC was
unable to guarantee the security of its partners in
the peace process. For example when Tengku Al Kamal, a
member of the monitoring committee for security, was
killed by Indonesia in South Aceh on 30 March 2001,
HDC did not even do anything for his family. Yet he
had been killed while on duty as a partner with HDC.
The HDC negotiations of early 2000 did offer a new
alternative for the conflict, but after it was signed
HDC was no longer the engine of transformation.
Instead, the initiative passed to GAM and the Republic
of Indonesia. GAM took advantage of it to recruit new
fighters and to establish a new village structure in
areas it controlled. Indonesia meanwhile sent in even
more troops, who set up new posts and, under the cover
of providing humanitarian assistance, conducted
counter-insurgency intelligence operations in the
villages. Nor was HDC able to create a new common
understanding of the conflict, as its mission
statement indicates it wanted to do. HDC used none of
the abundant human rights information (which had
strong humanitarian relevance) to create a new
consensus. Instead, Jakarta dominated the media,
leaving HDC with no room to build on the agreement
that had been reached. That reduced the credibility of
HDC especially within Indonesia. Indeed, HDC's
influence declined sharply as one moved from the
international to the grassroots level. For example,
the agreement made provision for regular meetings
between GAM and TNI field commanders. And these did
take place. But GAM was suspicious that TNI would use
these meetings to capture senior commanders, so they
only sent second or third level commanders. When
Indonesia withdrew from the meetings, complaining that
GAM was not sending its top commander Abdullah
Syafi'ie, HDC again had nothing to say. This was
followed by the arrest of the entire GAM negotiating
team in Banda Aceh in July 2001. Of course HDC had no
troops to enforce any agreement, but it might have
been able to save its principles if it had brought in
other mediators with more clout such as US-AID.
Lessons
I thought 12 May was a moment of great hope. I felt
excited, but also anxious about attitudes on the two
sides - GAM stubborn as Acehnese generally are, and
Indonesia cunning and always ready to use violence.
Considering the generally negative Indonesian response
to the agreement, the enthusiasm with which countries
like Norway and the US greeted it was perhaps naive.
We can draw two lessons from the HDC process. The
first is that this cannot be resolved as a domestic
Indonesian problem. Within Southeast Asia it has a
negative impact on Malaysia and Singapore because of
the Acehnese refugees. And more globally the massive
American investment by Exxon is under threat of
insecurity. These concerns should lead to more
international involvement.
Second, the loss of HDC's credibility in Indonesian
eyes led to a spiral of violence. That is why I am
excited about the latest development, in which the
United States is supporting the HDC process with an
additional initiative known as the Four Wise Men. The
American idea, conceived before Megawati became
president, is that she can work together better with
the military and may be able to control them. One of
the four individuals will be an influential American,
one a Japanese (they buy a lot of gas from Aceh, but
are not keen to be involved), one from Yugoslavia who
is a friend of Megawati, and Surin Pitsuwan, former
Thai foreign minister who is Muslim. TNI think they
can resolve the Aceh issue alone. Shooting dead top
GAM commander Tgk Abdullah Syafi'ie on 22 January 2002
encouraged them. But GAM immediately appointed a
replacement, Muzakkir Manaf. They are well organised.
And the Acehnese now have two new martyrs - Abdullah
Syafi'i and his wife (who died with him). To them he
was a model of humanism, unpretentious, simple, and
devout. That he will become a legend is obvious even
from the Indonesian press reporting of his death,
which was positive about him and did not describe the
soldiers who shot him as heroes.

Otto Syamsuddin Ishak has published two books on Aceh.
The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
website is: www.hdcentre.org <HTTP://www.hdcentre.org>. |